

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

C. F. CLAY, MANAGER

LONDON : FETTER LANE, E.C. 4

BOMBAY
CALCUTTA } MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.
MADRAS }

TORONTO : J. M. DENT AND SONS, LTD.

NEW YORK : THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

TOKYO : MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING BROTHERHOOD AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

BY

SIR CHARLES WALSTON (WALDSTEIN),

M.A., Litt.D., Cambridge and Columbia Universities, etc.; Fellow of King's College and late Professor and Reader in the University of Cambridge and Director of the American Arch. School, Athens; Author of *Aristodemocracy*, etc., *Patriotism—National and International*, *Truth—an Essay in Moral Reconstruction*, etc.

SECOND EDITION

CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

1920

L'esprit des temps rejoint ce que la mer sépare;
Le titre de famille est écrit en tout lieu.
L'homme n'est plus Français, Anglais, Romain, Barbare
Il est concitoyen de l'empire de Dieu!
Les murs des nations s'écroulent en poussières,
Les langues de Babel retrouvent l'unité,
L'Evangile refait avec toutes ses pierres
Le temple de l'humanité!

Réjouissons-nous donc dans le jour qu'il nous prête;
L'aube des jours nouveaux fait poindre ses rayons,
Vous serez dans les temps, monts à la verte crête,
Un Sinaï de paix entre les nations!
Sous nos pas cadencés faisons sonner la terre,
Jetons nos gants de fer et donnons-nous la main,
C'est nous qui conduisons aux conquêtes du Père
Les colonnes du genre humain!

LAMARTINE.

Two verses from a Toast at a National Banquet of Gauls and Bretons
at Abergavenny, September 25, 1838.

First Edition 1919
Second Edition 1920

TO THE MEMORY OF MY FRIENDS

CHARLES ELIOT NORTON

AND

JOHN HAY

WHO, EACH IN HIS OWN WAY, INFLUENCED
AMERICAN LIFE IN HIS TIME,
BOTH OF THEM PERFECT AND REPRESENTATIVE TYPES
OF
THE AMERICAN GENTLEMAN

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

SINCE this book was first published in October of this year, the future of the League of Nations has been seriously jeopardised owing to the action of the United States Senate. I cannot believe that the people of the United States will consent to see their country go down to history as having been instrumental in wrecking this most momentous movement of modern history, after the glory—itsself unique in history—which is theirs of entering the Great War for a lofty moral cause, with no prospect of any material advantage accruing to themselves from victory. Nor can the League of Nations be made a party question on the old lines of party distinction in American politics. For I have sufficient evidence to show that in the Republican Administration of President Roosevelt, his Secretary of State, John Hay, was imbued with the ideals implied by the phrase "League of Nations" as he was also keenly alive to the fact that the people of the United States, whose political education in all that concerned domestic politics was second to none, greatly required education in foreign and international politics and of the full realisation of the States' direct duty to modify its policy in the interest of the wider civilisation of the world. Another member of that same cabinet, who subsequently became President of the United States, Mr Taft, has since then identified himself prominently with this great international movement. I must also recall the fact that, in the published letters which President Roosevelt wrote to Mr Oscar Strauss and to Major Putnam shortly before his death, he emphatically upheld the ideals of a League of Nations.

But the action of the United States Senate is not the only source of danger. The evil recrudescence of the older methods of diplomacy, as well as of the chauvinistic spirit of national jealousy and antagonism even among allies, which it is futile to hope can be radically eliminated from a generation of men bred and educated in the principles and in the atmosphere of narrow nationalism, has already blocked the way to a successful fulfilment of the decisions agreed upon by the Peace Conference. We need but point to the aggressive activities of Italy in her Adriatic Policy, and, during the last few days, to the acute controversy between the Foreign Offices of the United States and of Great Britain over the Persian Treaty of the latter Power; while a most significant and lurid light is thrown upon the attitude of a section of the French people towards the allied British Nation, towards whom there still exists an intense sentiment of friendship, regard and gratitude born of the common sacrifices of these terrible years of suffering. Either from stupendous stupidity or from more sinister motives, a section of people in France, at the very moment that I am writing, are effectually endeavouring to convince the French people that Great Britain is responsible for the decline in the exchange value of the franc*.

Most of us who have ever given any thought to the great international problems of the world, well knew long ago of the discordant and disruptive forces which would ever be active in barring the way to complete and lasting inter-

*—A striking light is thrown upon the wide diffusion and depth of penetration which such misleading propaganda effects by an apparently trivial experience which has just come to my notice. In the hotel in which I am staying, I am informed that, among the visitors' servants, the French maids are boycotting those of the English visitors because "the English are responsible for the fall of the franc."

national unity in the cause of peace and good will among men. We were always convinced that, only when Truth and Justice were endowed with the material means of physically prevailing amidst the clash of interests and prejudices, could such consummation be finally attained. But it is most important to realise at this stage that a unique condition of success has been attained in which it must be indubitably realised by all the nations that the successful establishment of something in the nature of a League of Nations depends upon the effective domination of Truth and Justice throughout the world.

It is thus no longer on the grounds of what the French call "*idéalogie*," on the grounds of moral sentiment and lofty humanitarian ideals, but on the clear and simple grounds of essential material interests common to all nations that the establishment of such an International body has become imperative. It is a question of self-preservation to *all* of us that something in the nature of the League of Nations MUST come. For let us ask the following straightforward questions of any average citizen in the civilised world: What will happen if the League of Nations utterly fails? Are not the conditions of disunion and antagonism in every part of the world more complicated and active at this moment than they were even before the Great War? Merely look at the geographical and ethnological map of the world as now designed by the Paris Conference. Is not every nation at present bound in the supreme duty of national self-defence to organise effectively its military forces and armaments? And, in view of the experience gained in this last war, with the direct application of modern science to warfare, what will be the position, not only of the combatants but of the non-combatants—their country

homes, their industrial centres and their great metropolises? Can the imagination of even the expert adequately picture the results of a future war with the inventive brains of the best intellects bent upon the production of the most destructive engines which human ingenuity has yet devised? And, finally, how can even the most affluent nations, who before the war were groaning under the insufferable financial burdens of armaments, provide for this still greater expenditure of treasure when every country is on the verge of bankruptcy and the concentration of all economic forces is required to pay off accumulated debts and to restore the depleted sources of industrial productivity after a great part of the surplus wealth of the world has been engulfed in absolute annihilation for the last five years? Surely to find a remedy for such devastating universal disease in the body politic of the world is not a question of Utopian or fantastic "*idéalogie*," but of absolute material necessity.

But how is this end to be attained? Now, since I re-stated and developed further my scheme for the Supernational Court backed by Power in September of 1918, I have loyally refrained from assuming in any form a negative attitude towards the great scheme of the League of Nations, which was then being advocated and discussed at the Paris Peace Conference. Not only that I realised all the complex difficulties with which those responsible for this greatest scheme of modern history had to contend; but because I was deeply convinced that the establishment of sectional differences and antagonisms among the upholders of a great movement to secure Peace, could but weaken the main cause and hamper those who were working for the ultimate object in their own way. I felt that, whatever might be the immediate outcome, the movement was in the right direction

and would of itself lead to the desired end. I thus refrained, as far as possible, from obtruding unduly a negative or critical attitude; though I was firmly convinced that, if a Supernational Court backed by Power, including gradual and organic disarmament, had been boldly adopted and presented to the Paris Peace Conference, whatever might have been the resultant compromise and modifications of such a scheme, it would not only have been nearer the ultimate goal of securing peace, but it would have also avoided much of the opposition which has since shown itself to be the greatest danger to the whole movement. But now, with the experience of the opposition in the United States Senate and with the appearance of other dissolvent elements on all sides, I do not hesitate to say, that the great object will never be attained unless the world has clearly put before it the one effective means of securing peace and economic recuperation—namely, by the establishment of a Supernational Court backed by a purely International Police Force. All the objections raised by the United States Senate would be met by such a body, which must never be confused with a Supernational State; while no State can ever maintain that it is not prepared to submit to one supreme, and still unpolitical, body—which is Justice. There can be no question of incursions into the sovereignty of any nation, as little as the power of the Supreme Court of the United States impairs its own sovereignty and that of each State. There can be no need for fearing a reversal of the Monroe Doctrine. There can be no objection on the ground of disproportionate representation of individual States or Empires. There will be no danger that any of the Powers within the League might refuse to mobilise its army against a State refusing to recognise the judicial

decision of the League, nor, should there be a joint international army, any single corps or regiment should refuse to fight against its own recalcitrant State. For this International Force—I must insist upon this point—will in no sense be national or consist of solid quotas from the different nations; but will be made up of a body of professional soldiers, sailors and air-men, who will naturally and freely choose this business in life, as the municipal police-force is drawn from every district of the nation, and, together with the judges who judicially direct their action, are in no way influenced by their local origin or relationships. And, finally, the maintenance at the common cost of such a Court and such a Police will distinctly not weigh heavily on the contributory nations, who, freed from the insufferable incubus of national armaments as well as from the peace-disturbing influence of the armament industry, will be able to concentrate on the great economic tasks before the world and to make good the catastrophic losses which the Great War has brought upon us.

C. W.

CIMIEZ, *December*, 1919.

PREFACE

SINCE the outbreak of the war, and more especially since the conclusion of the armistice, I have been advised to republish my book, *The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace*, which was first published in 1899 and has long since been out of print. It has been considered that that book throws some important light on the early conditions leading to the war, as well as on the momentous problems now before the world and approaching their final solution. The republication of that early work may also be justified, not only because it anticipates the foundation of a League of Nations, but because it looks to this consummation primarily through the intervention of the United States in the world's affairs, and, more especially, through the closer understanding and co-operation between the great English-speaking democracies. Furthermore, it may be maintained that some of the remarks on the foreign relations of the several European States and the position which the United States ought to take in the foreign affairs of the world, made at that time and under the conditions then prevailing, may be of some importance at the present juncture.

I should again¹ like to publish here two letters from personal friends whom I consider to have been at that time the most representative of the two broadly differing, if not opposed, conceptions of America's position in the foreign affairs of the world, John Hay and Charles Eliot Norton.

¹ Portions of these letters have already been republished in the Preface to the First American edition of my book *Aristocracy, etc.*

John Hay wrote from the Department of State, Washington, October 21st, 1899 (in the privately printed publication of the *Letters of John Hay*, 1908, p. 100, this letter is wrongly dated as 1897 instead of 1899).

DEAR WALDSTEIN,

Last night for the first time since your book (*The Expansion of Western Ideals*) arrived, I found a quiet hour to read it, and I must thank you most sincerely for a great pleasure. It is a charming treatise, handling a grave subject with an elevation and grace of style which make it as agreeable to read, as it is weighty and important in substance.

What can be the matter with poor dear S——, who set forth at C—— the other day with this preposterous program:

1. Surrender to Aguinaldo.
2. Make the other tribes surrender to him.
3. Fight any nation he quarrels with.

I think our good friends are wiser when they abuse us for what we do, than when they try to say what ought to be done.

I wish you would lend some of your wisdom to certain of our German friends who seem to think that peace with England means war with Germany.

We are brutally busy nowadays and there seems to be no hope of any improvement till next summer....

Yours faithfully

JOHN HAY.

Charles Eliot Norton wrote as follows (*Letters of Charles Eliot Norton*, 1913, II, p. 290):

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,

November 18th, 1899.

DEAR WALDSTEIN,

I have read your little volume on the *Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace* with great interest.

As you are aware, your position and my own differ widely on the fundamental question which underlies your essays. But I read with genuine sympathy your very able statement of your own views. I do not think that you do quite justice to the opinions of the men who regard the present policy of America as a misfortune. It is not that

we would hold America back from playing her full part in the world's affairs, but that we believe that her part could be better accomplished by close adherence to those high principles which are ideally embodied in her institutions,—by the establishment of her own democracy in such wise as to make it a symbol of noble self-government, and by exercising the influence of a great, unarmed, and peaceful power on the affairs and the moral temper of the world. We believe that America had something better to offer to mankind than those aims she is now pursuing, and we mourn her desertion of ideals which were not selfish nor limited in their application, but which are of universal worth and validity.

She has lost her unique position as a potential leader in the progress of civilization, and has taken up her place simply as one of the grasping and selfish nations of the present day. We all know how far she has fallen short in the past of exhibiting in her conduct a fidelity to those ideals which she professed, but some of us, at least, had not lost the hope that she would ultimately succeed in becoming more faithful to them.

There are many points in your two papers, which, were you here, I should be glad to talk over with you. But it is hardly worth while to write of them. Your presentation of the Imperialistic position has this great value at least, that it shows that men who hold it are cherishing ideals which, if they can be fulfilled, will make the course on which America has entered less disastrous than we who do not hold them now fear...

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES ELIOT NORTON.

As will be seen in the preface (see below, pp. 43 seq.) it consists of two parts. The first (The English-Speaking Brotherhood), an address, was delivered at the Imperial Institute, London, July 7th, 1898, and is placed in this book ahead of the essay written in America in 1899. My immediate purpose in delivering this address was not only to impress the necessity for a closer understanding and co-operation between the United States and Great Britain, but, above all, to counteract what I considered then and

would still consider the disastrous effects of any proposal for an "Anglo-Saxon Alliance." For such a phrase and the ideas it conveyed I suggested as a substitute the title of my lecture, "The English-Speaking Brotherhood." I felt at the time that the term alliance would naturally and rightly evoke the opposition of representative statesmen in America; and, above all, I was convinced that the term "Anglo-Saxon" would arouse the strenuous and justified opposition of all Americans not of direct English origin. More directly still I then felt that it would, for instance, throw those citizens of the United States of German origin into the arms of the disaffected Irish element and thus establish a powerful centre of antagonism in the United States against any closer understanding between the English-speaking nations of the world. Moreover, the fundamental fallacy and the evil consequences of that conception of nationality, based upon race instead of on political, moral and social factors, were one of the main evils against which I had been contending before and have been fighting ever since, and to which the first and new essay in the present book is specially devoted. The warnings I then gave have since proved only too well-founded. If these were my immediate aims in delivering the Imperial Institute address and in publishing the book twenty years ago, my more remote aims were, in the first instance to urge upon the citizens of the United States, who had hitherto stood in the very forefront of democratic nations in the political education of the people as regards domestic politics, to supplement their political education by the study and the understanding of foreign politics, of their own relations to other civilised countries and their duties to the civilised world as a whole. I maintained—and I believe rightly—that in this respect they

were far below even their own educational standards and I now venture to believe that this is so even in the present. I maintained, and I still maintain, that the people of the United States must take their place in the politics of the world and their share of the moral burden of carrying further afield into the darker regions the torch of civilisation, of liberty, and, above all, of justice. They are perhaps the one nation most fitted to counteract the evil influence of the older racial conception of nationality; and it is not a mere accident that, among so many statesmen of the democratic powers of the world, the President of the United States has been the foremost protagonist in the crusade against the older diplomacy with its heritage of internecine wars, and for the victory and secure establishment of the League of Nations, the only foundation for a lasting peace.

But, in the second instance, the ultimate aim of my efforts at that time and ever since has been, through the closer understanding and the co-operation of the two leading democratic nations of the world (who, moreover, are united by a common language, common laws, customs, ways of living and ideals of life, with so many traditions of the past in common), to obtain the adhesion of other democracies and that the League of Nations or, as I prefer to hope, the establishment of a Supernational Court backed by Power, will be carried to realisation.

Of course, the political conditions prevailing in Europe and in America at that time and the relations between the several Powers in 1898 and 1899 differed from what they subsequently were in the following years, especially after the Russo-Japanese War. The Russian autocracy with the fixed tradition and policy of its Foreign Office, which simply aimed at extension of power in every direction and could

use with perfect freedom all the nefarious ways of the older diplomacy, unhampered by democratic control and publicity, was in those days the chief disturber of the world's peace and stood in the way of all of the ideals for which I was then contending. But Germany had already begun its tortuous and all-pervading activities to secure world-power and, ultimately, world-domination. It did this then, of course, through the Triple Alliance, especially through Austria; but it did not hesitate at times to use and to co-operate with Russia (as in the case of the Turco-Greek War) in spite of the general clashing of interests between these two autocracies. More especially was Germany concerned with Russia at that time to prevent an understanding between the United States and Great Britain and the united front which would by such an understanding be called up against its aggressive militarism. The passage in John Hay's letter referring to this policy on the part of Germany is significant and is confirmed by the passages in my book *The Expansion of Western Ideals, etc.* (see below, pp. 62, 64, 65, 68, 71, 80).

With regard to the account given in these pages concerning the action of the Powers, especially Germany and Russia, there is one point which it may now be of interest to bring forward in view of subsequent events and especially the great war.

The far-seeing policy of the Wilhelmstrasse—most probably of the Kaiser himself who led it after the dismissal of Bismarck—identified the interests of Germany in the East with those of Austria, realising that sooner or later, if not by the ultimate absorption of Austria into the German Empire, then by a most effective political and commercial alliance between these two empires, their interests would be

identical. Now, in Austria's Eastern ambitions, the *Drang nach Osten* (the push towards the East), Salonika has ever been recognised as the most important point of transit and junction. It will readily be seen how—especially with the development of railways—the direct line of communication from Hamburg and Berlin through Austria to Salonika would be of supreme importance. Salonika, moreover, was again the point of junction from the North to the East and Constantinople, and from the West and South-west to the Adriatic and to the Piraeus. As a railway terminus, furthermore, with its splendid harbour, it was the vital point of communication by sea to all ports of Asia Minor and Egypt, in fact the whole of the East. We can therefore well understand why this harbour should not have been allowed to fall into the hands of the Greeks, who at that time, so far from showing any signs of subserviency to Austro-German interests, inclined more in their own interests and sympathies to Great Britain and the Western Powers. Of course, in subsequent years, with the concession for the construction of the Baghdad Railway to Germany, these interests and the consequent policy were more fully developed and defined.

Now, during the early stages of the Turco-Greek War in 1897 I was in constant, almost daily, communication—as a private friend—with the late King George of Greece. He was very emphatic and indignant at the brutal action of the Kaiser in opposing every attempt on the part of Greece either to save her face and to retire without loss of national interests or prestige from the Cretan imbroglio or, when war had been declared, successfully to carry it to a victorious issue. In those early days of the war King George, originally a sailor by profession, was most hopeful of the victorious activity of the Greek fleet, which, compared with that of

Turkey, was undoubtedly in a state of marked superiority. He even spoke to me of a plan, in the success of which he had great faith, of forcing the Dardanelles. Now, despite all the information he gave me in the many long conversations we had and which should have furnished ample opportunity for forming an opinion on the events of that war, there is one problem which has never been satisfactorily solved or explained: Why did the Greek fleet remain comparatively inactive when, by sailing into the harbour of Salonika and occupying that important strategic position, the communications of the Turkish army in Thessaly and Epirus could easily and effectively have been cut and the enemy been taken in flank and rear? The subsequent explanation that the Greek fleet was wanting in the necessary ammunition will not for a moment hold water. I may be justified in putting forth the hypothesis that, if not directly through the action of the Kaiser and the Austrian Foreign Office, then through the European Concert, which they well knew how to manipulate in their own interests, the Greek fleet was compelled to remain inactive.

As with Greece, so with Armenia. In 1887 it was probably Russian influence which neutralised the efforts of England, who with the support of Italy and the consent of Germany and Austria, was honestly striving to settle the Armenian question when the Venezuelan question intervened. In 1896 England had the strong support of America in preventing further Armenian massacres, when again the Venezuelan question opportunely arose and nearly led to war between England and America. The subsequent attitude of Germany as regards the Armenian question is clearly before us all. In the light of what has since happened we cannot be wrong in our surmise that many

of the essential objectives of German *Welt-politik* which led to the great war were already fully conceived in the minds of the Kaiser and his advisers towards the close of the last century. Sir Valentine Chirol, than whom there is no more competent student of German affairs, assures me that "he has it on the authority of one of Bismarck's most intimate confidants that one of the first serious differences between him and William II arose over the latter's visit to Constantinople the year after his accession and the far reaching schemes which he coupled with it." These schemes became more definitely formulated with his theatrical visit to Constantinople, Jerusalem and Damascus in 1898. Let us then hope that this whole system of aggression and grab is now a thing of the past, and that the establishment of a League of Nations with the active co-operation of the United States of America will put an end to all this antiquated spirit of conquest for purely selfish ends of national aggrandisement.

One of the greatest dangers to the peace of the world and an obstacle to the firm establishment of a League of Nations or a Supernational Court backed by Power, is to be found in the stereotyping of racial nationalities in envious rivalry and hatred as fully-developed neighbour-states, such as we are especially likely to have in the future in the South-east of Europe and in Asia Minor. With this question the first essay on Nationality and Hyphenism here deals. But beyond this danger there looms before us another broader corporate sub-division of civilised humanity which, as a logical consequence of the development of racial nationality, began to show itself in the first half of the 19th century and to present itself as a practical aim and ideal in the political life of Europe after the Congress of Vienna. Already in those early days Pan-Slavism and Pan-Hellenism

were fixed in the minds of thinkers and patriots as factors in practical politics. With the unification of Germany and the foundation of the German Empire, and its rapid growth in prosperity and power, Pan-Germanism naturally and logically arose before the eyes of ambitious German patriots, who, smarting in envious rivalry under the colonial expansion, the growth and world-supremacy of the British Empire, never rested until their aims and aspirations were fixed and formulated in the programme of the powerful Pan-German party, appealing to the racial Chauvinism of the whole people (even of those not members of such a party), and ultimately acting as the central force in producing the great war.

It is well for us to remember that signs were not wanting in the past that patriotic Englishmen and subjects of the British Empire in every one of its constituent parts were nurturing in their hearts, and endeavouring to formulate, the ideals of Anglo-Saxon supremacy for the whole world; and it was to a great extent to counteract the dangers arising out of such ambitious racial nationalism that, in 1899, I wrote the book which is here reprinted. Even during the war, when on the grounds of justice, humanity and liberty, we were all hoping for the entrance of the United States into the conflict, there were those in England who urged this just claim on the grounds of community of blood, descent and race. In a letter to *The Times* (August 28th, 1915) I felt moved to oppose such arguments and to point out the dangers which they implied at that early stage of the conflict. Even now I feel it right to strike a further note of warning. I was heartily gratified to find that my old friend, Major Putnam, in America and Mr J. Evelyn Wrench in England have given practical effect to

my own early hopes for an English-speaking Bretherhood in founding the English-speaking Union in America and in England. The choice of their designation emphatically shows that their Union is not based upon principles of racial nationality. So long as it clearly and solely implies, in the first place, the union of all free peoples who adhere to the English-speaking laws and traditions, moral, political and cultural, and, in the second place, as it is subordinated to the higher ultimate aim of a wider union and league of all free peoples, whatever their nationality and language, who stand for the peace of the world and the advancement of liberty and civilisation, there can be no danger to our true ideals in such a union—on the contrary it can but work for the good of humanity. But if it were to imply and to develop an antagonistic attitude towards all nations who do not use the English language, its influence would be wholly for the bad. In my book *Aristodemocracy, etc.* I emphasised the importance of an international language to facilitate and accelerate the union of all civilised peoples. In case no new language, such as Esperanto, was evolved and accepted, I advocated the adoption of Latin for reasons which seemed to me valid, highly advantageous, and not unpractical. Let us hope that the interests, rivalries and antagonisms among the civilised States may in the future never lead to a Latin Union to defend or to assert the common interests which for the time may marshal the Latin nations against the rest of the world.

There is, finally, another danger of the same order of spiritual and material interests against which it may not be untimely to raise a warning voice. During the Spanish-American War the then Foreign Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Count Goluchowski), for reasons which

must be patent to every student of politics, warned the European world against the prospective predominance of America, i.e. the United States, over Europe, and advocated a union of the European States to guard against such a danger. It may be a mere coincidence that another Austrian, of a very different, if not opposed, order of thought and political conviction, namely, the Pacifist, Dr Alfred H. Fried, in a recent article¹ advocates a *Zweckverband Europa* (European Interests Combine) as a set-off to the Pan-American Union. We may thus in the future be threatened with the contending forces of Pan-Americanism and Pan-Europeanism, and the clashing of these opposed world-interests will not be conducive to the peace of the world or the advancement of civilisation.

We must inevitably come to the conclusion, and declare our conviction, that no federation or confederation of States is justified and enduring, unless it is based upon moral principles of justice, liberty and progress for mankind and hence for every nation. We shall then find that on the essential grounds of material interests of practical and business advantage (as enumerated by Dr Fried and upon which I have also laid some stress)² these lasting moral principles of union are confirmed, are in fact urgently called for. We may go further and say that no corporate social grouping, even in business and in politics, can stand unless it can bear the ultimate test of moral principles and aims established by civilised society.

In fine I must admit, and it may be rightly urged, that

¹ *Problems of the International Settlement* (London, 1918) III—International co-operation as the foundation for an international administration of justice (pp. 14 seq.).

² *Aristodemocracy, etc.* pp. 153, 161.

all principles of social and political betterment to secure the peace of the world and the progress of civilisation which we can devise on political or on economic grounds, will not secure our great purpose unless we can change and mend the heart of man. Only then can peace be assured. We must first remove the all-pervading force of envy and jealousy, leading to hatred, and ending in strife. I have stated elsewhere¹ that few people can forgo the emotional luxury of hatred or at least of a 'pet aversion.' The passion of envy among individuals and nations cannot be totally eradicated; nor can the comparatively milder vice or weakness—kindred to envy and hatred—of vanity. I have endeavoured to show² how potent a factor was this national vanity in leading Germany into the war. Anyone daring to hope that he can totally eradicate these nefarious forces from the heart of individual man and the soul of nations would indeed be rash. But what we can do is, as far as possible, to remove the conditions favouring their growth and strengthen the forces arrayed against them. And we may hope, by insisting upon those universal and potent qualities of human nature which war against these evil instincts in man and beast—or rather in the beast in man—and by establishing and strengthening the conditions which make for the dominance of humanity and justice, to control and overcome, even extirpate, the powers of evil.

A few words more on the sub-divisions of this book:

(i) The lecture on *Nationality and Hyphenism* was given in the Arts School of the University of Cambridge on May 29th of this year. It was especially designed for our guests,

¹ *Aristodemocracy, etc.* p. 67; *Jewish Question, etc.* p. 12, 2nd ed.; *Patriotism, etc.* pp. 43 seq.

² *Aristodemocracy, etc.* p. 103; *Patriotism, etc.* pp. 36-41.

the American officers as well as the British Naval officers, who were for the time enrolled as students. With the exception of a few enlargements and references the lecture is here published as delivered.

(2, 3) The chief subject of this volume, in fact the actual reason for its publication, is the re-issue of my book *The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace*. I have referred above to the conditions under which it is here republished.

(4) The essay on *The Next War, Wilsonism and Anti-Wilsonism*, was published in the Autumn of 1918 before the signing of the Armistice. I wish to make it unequivocally clear that in writing and publishing it—especially in view of its second title—I in no way intended or desired to trench upon American party politics. I regarded President Wilson as the most prominent representative of those striving for the establishment of something in the nature of a League of Nations. I discerned at an early date that in Europe as well as in America there was definite opposition to this movement and it was this opposition that I desired to combat. I have expressed my opinion of President Wilson's attitude in the war in the preface to the second edition of *Aristodemocracy, etc.*, recently published.

As a matter of fact the question of a League of Nations cannot be made a party question either in Europe or America—at least not on the old lines of party demarcation as existing down to our day. It is important to remember that John Hay was chief of President Roosevelt's Cabinet at the time he wrote the letter here published and approved of the plan advocated in my book, while in many other ways he manifested the strongest sympathy with the plans for international organisation to secure peace. President

Taft, also at that time a member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet, has ever since been a single-minded and active supporter of some form of a League of Nations. The *Open Letter* to Mr Roosevelt which formed the preface to that essay, and is here reprinted, must now be read in the light of the letters which, before his death, that great American statesman addressed to the Hon. Oscar Strauss and to Major G. H. Putnam, in both of which his attitude towards a League of Nations was essentially modified from what the speech I refer to would have led the public to believe.

(5) Finally, the article on *A Supernational Jury and Police Force*, here reprinted from the *Nineteenth Century and After* of February, 1919, was one of three articles written in reply to Sir Herbert Stephen's article on *A League of Dreams* published in the previous month in that review. Sir Herbert Stephen replied to his critics in the March number of the same review.

I must again acknowledge the efficient help given me by my wife in the revision of both manuscript and proofs.

C. W.

NEWTON HALL, NEWTON,
CAMBRIDGE.

July 19, 1919.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. NATIONALITY AND HYPHENISM	I
II. THE EXPANSION OF WESTERN IDEALS AND THE WORLD'S PEACE	47
III. THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING BROTHER- HOOD	97
IV. THE NEXT WAR. WILSONISM AND ANTI-WILSONISM	139
V. LEAGUE OF DREAMS OR LEAGUE OF REALITIES?	209

I

NATIONALITY AND HYPHENISM

A LECTURE DELIVERED IN THE UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE, MAY 29, 1919

I

NATIONALITY AND HYPHENISM¹

In the Preface to my book *Aristodemocracy*², written at the beginning of the war, I made the following statement:

The war will, I venture to predict, prove to be the swan-song of the older conception of nationality; for it is the misconception of nationality which has in great part produced it. Ultimately a new conception of nationality and internationality will be ushered in, in which loyalty to the narrower relations will in no way prevent loyalty to the wider. It will be the Era of Patriotic Internationalism. Not so very many years ago, as human history goes, the Scotsman, for instance, could not have conceived it possible to have loyally upheld the interests of a great British Empire, even at the sacrifice of Scottish local or personal interests, as he is now prepared to do. The same, I believe, will be true as regards the wider international unit of the future in its relation to the nations of to-day.

Let me at once clear the way and remove all possible misunderstandings as to what I meant then and mean now by these terms:

By the older conception of Nationality, which I hope will now be modified and superseded, I do not mean loyalty and self-suppression to the State, to our country, our laws,

¹ A Lecture delivered in the Arts Schools of the University of Cambridge on May 29, 1919, and especially addressed to the United States Army Officers and the British Navy Officers at the time students of the University.

² *Aristodemocracy, From the Great War back to Moses, Christ and Plato*, London, John Murray, 1916 and 1918, New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1916 and 1919.

institutions and customs, all of which give individual character and distinctiveness to the British people. Our action in attempting to modify the conception of this term in no way implies a weakening of our sense of duty as citizens, including also our duty to fight in the defence of our country; and, if the religious convictions, which we held before the outbreak of war and which were admitted and recognised by the State, forbade us from taking life, it still includes our duty to serve our country and even to sacrifice our lives in saving the lives of our fighting fellow-citizens or in mitigating the sufferings of those who are fighting for the self-preservation of the nation. Our conception of nationality encourages the love of our country and its people—in one word, our Patriotism. More than this, I hope to show you how, with the removal of the old conception of the term Nationality, this Patriotism and all that it implies will be intensified and made more secure and lasting, because it will rest on a moral, and not on an accidental, groundwork. While it is thus conceived as favouring and encouraging patriotism, it actually means the disfavouring and the extinction of what is called *Chauvinism*, which the current misconception of Nationalism has, if not produced, at all events favoured in its rapid growth, destructive of all peace and good-will among men. Now, Patriotism means love of one's own country and its people; while *Chauvinism* means hatred of other countries and other people. Patriotism is a positive quality of the soul and arises out of love, generosity and admiration. Chauvinism is a negative quality and springs from hatred, envy and vanity.

The conception of Nationality, from which true patriotism emerges, is based upon rational, moral and intellectual grounds, which are not a matter of accident. It must

necessarily appeal to our intelligence, our spirituality, our sense of justice and charity, our unselfishness and devotion to a great idea, which we can and which, at all events, we ought to have in common. But Chauvinism rests upon that conception of nationality which is accidental, which bases corporateness and social groups on the accidents of birth, inherited sectarian differences in religion, class or locality, in each of which the citizens of even the smallest States differ individually from one another and are frequently, if not always, opposed to one another in their interests, tastes, and aspirations. So far from leading to cohesion, Chauvinism encourages disunion, and, when causes for dissension arouse wounded vanity, culminating in envy, passion supervenes leading to hatred and conflict among the citizens of each State.

Through the individual, such a false conception of Nationality has the same influence upon the international relations of the communities and States to one another. But let me here at once remove a further misunderstanding, the realisation of which is of the utmost importance. It concerns our conception of the term International, upon which I shall have more to say as we proceed.

In using the term international I in no way mean the Marxian conception of Internationalism, which aims at uniting all people in the world, not only against the State, as the upholder of the present order of civilised society, but also the so-called labouring classes within each State against the other classes, aiming at the final domination of that particular class, self-styled the *proletariat*. Furthermore, in this conception of class-warfare the scale of moral and intellectual values, on which our present ethics and our future ideals of progress are based, is denied and opposed. We

have quite recently had the tragic attempt at realising such ideals in the conception of internationalism in the unspeakably and grotesquely disastrous rule of the Russian Bolsheviks.

Nor does our conception of Internationality in any way coincide with that of those people for whom our late lamented friend, Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, invented the term *Gosmobolidan*—the type he met especially in some parts of the Near East, who professed no adhesion nor fealty to any State or country; who, neither in their principles nor in their occupations, recognised or lived up to any duties to the State in which they were born and of which they were nominally citizens; but who flippantly and with gross ignorance adopted and used the shibboleths of humanitarian internationality without understanding its true meaning and import and without realising that the schooling through which we reach or approach the higher ultimate ideals of humanity as a whole, runs through the humble teaching and discipline of unselfishness and sacrifice in the performance of the duties that lie immediately before us in the family, the community in which we live, and the country of which we are citizens.

Our conceptions of Internationality and of Nationality have nothing to do with such people.

Let me at once anticipate and say to you in simple words that, at least as regards the civilised and democratic states of the West, to which practically all of us here belong, Nationality means the corporate unity of the free citizens of a State, whether single and self-contained, or united into a wider whole as a confederation, a federation or an empire, on the grounds of political, legal, social, moral and intellectual unity of the people of such States and their common ideals.

Internationality for us thus means the relationship, tending towards closer union and organisation, of these several States as units, while retaining their complete independence and "sovereignty," on the ground of the positive moral agreement between them all, however different the separate manifestations in the character of each one may be. These physical and moral properties, towards which they all strive, are moreover directly furthered in their common interest for the good of humanity as a whole.

But I am sorry to say that many people, and even many serious and thoughtful writers on political and social problems, do not agree with such definitions of nationality and internationality as I have here suggested. On the contrary, we shall see that the term Nationality has been, and is, used with very different meanings. You will find, the more you study the voluminous literature of writers on this subject, not only that they differ among each other, but also that the several significations in which they have each applied and still apply this term, have been used for them to uphold the most varied opinions on important matters of State in practical politics and in diplomacy, even at one and the same time to justify one course or its direct opposite, and finally you will realise that the term is so fluctuating, composed of so many discordant elements in meaning and in fact, that it becomes useless to the serious searcher after truth and that we almost feel inclined to expunge it from our modern vocabulary¹.

Before giving you a glimpse into the tortuous web and labyrinth of this term and the history of its influence in modern politics (and I cannot give more than a glimpse in

¹ Cf. in support of this contention, Johannet, *Le Principe des Nationalités*, pp. xxi and xxxi seq.

this single lecture) I wish, however, to clear away one definite view which to my mind has been, and is, misleading. It is the conception that Nationality in no way depends for its meaning upon the idea of the State, that it is not a truly political conception. This view is upheld by many serious and distinguished writers. Quite recently it formed an essential part in the reasoning of an ingenious and scholarly writer, Mr Alfred E. Zimmern, in his book *Nationality and Government*. Now I maintain that the connotation of the term Nationality, including all its denotations, in whatever sense we may apply it to peoples, groups of people, or individuals, must always imply some relation to a State, to whatever rudimentary or embryonic form the political bodies of the remote past may have attained. The conception of a State may, it is true, only have existed in the past, nay in the remote past, or in the future, as an ultimate aim or ideal; but the tangible corporate cohesion of the groups of people claiming nationality must look backward or forward to such a social or political organisation which is called a State¹.

It will perhaps also assist in the clearer understanding of this treatment of the problem before us if I again anticipate, what will receive fuller exposition as we proceed,

¹ As to the very complicated question concerning the position of the Jews in their dispersion through all civilised States of the East and West, I must refer the reader to my book *The Jewish Question and the Mission of the Jews*, published many years ago, and to my recent article on "Is a Jewish State desirable?" in the *Menorah Journal*, New York, Feb. 1919. That a common racial origin, including even a common and distinctive language, is not enough to produce a nation becomes quite clear when we consider the case of the gypsies. Though they possess both a language of their own and a comparatively pure and exclusive racial origin, I doubt whether anybody would apply to them collectively the term *Nation*.

and at once insist upon the difference between our use of the term "Nationality" in the Western democratic States and the term "racial or historical origin." When, while travelling in foreign countries, any citizen of one of these States is asked to register his name by the administrative or police authorities and to reply to the question concerning his nationality, no citizen of the British Empire, of the United States of America, of France, Italy, and even of Germany (in spite of what will shortly be said below concerning the distinctive meaning given in German to Nation and People), would think of recording his racial or historical origin in lieu of the citizenship of the country or State of which he is a citizen. Race, religion, or historical origin will never constitute in the minds of these people their nationality. Whatever race or country the immediate or remote ancestors of any citizen of the United States may have sprung from, and even if, as a naturalised citizen, he himself may have been born in a foreign country, not only would he never hesitate thus correctly to declare his American nationality; but, if he did give the country or race from which his family or he had sprung in lieu of his adopted one, his statement would be incorrect, misleading—in fact a direct untruth. The same would apply to any Englishman of Huguenot, or more recent French, Flemish, Dutch, and even German origin, as also to those Germans of French, or Frenchmen of German, origin. As regards the ordinary usage of language and the unequivocal ideas which they convey, Mr A. E. Zimmern and those who agree with him are decidedly mistaken in fact if they give any other definition to nationality and use it in lieu of origin or ancestry, racial or historical. In the same way Mr Zimmern cannot be right in endeavouring to convey the true meaning of "international" and "internationality" by

reminding the English reader of the use of that term when speaking of an International football-player. In such a case the term is used in a quasi-figurative sense in order to indicate the widest corporate body in contradistinction to the narrower local bodies (village, town or county clubs as opposed to English, Scotch, Welsh or Irish clubs). The more the different Nations (and I can find no other word to indicate the French, German, Belgian, American, etc. units) organise and develop football teams to play regularly against ours, the sooner will the term "international" in this sporting connection be restored to its correct meaning and will no longer incorrectly be applied to these minor sub-divisions within the United Kingdom or the British Empire. Surely he must admit that in common parlance and in common sense the term International in the English language and in all European languages, in contradistinction to National, indicates, as do the terms international and municipal law, the relationship between the inhabitants of the several States of the modern world. Nevertheless, even the various authors who have made the most accurate and searching study of the problem of Nationality, will confuse the different meanings of the term, with the result that some of their conclusions and inferences are materially affected by such vacillation of meaning with far-reaching consequences to momentous conclusions in matters of State, as well as national and international life. Even Lord Acton, in that very suggestive and illuminating study on Nationality¹, appears to me not always to bear this essential distinction clearly in mind. Thus he condemns "the theory of nationality" as "a retrograde step in history" (p. 298); and again when he says:

¹ *The History of Freedom and Other Essays*, pp. 270-300.

But nationality does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the State. Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind. There is no principle of change, no phase of political speculation conceivable, more comprehensive, more subversive, or more arbitrary than this... Although, therefore, the theory of nationality is more absurd and more criminal than the theory of socialism, it has an important mission in the world, and marks the final conflict, and therefore the end, of two forces which are the worst enemies of civil freedom—the absolute monarchy and the revolution (pp. 299–300).

In these statements he seems clearly to realise the proper meaning of nationality in modern life. But in other passages, especially when he appears to plead for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, he seems to me to have in mind the racial or German conception of nationality, which he himself elsewhere considers to be the outcome of merely accidental and physical causes instead of the reasonable and moral idea of nationality as an elective principle leading to liberty and to political progress.

I must further anticipate here and ask the reader to cast out of his mind and ignore for the moment the problem of the oppressed nationalities of the East. He will then come to the conclusion that nationalities in the case of democracies, and especially the Western nationalities as represented by the present Allies (Great Britain, France, the United States, and Italy), each of whom have one national language, a solidarity in their laws, customs and morals, are essentially different in their conception of nationality from the Balkan States, Turkey, and the Austrian and Russian Empires. In these Western democracies the elective, and not the physical,

principle of nationality must predominate, however much as a matter of historical continuity, piety and sentiment, other elements, the outcome of race, country, common historical past, may intensify and give an organic life—a tangible soul—to the unity of moral conditions in a true nation. But all corporate activities arising out of social and business organisations, including also religious congregations, must be given full freedom, provided always they conform to the constitution and laws of the country and do not contravene their form and spirit. Such smaller bodies and groupings within the State, and the members belonging to them, must never be subject to repression or persecution. Now, though the conditions of Eastern Europe have for the time enforced upon the Western Allies, in redeeming their pledges to secure freedom and autonomy for the suppressed nations, the Eastern conception of nationality in dealing with them, and though they are thus bound to consider as essential conditions to such freedom and autonomy, racial, geographical (regional), as well as religious principles of nationality, they must, when once the arduous, almost impossible, task of defining and fixing these newly-constituted and free States on a just basis has been fulfilled, return to our conception of elective nationality. We may even hope for these newly-formed States that, when once their own freedom is established and they are secure from repression or persecution on the grounds of their racial origin or religious professions, the narrower conception of nationality which has prevailed among them, and has produced violent antagonism and hatred between them, will die away and be abandoned and make way for the full establishment of our own conception of nationality with the consequent political and social attitude of mind towards all the inhabitants within

their newly-formed State and even towards the citizens of the neighbouring States and of the wider world.

Now, when we endeavour to fix the definition of the words Nation and Nationality, as well as the ideas they convey to us, it is of little or of no use to consider their etymology¹ from the Latin *Natio*, or birth, in which the common descent would no doubt be an essential element in the composition of the term. But even in Latin, in the use made of it by Cicero², it sometimes does convey the larger grouping of people independently of birth. Nor will it help us much, for the purpose we are pursuing, to study the historical development of the terms Nation and Nationality and the political ideas they conveyed in the history of bygone ages. For such studies I may refer you to the very interesting account given by Johannet of the development of the principle of Nationality in France and elsewhere in the Second Book of his interesting and comprehensive work *Le Principe des Nationalités*³. In a smaller compass and from a narrower point of view you will find an interesting discussion of these historical problems in Lord Acton's essay on that subject, published first in 1862 and since incorporated in his more recent work on *The History of Freedom and Other Essays* published in 1909. I may also single out the thoughtful and suggestive discourse of Renan "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" published in his *Discours et Conférences* in 1887.

It is important and instructive for us to realise that in

¹ We might as well use the etymology of *State* from *Status* (manner of standing, attitude, position, etc.) to define the modern conception of the political body called State.

² *Mur.* 69.

³ I would also refer the reader to the exhaustive literature, especially of French writers, on the whole subject of Nationality to be found in that work.

modern times the meaning of the term Nation, as distinguished from that of People or Peoples, differs in Germany and in Eastern Europe from its use in England and the West. Bluntschli in his *Staats-Recht* and in his *Staats-Wörterbuch*¹, referring in general to the fluctuating meaning of these terms everywhere, draws attention to the difference between the use in France and England of the word *Nation*, where in Germany the expression *Volk* (People) would be applied; while *Peuples* and *People* would be used by us where the Germans would speak of *Nation*. The Germans would thus consider Nation a natural product or one indicative of the general *Kultur* of the people, while the *Volk* (People) would have a political signification. However, I could cite many instances from writers in Germany and Eastern Europe, as well as in England and in France, where these terms are used indifferently with the one or the other meaning. In France the current definition would be that of *Littré* in which "the principle of nationality is the principle according to which the parts of the human races tend to constitute themselves into a single political body"; while the dictionary of the French Academy, with equal brevity and clearness, defines the nation as "the totality of persons born or naturalised in one land and living under the same Government." But a more specific meaning in various directions has been given to the term from the second half of the eighteenth century to our own days, directly influenced by the peculiar history of those times. We cannot here dwell upon the interesting light thrown upon these ideas by the theories of Rousseau, Burke, the leaders of the French Revolution, by the writings of Mme de Staël, by the political aims and pronouncements of Napoleon, by the predominant

activity of Metternich in the Congress of Vienna, and by the traditional attitude (rightly traditional ever since those days) of England, represented chiefly by Canning and his successors.

It must suffice for our purpose to point to the fact that the idea of Nationality as a determining political factor in modern times dates from the dismemberment of Poland¹, as well as the partial dismemberment of Italy², when, especially through Mazzini, it received its most definite formulation and has since become a powerful factor in the formation of States internally and externally, with which diplomacy has juggled ever since, and with which it is even juggling at this moment to the detriment of peace and prosperity throughout every country of Europe.

In a characteristic passage, in which Mazzini develops his *Giovine Italia* into a *Giovine Europa* (thereby already in 1847 recommending the foundation of an International League of Nations), he said "The people is penetrated with only one idea, that of unity and nationality... There is no international question as to forms of government, but only a national question." But it will readily be seen (and is most instructive for us during the present critical period of the world's history), and we must realise at the same time to what such an exaggeration of the national principle inevitably leads, when we find that even in those early days after the Congress of Vienna we first hear of *Pan-Slavism* and *Pan-Hellenism*, the natural and logical sequel to every form of national imperialism. It is also essential to the right

¹ According to Stubbs (*Med. and Mod. History*, p. 236) "the partition of Poland was the event that forced the idea of nationality upon the world." See also Acton, *o.c.* p. 275.

² See Acton, pp. 284 seq.

understanding of our subject that we should realise—and we may almost lay this down as an axiom—that “Nationality,” as it was then, became dominant (and has been dominant with the specific nationalists ever since), only arises in this aggressive form, as it did with the Poles and in Italy, when any political body or State possessed of independence and sovereignty is dismembered and its freedom-loving citizens are driven into exile, or when one social group, distinct by origin, customs and traditions, within a given State is oppressed and persecuted. It is such dismemberment or persecution which produces the aggressive form of nationalism.

What exactly were, and are, the component elements in this complex idea of nationality? They are numerous, confusing, and often conflicting¹. The elements which are thus supposed to unite people into a definite corporate body, possessing a nationality of their own, are: first, a common race or origin; second, a common country; third, a common language; and, fourth, a common religion; to which have also been added a common dynasty, even the possession of great men in common (concerning the uniting power of which Bagehot has written an interesting essay in his *Physics and Politics*); common laws and customs—nay, generally a common expression of higher civilisation.

¹ Bagehot (*Physics and Politics*, p. 20) well expresses the apparent simplicity and actual complexity of the term Nation when he says: “Again, the primitive man could not have imagined what we mean by a nation. We, on the other hand, cannot imagine those to whom it is a difficulty; we know what it is when you do not ask us; but we cannot very clearly explain or define it. But so much as this is plain, a nation means a *like* body of men, because of that likeness capable of acting together, and because of that likeness inclined to obey similar rules; and even this Homer’s *Cyclops*—used only to sparse human beings—could not have conceived.”

Now it has been shown, with regard to most of these essential points, by many writers (notably by Johannet) that not one of the great civilised States of Europe (not to speak of America) possesses all these essential characteristics in the creation of any national unity among its citizens. Germany, in which the racial conception of the Nation, both in the theoretical as well as in the practical principles of the State and of the empire, is predominant, is a singularly composite body within its constituent States as regards racial origin, quite apart from the convulsive changes of history from the Middle Ages onwards. The racial difference between the North Germans, especially the Prussians, and the South Germans is not only marked but has led to bloody warfare.

It may be enlightening if I tell you that, when as a boy I passed through Germany on my first visit to that country in 1867, immediately after the Prusso-Austrian War, I can still vividly recall the intense hatred of people in Hanover, Frankfort and Munich against the Prussians and their German allies—a hatred perhaps as intense as that now felt by the Germans against each one of their allied enemies. That antagonism lasted for many years and the hatred of those days may not be wholly spent at the present time.

But even the Prussians, who are distinctly un-Germanic, are a mixture of Borussi, of Poles, of Teutons, of Celts, of Serbs, and of Obotrites. At one time in the army of Frederick the Great there were 20,000 Frenchmen, most of whom eventually settled in Prussia and are now good Germans. I cannot refrain in this connection from pointing out the fact, which ironically speaks volumes in regard to the political capital which is made out of the unity of national descent, that, among many other men of great distinction in Prussian

and German history who were and are of French descent, the Prussian Minister of War less than twenty years ago was named Verdy Duvernois, at the time when the Minister of War in France was Zurlinden; while in the first great push towards Amiens in the Spring of 1918 the most prominent figure among the German generals was von Hutier (of quite recently French origin), at the time when the Chief-of-Staff of Marshal Foch was General Weygand. Remember too that some of Napoleon's most prominent and successful generals (Marshals Ney, Kleber, etc.) were Alsatians of German race. It may also be as well to point out at this juncture that among the political founders of the United States of America were some of German name and origin, while, in the reports we received here of the glorious advance of the American Army about Château Thierry, one regiment which especially distinguished itself consisted of forty-two per cent. of Americans of immediate German origin and name.

As to unity of race, the same applies to Italy with its stupendous racial mixtures, to England with its aborigines, Britons, Picts and Scots, Celts and Saxons, Danes and Normans, and its accretion of Huguenots, Flemings and Dutch; while in France, Proudhon distinguishes twelve "nationalities." No, the question of racial unity as the basis of nationality is a mere figment.

Next we come to Country, which has played, and always will play, such an important part.

The stirring verses of Sir Walter Scott's appeal to all who love their home and the political and social atmosphere in which we live from childhood upwards; but the land, the country itself, is the tangible centre of all these associations:

Breathes there a man with soul so dead,
Who never to himself hath said,

This is my own, my native land!
Whose heart hath ne'er within him burned,
As home his footsteps he hath turned
From wandering on a foreign strand!
If such there be, go, mark him well;
For him no Minstrel raptures swell;
High though his titles, proud his name,
Boundless his wealth as wish can claim;
Despite those titles, power and pelf,
The wretch, concentred all in self,
Living, shall forfeit fair renown,
And doubly dying, shall go down
To the vile dust, from whence he sprung,
Unwept, unhonoured and unsung.

There can be no doubt that the country, especially the country of our youth, of our school-days—provided always that the experiences of our youth may not have been unhappy within such surroundings—go far and deep down to establish the sense of nationality and the passion of patriotism within us. But even a common country is not exclusively essential to the establishment of nationality. If other proof were required, the experience of this great war has shown that the inhabitants of the most diverse countries, remote from one another, have not lost their sense of true and passionate nationality and patriotism as regards the British Empire in whatever country they may have been born. To what lengths of separatism, leading to the disruption of practically all the existing modern States and nations, the consideration of our actual country as the essential basis for nationality may lead us, is brought home by the advocacy of M. Flach¹ of what he called "Regional" nationality during the Third Congress of Nationalities at Lausanne in June,

¹ Quoted by Johannet, *o.c.* pp. xxi-xxii. •

1916. He claimed "Regional Nationality" in France for Bretons, Corsicans, French-Flemings, Basques, Provençaux, and the inhabitants of Savoy and of Montbéliard. The citizens of other great countries in Europe and of America must all know the readiness with which geographical subdivisions (North, South, East and West, as well as the Middle District) are established, if not as separate countries, at all events as a basis for asserting a quasi-national separateness within the nation and State as a whole. In England the "county" feeling might in this respect in some instances almost be considered of the same strength and intensity as are those feelings based upon the difference of nationality. Everyone familiar with village life will probably be able to record instances in which the inhabitants of one village consider those of a neighbouring village as "foreigners" and treat the new-comer who settles among them as such, even though they themselves may not have dwelt there more than one generation. These incidents, which often have serious consequences in the social and political life of a community, show to what absurd conclusions we are logically driven when the actual land is made the essential condition of nationality.

The next essential constituent element in Nationality is a common language. I have always felt the strength of its claim. In fact I felt it so strongly over twenty years ago that, when during the Spanish-American War I delivered, and subsequently published, an address on the English-speaking Brotherhood at the Imperial Institute in London, with a view to uniting more closely the two great peoples of Great Britain and the United States, I gave to this address the title "The English-Speaking Brotherhood" in order especially to counteract the dangerous effects produced by

those who spoke of an Anglo-Saxon Alliance and thereby laid stress upon the racial elements as a uniting power. I pointed out then that one of the immediate effects of encouraging a *rapprochement* or union of those of Anglo-Saxon descent would inevitably lead to a fatal and severing movement in the United States. I maintained that it would tend to throw all those citizens of the United States who were not immediately of Anglo-Saxon race or origin into direct opposition to a closer union between the two great nations. More definitely still it would result in throwing those of German descent, by opposition to such racial English pretensions, into the arms of the disaffected Irish element. My words have proved prophetic. I am also happy to find that at the present day my friend, the veteran Major Putnam in America, and Mr J. Evelyn Wrench in England, have accepted my suggestion of over twenty years ago, and have founded in both countries the English-Speaking Union on the solid ground of this linguistic union of our common civilisation. The result of such an association can only be good. But I may be allowed to give a timely warning in the direction of moderation as regards our final objects, against allowing such a movement to create and to diffuse widely the aims of what might be called Pan-Anglicanism, corresponding to the nefarious and destructive influence of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism in the immediate past. There can be no doubt that, in as much as language is the chief vehicle of thought, it carries with it, for social and political groupings of men, the spiritual characteristics, aims and ideals, of laws, morals, customs and aspirations which are truly and effectively uniting elements in human society. Nevertheless, language is not an essential and exclusive factor in the composition of modern nationality; for, in countries like Switzer-

land, Belgium and Canada, which socially, as well as politically, present us with united and distinctive nationalities, we have elements and groupings speaking at least two different languages.

Nor does a common religion form the essential factor in the production of nationality, to whatever internecine wars in the past sectarian differences may have led. None of the great Nations, States and Empires of the civilised world is made up of the adherents of only one religious faith. The variety of thought and the development of toleration in men's hearts, springing from the diversity in sectarian beliefs, can only lead to the advancement of intellectual and moral aspirations and to the ultimate furtherance of religious sentiment in the aggregate.

The same applies *a fortiori* to the other elements I have adduced as being supposed to be essential to the conception of Nationality. As regards these elements: all modern civilised States are composite and, as Lord Acton has pointed out, it is good that they should be so—the fusion of races and tradition gives vitality and growth to every nation.

True unity in nationality is to be found in the political unity of each State and Empire, and this political unity is based upon the maintenance of the political constitution of each free country, its laws, its customs. The natural factor, such as racial origin; a common country; the historical evolution of a country, a society, a State; the common past which it creates; the language which has been evolved—all these may be, and generally are, contributory to this great moral union. They support and intensify this union *so long as they do not each assert themselves with exclusiveness, leading to the persecution of minorities.*

Each nation has risen out of, has begun its corporate existence with, its physical conditions: its aboriginal ethnical basis and the subsequent ethnical struggles and changes; the soil and climate; the configuration of that soil,—plain or mountain, river-beds or sea-shore; primitive occupations determined by climate and soil, whether nomadic or agricultural, hunting or sea-faring; comparative wealth or poverty of the inhabitants; language and rudimentary forms of religion evolved—all these are no doubt basic factors in the differentiation of nationalities. But there are many other co-efficients, contributory to the physical and social factors which have gone to the making of every nationality, to be found in the civilised world of the West. These may not be so manifest as are the broadly physical elements, but they have been none the less efficient in the making of every Western civilised nation. To indicate but a few of these, we must begin with the influence of the Roman Empire before, and even after, its decline, when it spread its civilisation throughout the whole of Western Europe. Then followed the varied tangle of ethnical, social and political influences during the migration of the peoples, to be followed again by the introduction and diffusion of Christianity, of what might broadly be called Hebraism, as contained, above all, in the spirit and ethics of the Old and New Testaments and their teaching; and this is succeeded by the Italian Renaissance, the reformation and the spread of humanism—the spirit continuously carried into the actual life of Western nations since the Italian Renaissance through the humanists down to our own days. Thus the Hellenic spirit, indirectly diffused in an attenuated form through the Roman Empire, was in later days fused with the spirit of Hebraism and both together produced the main current of our civilisation. We

may then single out the French Revolution and what it meant for the political life of all Western nations. To these formative forces must be added, not only discoveries and inventions which thinkers and men of action gave to the world, modifying the mental horizon as well as the daily life of every class of dwellers in Western lands, as it shifted the relations between these classes themselves; nor must we pass over the great law-givers, from Khammurabi and Moses, Solon and Lycurgus, the philosophers and moralists of ancient Greece and Rome, those among the Schoolmen, like St Thomas Aquinas, down to Rousseau and the political teachers of modern times, their teaching made directly effective in the framing of constitutions such as that of the United States of America; the national heroes, of action and of thought, the poets and artists who stamp the mentality of each age and of each nation and act as models and beacon lights to the peoples who worship their example and their memory; and, finally, the intensely efficient influence of national occupations, of industry and commerce, of wealth or poverty, which affect the personality of the wealthy leader or the humble toiler. Every nation and, through its national, political and social life, all citizens have been subjected to these influences which become transformed and varied according to the social and political soil in which they grow.

Now, *all* these currents of influence are fused into unity. To attempt to dissolve this unity into its component parts and to isolate one element or one group of influences destroys the very essence of nationality as a factor in practical politics. Almost every chemical body in practical chemistry is composed of several elements. To dissolve any one of them into its components and to isolate these destroys the chemical

body itself. Still more is this the case with organic bodies, with organisms, and, with things of the mind and spirit. However complex a nation may be, it is the unity of its component elements which makes it a nation—the unity which produces, what Renan has called, *L'âme d'une nation*.

This soul of the nation gives distinctive individuality to each one of the several States and nations in the civilised modern world. There can be no doubt of this marked distinctiveness in the *truly* national character of the various States and countries of the Western world, though they may each be made up of several distinct races, and even when two States or countries in the main spring from the same racial and historical stock. I need hardly remind this audience consisting of British subjects and citizens of the United States that, whatever intimate relationship and harmony there be between our fundamental moral, legal and political principles and habits of mind, we each have our own individuality, even in the pronunciation and use of our identical mother tongue; and no neutral observer with discrimination would fail to detect our separate nationalities. Merely cross the Channel or the North Sea from England, whether to France, Belgium or Holland, to Italy or to Spain, to Germany or to Austria, not to mention the States of the East of Europe, and, with the first step you take on foreign shores, you will find that in looks, in dress and in the manners of these several peoples—quite apart from the difference of language—the cut of their clothes and caps and boots, their gestures and mode of accost—they differ not only from similar types in England, but amongst each other. Look at the distinctive physiognomy, of Paris and Berlin, even of Brussels and The Hague—though racially and historically the inhabitants may in great part have been related, sprung

from similar races and influenced by the same historical movements—and you will be forced to recognise the striking differences between contiguous, and in some respects cognate, nationalities. I need not elaborate this point. Whoever has travelled abroad will be convinced of the radical national differences firmly established between the several States.

Now, we must tolerate such differences, we must even appreciate and, in many respects, admire them; but we must not encourage them to such a degree that difference creates antagonism.

I have elsewhere¹ quoted in illustration of such childish, and far from uncommon, provinciality and intolerance, the story of the British sailor who wreaked serious physical violence upon a Spaniard because he “could not stand a man who called a hat a sombrero,” as well as the—let us hope—more exceptional instance of crass provincialism on the part of a member of a more highly cultured class of Englishman who ended his unfavourable criticism of Americans with the exclamation, “What are you to do with people who call a biscuit a cracker?” Lowell has long since remonstrated against such provincial intolerance and ignorance in his essay on *A Certain Condescension in Foreigners*, when he argued, and successfully showed, that a first-rate American is not a second-rate Englishman. On the other hand, it is well for Americans to remember that the English “accent” of educated Englishmen is likely to be expressive of the natural evolution of the English language and that there is some hope for salvation in a country in which the “check system” in railways, the profusion of bath-rooms and the improvement of elevators have not all

¹ *Patriotism, etc.* pp. 53 and 54.

kept pace with the higher standards of the United States. Though I should personally greet—especially on a day like this—the presence of soda-water fountains in every part of London, as well as in our provincial towns, their absence is not a mark of moral or intellectual inferiority. There is a more serious and more far-reaching side to the unsympathetic dwelling upon such differences of national customs and institutions and of the want of self-detachment in those who make them the basis of national dislike or antagonism. I found, for instance, the other day that an American private soldier among us, a man of university education, was in a state of great excitement and resentment because, at a railway booking-office, he was not allowed to purchase a first-class ticket and was informed that, as a private, he was debarred from travelling in such a carriage. It is not impossible that this man may no longer be a friend of this country and may, on the contrary, develop an antagonism against a people to whom he would deny the title of a democratic nation. It would be well for him to remember that those in America who can afford it, can take seats in a Pullman car or even secure a private State-room. If, moreover, he would consider that, rightly or wrongly, it is held by the military authorities that it may endanger discipline, which is essential to military efficiency, for a private to be cooped-up with his officer on a long journey, he may find that there is some reason for such an enactment. Whether he agrees with its necessity or desirability or not, he must admit that there is something to be said for it and must merely regard it as a difference of national custom to be considered with tolerance.

With all tolerance towards other nationalities let us however never forget that our own nationality, which gives coherence and solidarity, independence and security to the

State of which we are citizens, should be one and undivided; that by word and by deed and by our whole lives we should confirm and strengthen this unity of the political and moral corporateness of our own State. This is a primary and essential need and duty in time of peace and, especially so, in time of war. We cannot serve two masters, particularly when there is the possibility of a conflict between them, and, still less so, when they are actually at war.

It is here at this point that the false conception of nationality, against which I have hitherto been arguing, is fraught with the gravest consequences. With the racial conception, nationality readily merges into Hyphenism. Let us ignore, for the moment, autocracies (now happily, let us hope, of the past), in which those citizens belonging to races or religions differing from the majority of the inhabitants, or, at all events, from the ruling powers of such States, were suppressed and persecuted and were therefore driven into the assertion of their separate race or origin. But let us turn to the democratic States of the West, notably to the British Empire and the United States of America. In these States of which we here are citizens, we must confirm, and insist with all our power upon, our conception of nationality, in which racial differences and differences of origin and religion form no integral element. In this sense the citizen of the United States, as well as of Great Britain (not to mention France, Italy and our other Allies), must strictly profess and adhere to his American or British nationality and nothing else. This does not in any way imply that any self-respecting man should deny his origin, as little as he would deny his own father and grandfather. In many cases he may cherish, and rightly cherish, the sense of pride as regards his origin. But, in referring to his past and especially in his business and

social intercourse and, still more especially, in his political activities, he must refer to them as his *origin* or *descent* and in no way as his "nationality." In the so-called "Delbrueck laws," enacted in Germany not long before the war, it was decided that the German emigrant who settled in foreign countries and there became naturalised as a citizen, might retain his German nationality simultaneously with that of the country of his adoption. The reason supporting such a decision was one of "economic interest." This war has opened our eyes to the true motives and the political interests which might be involved in such "economic interests."

The sense of piety and regard for our forbears and their traditions may well be a beneficent element. It can coexist with our immediate and wider duties and may thus be morally educative. But it is here that I emphatically differ from Mr Zimmern¹, who first maintains that "no task is more urgent among the backward and weaker peoples than the wise fostering of nationality, of the maintenance of national traditions and corporate life as a school of character." I agree with him in this, and not only for backward peoples. But, when his conception of nationality is the older one, against which I have been arguing, and when he advises that these national traditions of *origin* should be fostered and developed in those who have become citizens of a new State possessing its own national traditions and corporate life, presumably higher than those of the emigrant's country of origin, I emphatically disagree with him. No doubt we have before us a sad specimen of humanity in the case of the expatriated Russian or Polish-Jew, the Slovak, the Neapolitan member of a Maffia, who enters the United States, drops all the traditions of his native country and, without

¹ *Nationality and Government*, pp 54-55.

having assimilated any of the moral, social and political traditions of his new home, becomes an unmoral vagabond who, like Sir Mark Sykes's *Gosmobolidan*, enunciates advanced shibboleths, the meaning of which he has not half realised. This only means that any social traditions are better than none at all. On the other hand, we would ask the question:

How can these new settlers and aspiring citizens ever become truly possessed of the distinctive culture, manners, customs, political consciousness and loyalty of their new home unless they start life anew and open out their souls, free from prejudices and preconceptions of another world, to the new light that is to shine upon them, to penetrate their very being and illumine their lives?

This does not only apply to the child at school, but also to the adult immigrant, who must speedily and continuously be taught, or teach himself, the language, the thought, the outlook upon life and, above all, the political aims and ideals of the country of which he is to become a loyal citizen. He will surely not be without ideals if this effort is truly made—ideals, moreover, which presumably are higher than those of the land from which he came. One of the greatest blessings of the future, the outcome of this very war and of the new Peace Treaty—whatever its individual deficiencies—will, let us hope, be, that the world will no longer tolerate the persecution of racial or religious minorities within any country. If that is so, there need no longer be the mass-exodus of suppressed nationalities. All the more, therefore, in the future will the emigrant settler in a new free country be one who will claim naturalisation from free choice because he believes the conditions of life in his new country to be superior to those in his old home. All the more urgent, there-

fore, will be his duty to assimilate into his whole being the language, laws and customs—all that goes to the making of true nationality—in the country of his adoption. These laws, customs and ideals of the United States and Great Britain are beacon-lights of sufficient educative force to fill the whole social intelligence and energy of every child and every adult citizen. They must not be diluted or polluted by any other alien elements that may conflict, and actually have conflicted, with our national ideals. If the emigrant to the United States or Great Britain is hospitably received in those countries, he must make up his mind whether he wishes to remain a transient visitor or whether he wishes to become fully identified with his new home as a loyal citizen of a free country, where no persecution of minorities exists. He must then become naturalised as a citizen of such a country—if the country considers him worthy of such naturalisation. If he prefers, or values more highly, the political constitution, the laws, customs, and ideals of his mother country he should return there. But the moment he becomes naturalised he must identify himself in every respect with the political constitution, with the laws, customs and ideals of his elective nationality. His own aim and that of his children must be as soon as possible to step out of the circle of a distinctive foreign nationality, he must make every effort to acquire completely the language of his new home, acquaintance with its history and laws and customs, and full identification with its national aims. It is therefore a misfortune, to be strenuously avoided or mitigated, that the several foreign accretions within a country should, by collective occupation of one district in the country, or one quarter in a metropolis, confirm and perpetuate their racial or religious difference of foreign origin and thus counteract

full assimilation with the true national life of the country of which they are citizens. It would be the greatest political misfortune for the United States if the votes were grouped by the descent of its citizens. The encouragement of such separateness among the inhabitants of any country produces, not a new nationality, but what we have learnt to call Hyphenism. Hyphenism is the negation of true nationality and must be discouraged by individual citizens as well as by the State itself. It is important for Englishmen to realise that, before America entered the war, every American who urged her entrance into the war for the noble cause of the Entente Powers purely on the grounds of his English descent, was as much a Hyphenate as was the American of German origin who sided with the Central Powers because of his origin. President Wilson is of English origin, the late Mr Roosevelt was of Dutch (perhaps Teuton) origin. They would have been guilty of Hyphenism if their attitude as regards this war had been decided by their historical descent. In such a crisis as that of this great war there necessarily may arise difficult problems in the regulation of national life in this respect, especially when the recent, or even more remote, origin of the citizens of any country may be that of the enemy with whom the State is in conflict. The simple and only just procedure to be pursued by the State and its citizens in such a contingency is, that those naturalised citizens of enemy origin, concerning whose sympathies there may be any doubt, should, for the sake of public safety, be required to declare anew their adherence and loyalty to the country of their adoption. Should they then by word or deed in any way favour the enemy and his cause, they must summarily be punished for high treason, for which the law makes ample provision. But their claims to absolute equality

of citizenship, its rights as well as its duties, must be recognised as equal to those of all other citizens.

I have endeavoured to establish the true meaning of nationality and to indicate the dangers of its false conception. In *Patriotism—National and International*¹, referring to the liberation of the Balkan nationalities, I thought it right to point out that the so-called "Defence of the Smaller Nationalities," as well as the principle of "Self-determination of Nationalities," as thus wrongly conceived when applied to the democratic civilised States of Europe and America, present an element of great danger to the peace and progress of the world. That we should all unite in liberating from persecution, be they under the yoke of Turkish, Russian, German or Austrian autocracy, the so-called "nationalities" which have been suppressed or persecuted; that we should restore to political life and solidarity the oppressed or dispersed members of the Polish people; that we should even boldly undertake the almost impossible task or re-constituting the political boundaries of such people striving to realise their political nationality in the formation of States, is right. But we must remember, first, that in accepting such grave and stupendous responsibilities we are bound also to eliminate the possibility that other so-called nationalities, embodied in these liberated new States, should in their turn not meet with the fate of suppression or oppression. And we owe it to these to secure such fairness of treatment, not only in the present work of constituting these new national States, but even at the cost of infringing so-called sovereignty to ensure Justice in the future. But it is still more important for us of the West of Europe and of America to realise, and to face, the great danger which, by

¹ Pp. 5 seq.

such lawful and noble action on the part of the Allied Powers, we may have brought upon the whole civilised world, at least the whole of Europe, by thus using and confirming the conception of nationality which has been forced upon us only because of the unrighteous persecution in the immediate past on the part of autocratic powers. The danger is both imminent and far-reaching that the whole of Europe will become "Balkanised"; that we shall have created a vast number of so-called "national" States,—none of them satisfied with the response that has been made to their national claims—who stand in marked and prepared antagonism to one another, ready to spring at each others' throats. Moreover, M. Johannot has shown¹ in that most interesting introductory chapter to his book, how in the recent successive activities, not only of our enemies, the Central Powers, but also of the Entente Powers themselves, in every phase of their diplomatic action, from the beginning of the war and even during the present Peace Conference, the old racial and religious conception of nationality has been constantly used as an argument for and against the same object as suited the opportunistic interest of each side. Among other dangers to the peace of the world, inherent in these smaller national States as now constituted, he has pointed to one most lurid danger in the future. The final political result of this war may be to create a Central Power of Middle Europe consisting of at least 90,000,000 Germans, German-Austrians and Magyars, to which in time may be added the discontented remnant of the Turkish Empire; and that these powers will at once make use of the rivalries between the smaller, newly-constituted national States surrounding them, and, using their discontent, rivalries and conflicts, may win over one

¹ *O.c.* pp. vii to lvi.

or the other of them and some day call up the great Armageddon of the future.

Now, there is but one hope to meet this real and pressing danger. That hope rests in what has been called, The League of Nations; and that League of Nations is no longer, let me impress this upon you, a dream of Utopia. For, apart from all political and moral dreams or ideals, it has become a physical necessity for the future of the civilised world. If I may use the term (in order to counteract the charge of unpractical idealism or dreaming and to insist upon the sobriety and practicability of this new international institution), *it is a definite business proposition before us*. It is the only force in the future of the world which will save us from an imminent catastrophe which every good and reasonable citizen of our civilised States will exert all his energies to avert. But this League of Nations must develop into a far more effective and potent form before it can respond to our most crying needs. It must itself be constituted the Supreme Court, simply standing for Justice in the world; and this Justice must be supported by an actual Force at its command to carry into effect its decisions—a Force greater than that of any one nation or combination of States.

I solemnly appeal to you Britons and Americans who have fought in this war, to whatever political party you may belong: Do not belittle the great effort which the righteous and civilised world is at this moment making for the self-preservation of civilisation, even if you may have your doubts about one or the other aspect of its present formulation. Without presumption I may claim to speak with some authority on this question. For, more than twenty years ago, I published my own conviction that, first, through a closer understanding between the United States and Great

Britain, and then through the adhesion of other leading Powers, some unity of action on the part of such Powers should be established, and that this should ultimately lead to something of the nature of a League of Nations—which I then hoped would become the International Court backed by Power. I then saw, and expressed my belief, that such hopes were very remote, and I admitted that I laid myself open to be considered a Utopian dreamer. Well, within twenty years what was then considered the remotest dream, has become a reality. Who will dare to say that the further development of such an International Union to secure peace and progress to the world on the basis of what has already been achieved, is beyond the range of possibility? Who will venture to say, remembering the army of martyrs who have died at the stake for their religious beliefs quite independently of their material interests and even against them, that men of the present and of the future will not feel—and through the feeling and the passion be moved to make every sacrifice for—such international patriotism, the natural consequence of their truly national patriotism?

Let me warn you against two definite arguments which block the way to your acceptance of this my firm conviction. The first is contained in that commonplace *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* Who, in the case of such an International Jury or Court, will guard the guardians of the law? Nothing in this sublunary world of ours is absolute. Our own laws and our own administration of the laws may be imperfect and there may be miscarriage of justice. But can you suggest any other better means of ensuring justice in the business and social intercourse within civilised communities than our law-courts, judges and juries? In every case in this world we must ultimately rise to the conception of God, of all perfect

Justice, Wisdom and Charity to guard over our judges. Can you suggest any better power, more perfect to secure international justice, than a properly chosen jury or court of the wisest and best men, which each nation can send to administer pure Justice, but not with a mandate to represent the interests of the States from which they are deputed?

The other shibboleth which I wish to remove, in order that you may see the practical realisability of such an international body to ensure peace and progress, is the German contention of the Treitschkes, Bernhardis, and the rest of them, that war is a *biological necessity*; that it is against human nature to live at peace, and that nations must fight. It might be claimed, with some approach to truth, that lying, stealing and murdering are instinctive forces, are "*biological necessities*" in the individual man-animal. But civilised society, through its education and its laws, has seen to it that these instincts do not prevail. To maintain, that organised and civilised social groups called States, professing moral aims and necessarily acting with some forethought, cannot counteract and check immoral corporate instincts is palpably absurd.

The phrase "against nature" has been used to cover all forms of fallacies and iniquities. The study of man's history and even of men in the present, has shown us clearly how traditions, binding laws and customs, have been established and can be established, undreamt of by those who did not live under the rules of new institutions of higher and growing civilisation. Not to mention pre-historic man of the Paleolithic or Neolithic periods, but looking into more recent history, we find that men of those earlier days would have conceived it "against nature" that people should live peaceably together in civilised communities as they do

now, and that crimes and misdemeanours are immediately punished. Nay, I myself have known the most highly educated people in neighbouring countries who could not conceive how it was possible for the gentlemen of England and America to live in peace without fighting duels! Could pre-historic man conceive of the possibility that, by a simple business transaction, by a stroke of the pen, the most complicated business affairs, shiploads of produce, and the wealth of whole nations should be transferred over distances of land and sea under the protection of laws, never questioned by either participant dwelling in the most remote regions of the globe, distances which his imagination could never grasp? It would be "against nature" in his early conception. I have refuted such generalisations elsewhere¹, they are absolutely groundless.

As a last word allow me to warn you against such fallacious reasoning to weaken your righteous enthusiasm for the cause of international patriotism which forms the necessary keystone to the arch of national patriotism, ensuring peace and progress to the whole world. Let me end with the simple words of two great participants in this war—heroes whose ardent patriotism no one will dare to impugn. Henri Boland, late Postmaster-General of Canada, said after leaving his German prison:

Only politics for *all* civilisation till this war is won—that is what we all want most. I came out of prison like a baby that has just been born. I know very little about events that have taken place in Canada while I have been in prison. I must begin again. I must learn like a child. But there is one thing that I have not to learn, one thing I know: that humanity must make itself safe now and for all time against another fearful tragedy like that we are now undergoing. That is my politics

¹ *Aristodemocracy, etc.* chap. x.

and (I say it reverently) my religion too. If I can do something, anything, to bring about the end for which we all pray, then I am going to do it to the best of my ability. That is all! After a visit to my home and my mother I hope to take service at the front with the Canadian forces. [From *The Times*, August 7th, 1918.]

Nurse Cavell's last words were:

I have no fear nor shrinking; I have seen death so often that it is not strange or fearful to me....But this I would say, standing as I do in view of God and eternity—I realise that patriotism is not enough....

•

II AND III

THE EXPANSION OF WESTERN
IDEALS AND THE WORLD'S PEACE

AND

THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING
BROTHERHOOD

PREFACE

THE lecture on the English-Speaking Brotherhood, here printed as the second essay, was written in the beginning of the Spanish-American War and embodies thoughts and feelings which I have nurtured through my whole life. It was delivered on July 7, 1898, at the Imperial Institute, London, Lord Rosebery in the chair, while this war was raging, and was published in an abridged form in the *North American Review* for August, 1898. When preparing it in unabridged form for publication last summer, I wrote the following preface:—

“My greatest fear is that, from the nature of the subject and from the special conditions which evoked my remarks, I may not have been able on this occasion to give proper emphasis to my positive and friendly feeling for the European Powers that are essentially the bearers of Occidental Civilisation. In urging the coalition and combined action of England and the United States, I have but seized the opportunity offered of advocating the union of the two civilised Powers who are best fitted by present circumstance to draw nearer to each other, and who, from the fundamental constitution of their national life, are more closely related to one another than any other two Powers in the civilised world. Whatever negative attitude may be manifest in this lecture towards the other civilised Powers of the European Continent is due to the fact that these Powers have, by their recent action, shown themselves to be opposed to any closer union between the United States and Great Britain; that

by several of their institutions, as well as by their foreign and commercial policy, they are not yet prepared for a more general federation of civilised nations; and that the prevailing spirit of Ethnological Chauvinism among them is not only an impediment to wider humanitarian brotherhood, but is destructive of the inner peace and good-will among the citizens of each nation. I feel so strongly what I have said of this curse of Ethnological Chauvinism that if it were possible to create effective leagues and associations among the civilised nations, and, moreover, associations with a negative or defensive object, I should like to urge the institution of a great Anti-Chauvinistic League among the enlightened people of all nationalities, to join together in combating this evil spirit in whatever form it may manifest itself. But I am not so visionary as to think that such a league could be formed at the present juncture."

Since I wrote this preface last July, I have visited the United States, where, the immediate war with Spain being over, I found the country drifting into a division on what has been called the Expansion Policy. I found that many of my friends, actuated by the noblest motives, were opposed to Expansion on grounds which, however high and noble, appeared to me none the less fallacious. Moreover, in conversation with them and others, I came to realise that there were points of view, inseparable from an intimate knowledge of European affairs gained in living on the scenes where these events are enacted, with which they were more or less unfamiliar. And these points of view appear to me essential to a correct understanding of the situation and of the whole question of American Expansion. The most prominent fallacy, and at the same time the most misleading in its effects, appeared to me the assumption on the part of the

Anti-Expansionists (an assumption in danger of being accepted by their opponents from the very frequency of its repetition): that those who oppose Expansion are actuated by the ideal side and represent it exclusively; that they uphold, against material interests, the integrity of American idealism. There was and is danger that, when such statements are repeated sufficiently often to become common-places, the Expansionists will acquiesce in this misstatement from sheer impatience and pugnacity, and will thus be robbed of the living strength which is at the very core of their own movement, its lofty idealism,—that they will at last subside into the cynical acceptance of a low materialistic view which turns its back upon “cant,” and that the whole national life will suffer in consequence. When I realised this, it did not require the encouragement of my friends to make me feel that there was a call for me to speak in the cause of truth and to publish what I have to say on the Expansion of Western Ideals.

THE AUTHOR.

SOUTH ORANGE, N. J.

June 5, 1899.

THE EXPANSION OF WESTERN
IDEALS AND THE WORLD'S PEACE

1899

II

THE EXPANSION OF WESTERN IDEALS AND THE WORLD'S PEACE

IN his remarks following my lecture on the English-Speaking Brotherhood here published, Lord Rosebery¹ offers a graceful and gentle criticism of two of the chief points insisted upon by me.

With regard to my objection to the racial element contained in the term Anglo-Saxon, he says:

Our lecturer took exception to the term Anglo-Saxon, and he took exception very justly to that term as not being truly a scientific description of our race. But I think he would agree with me in saying that the same objections would lie against a generic description of almost any other race in the world—that there is hardly a race in the world inhabiting its own territory—I cannot recall one at this moment—which can be strictly called a race, if all the objections which lie against the term Anglo-Saxon lie against the adjective which may be applied to that race. I do not plead for the word Anglo-Saxon. I would welcome any other term than Anglo-Saxon which in a more conciliatory, a more scientific, and more adequate manner would describe the thing I want to describe. But whether you call it British or Anglo-Saxon, or whatever you call it, the fact is that the race is there and the sympathy of the race is there. How you arrive at that sympathy, whether it be purely by language, or as, perhaps, I think more truly, by the moral, intellectual, and political

¹ See *Appreciations and Addresses*, delivered by Lord Rosebery, K.G., K.T., 1899, pp. 261-269 (John Lane).

50 The Expansion of Western Ideals

influences under which a nationality has grown up—how you arrive at that sympathy, it is foreign to my purpose to discuss to-day. But this at least we may say, that when a nation has inhabited certain boundaries without disturbance for a considerable number of centuries, even though it has received accessions from foreign nations, and when it has fused those accessions from foreign nations into its own nationality, and made them accept the name and language and laws and the facts of that nationality, it seems to me that for all practical purposes you have a nation and a race.

Evidently in my lecture I failed to express as clearly and pointedly as I desired to do the fundamental viciousness of the idea of *race* as affecting modern international politics—nay, national politics,—in its immediately disintegrating influence upon the life of the nation, and in its ultimately retarding the realisation of humanitarian ideals. And I was opposed to the Chauvinism implied in, and engendered by, racial distinctions; to the tone of passion which it breeds; to the native inimical attitude towards other races which it fosters. In “community of race” stress is laid, not upon the uniting power of ideas, but upon that of mere consanguinity. It is true, love may grow out of this as well as hatred—but in any case passion. In substituting the phrase “English-Speaking Brotherhood” for “Anglo-Saxon Alliance” I wished to accentuate the communion of ideas, which do not in the same way evoke passion,—that is, personal passion,—and if they do, produce that form which is least destructive and degrading, namely, the passion for ideas. I know that in the phrase I adopted the prominence given to language fails to express the full meaning I wished to convey. “English-speaking” only stood as a symbol for the life, institutions, laws, and ideals of the English-speaking nations; and I should gratefully accept any other

phrase which conveyed my thoughts more adequately. But, after all, the Word, *λόγος*, has before this been used to symbolise a vast range of thought. The more I consider Lord Rosebery's criticism, the more am I inclined to believe that his misunderstanding of the main gist of my objection was not wholly due to the inadequacy of my presentation. For I find that at the end of the passage here quoted he gives nation and race as convertible terms—which is the last thing I would admit.

If this was my general reason for objecting to the term Anglo-Saxon, the more immediate and special reason, which at the time led me to raise my voice at all, has been proved by recent events to have been good and strong. The opposition which at first produced Mr Davitt's strictures as representing the Irish element in Great Britain has, as I anticipated, found a more powerful response in the United States. The ineptitude of the phrase Anglo-Saxon, as meant to convey the element of unity and cohesion between the inhabitants of the United States and of Greater Britain, has not only been properly exposed in the pages of Mr Dooley's powerful satire, but has also quite recently been publicly condemned in the mass-meetings held principally in the Western States. This protest is headed by the German section of the American people; who, no doubt, incited to opposition by the misleading phrase, have protested against the great idea it was meant to carry. I feel confident that every day will prove more convincingly how mischievous the effect of such a misplaced word can be.

With the doubts expressed by Lord Rosebery on a second point in my lecture I can fully sympathise. They have since found forcible expression in the United States,

50 The Expansion of Western Ideals

influences under which a nationality has grown up—how you arrive at that sympathy, it is foreign to my purpose to discuss to-day. But this at least we may say, that when a nation has inhabited certain boundaries without disturbance for a considerable number of centuries, even though it has received accessions from foreign nations, and when it has fused those accessions from foreign nations into its own nationality, and made them accept the name and language and laws and the facts of that nationality, it seems to me that for all practical purposes you have a nation and a race.

Evidently in my lecture I failed to express as clearly and pointedly as I desired to do the fundamental viciousness of the idea of *race* as affecting modern international politics—nay, national politics,—in its immediately disintegrating influence upon the life of the nation, and in its ultimately retarding the realisation of humanitarian ideals. And I was opposed to the Chauvinism implied in, and engendered by, racial distinctions; to the tone of passion which it breeds; to the native inimical attitude towards other races which it fosters. In “community of race” stress is laid, not upon the uniting power of ideas, but upon that of mere consanguinity. It is true, love may grow out of this as well as hatred—but in any case passion. In substituting the phrase “English-Speaking Brotherhood” for “Anglo-Saxon Alliance” I wished to accentuate the communion of ideas, which do not in the same way evoke passion,—that is, personal passion,—and if they do, produce that form which is least destructive and degrading, namely, the passion for ideas. I know that in the phrase I adopted the prominence given to language fails to express the full meaning I wished to convey. “English-speaking” only stood as a symbol for the life, institutions, laws, and ideals of the English-speaking nations; and I should gratefully accept any other

phrase which conveyed my thoughts more adequately. But, after all, the Word, λόγος, has before this been used to symbolise a vast range of thought. The more I consider Lord Rosebery's criticism, the more am I inclined to believe that his misunderstanding of the main gist of my objection was not wholly due to the inadequacy of my presentation. For I find that at the end of the passage here quoted he gives nation and race as convertible terms—which is the last thing I would admit.

If this was my general reason for objecting to the term Anglo-Saxon, the more immediate and special reason, which at the time led me to raise my voice at all, has been proved by recent events to have been good and strong. The opposition which at first produced Mr Davitt's strictures as representing the Irish element in Great Britain has, as I anticipated, found a more powerful response in the United States. The ineptitude of the phrase Anglo-Saxon, as meant to convey the element of unity and cohesion between the inhabitants of the United States and of Greater Britain, has not only been properly exposed in the pages of Mr Dooley's powerful satire, but has also quite recently been publicly condemned in the mass-meetings held principally in the Western States. This protest is headed by the German section of the American people; who, no doubt, incited to opposition by the misleading phrase, have protested against the great idea it was meant to carry. I feel confident that every day will prove more convincingly how mischievous the effect of such a misplaced word can be.

With the doubts expressed by Lord Rosebery on a second point in my lecture I can fully sympathise. They have since found forcible expression in the United States,

influences under which a nationality has grown up—how you arrive at that sympathy, it is foreign to my purpose to discuss to-day. But this at least we may say, that when a nation has inhabited certain boundaries without disturbance for a considerable number of centuries, even though it has received accessions from foreign nations, and when it has fused those accessions from foreign nations into its own nationality, and made them accept the name and language and laws and the facts of that nationality, it seems to me that for all practical purposes you have a nation and a race.

Evidently in my lecture I failed to express as clearly and pointedly as I desired to do the fundamental viciousness of the idea of *race* as affecting modern international politics—nay, national politics,—in its immediately disintegrating influence upon the life of the nation, and in its ultimately retarding the realisation of humanitarian ideals. And I was opposed to the Chauvinism implied in, and engendered by, racial distinctions; to the tone of passion which it breeds; to the native inimical attitude towards other races which it fosters. In “community of race” stress is laid, not upon the uniting power of ideas, but upon that of mere consanguinity. It is true, love may grow out of this as well as hatred—but in any case passion. In substituting the phrase “English-Speaking Brotherhood” for “Anglo-Saxon Alliance” I wished to accentuate the communion of ideas, which do not in the same way evoke passion,—that is, personal passion,—and if they do, produce that form which is least destructive and degrading, namely, the passion for ideas. I know that in the phrase I adopted the prominence given to language fails to express the full meaning I wished to convey. “English-speaking” only stood as a symbol for the life, institutions, laws, and ideals of the English-speaking nations; and I should gratefully accept any other

phrase which conveyed my thoughts more adequately. But, after all, the Word, *λόγος*, has before this been used to symbolise a vast range of thought. The more I consider Lord Rosebery's criticism, the more am I inclined to believe that his misunderstanding of the main gist of my objection was not wholly due to the inadequacy of my presentation. For I find that at the end of the passage here quoted he gives nation and race as convertible terms—which is the last thing I would admit.

If this was my general reason for objecting to the term Anglo-Saxon, the more immediate and special reason, which at the time led me to raise my voice at all, has been proved by recent events to have been good and strong. The opposition which at first produced Mr Davitt's strictures as representing the Irish element in Great Britain has, as I anticipated, found a more powerful response in the United States. The ineptitude of the phrase Anglo-Saxon, as meant to convey the element of unity and cohesion between the inhabitants of the United States and of Greater Britain, has not only been properly exposed in the pages of Mr Dooley's powerful satire, but has also quite recently been publicly condemned in the mass-meetings held principally in the Western States. This protest is headed by the German section of the American people; who, no doubt, incited to opposition by the misleading phrase, have protested against the great idea it was meant to carry. I feel confident that every day will prove more convincingly how mischievous the effect of such a misplaced word can be.

With the doubts expressed by Lord Rosebery on a second point in my lecture I can fully sympathise. They have since found forcible expression in the United States,

notably in a leader in the *Springfield Republican* (May 18, 1899), in which reference is made to an article by a Russian writer in the *Independent* showing the blessings arising out of an extension of the Czar's rule through Asia. Lord Rosebery says:

But I must warn you against a pitfall that lurks even in that expression. It is this—that, putting the conscientious Russian, whom the Professor summoned to give testimony, aside, I am afraid all the other great nations of the world are under the same impression as to the spread of their power and their empire. I doubt if the Germans or the French, for example, and I make bold to say even the Russians, though they have been quoted against the argument by the lecturer, would be disposed to say that the extension of their several empires was not in the best interests of the human race. That is a feeling common to all nationalities, and we can only hope that we indulge in it with more reason and on a broader basis than do the others I have mentioned.

Such arguments appear conclusive. Still, I venture to believe that they will not stand close and serious scrutiny. Of course, what I have to reply is not so much in the nature of argument as of fact; and these facts, from their very nature, are not readily tested. I can only give my personal experience, and rely upon the faith in my personal veracity of statement. But I venture to believe that there are so many who will bear me out in my experience, that we need not resort to a universal census of uninfluenced popular opinion throughout all European nations (if this were possible) to test the truth of my contention. Ask the simple question: "Do you think that the cause of civilisation, generally social and political, as well as in the national education of the individual, would be furthered more rapidly and effectually by the expansion of the

English-speaking nations or by that of Russia or any other of the Continental nations or grouping of these?" My own experience as regards this question is conclusive.

I would, in the first instance, point, not to Nihilists, political malcontents, or those in the political opposition (these, of course, disbelieve in Russian methods), but to genuine patriotic Russians of the educated and ruling classes, who have distinctly expressed their admiration of English and American social and political institutions, and have looked forward to the day when these institutions and the moral and intellectual tone of the nations possessing them would be introduced into their own country. They distinctly implied, and sometimes stated definitely, that humanity would gain more by the expansion of these advanced peoples than by that of their own nation.

In spite of the temporary state of ill feeling, arising out of rivalry and misunderstandings fostered by political rulers in Germany for definite and immediate political ends (a state of affairs as much to be deplored as it is bound ultimately to give way to a better understanding), the number of Germans—and these the best and highest among them—who are intense admirers of the social and political life and institutions of Great Britain and America is greater than the German Anglophobes are willing to admit. And I am confident, that, though everybody will willingly concede to Germany its high place in the sphere of intellectual education as fostered by its excellent schools and universities, the Germans themselves whose opinions count will recognise the superior political education and the social element which is its outcome as they are to be found in Great Britain and the United States. The necessary logical conclusion to such an admission is: that it is better for the

world at large that the politically superior nation should expand its political influence, even though the politically inferior nation be possessed of superior scientific attainment. For the first steps in civilisation are necessarily political.

I shall never forget one of the most impressive and touching—I was almost about to say tragic—conversations I have ever had. It was with a great statesman, now dead, the leader of the political life of one of the smaller states of Europe, who, in the opinion of many eminent diplomats of various nations, would have found his fittest, and probably most successful, sphere of activity in one of the great states. Our conversation on patriotism, which we discussed from every conceivable point of view, had lasted for some hours during which his face beamed with intellectual vigour and the strength of his concentrated and controlled will, while he maintained all his points with incisive eloquence. He seemed to have exhausted all that could be said on his side, and then paused. I did not interrupt his silence and watched him as he sat in thoughtful concentration, blind to the outer world, and merely following the sequence of images that were passing before his inner eye. I noted how gradually the expression of youthful energy and alertness faded from his face; the eye grew duller as the lids, briskly raised before, wearily descended over the orbs; the features seemed to grow more heavy, the furrows and wrinkles more accentuated, all the lines were drawn downwards; the head sank further forward on the breast; the arms hung relaxed, and the tall body seemed shrunk into itself.

After this long pause he slowly and wearily turned his head towards me, and, with an expression and a voice in

which deep sorrow and affectionate kindness were mingled, he said:

You are fortunate, inexpressibly fortunate, my young friend. For you have never felt the soul-deadening doubt which so often assails me and clips the wings of my imagination as it soars up like a dove in the morning sun, carrying with it the great message of my life, the love of my own country. You have never felt the doubt which has so often assailed me and which comes over me now: Whether it is ultimately right and good that my country should live and grow,—nay, that it should exist, as a country at all? Whether there are sufficient grounds, sufficient in view of what is ultimately to be in the rightness of things, for the solidarity and separateness of these people grouped together by tradition and language? Whether these traditions are likely to survive, and whether they are worthy of survival? Whether even this language, which I love and do all to foster and improve in its ancient purity, can ever develop effectively, and ought to be maintained for any reason beyond mere literary and philological convenience? Whether, in short, it would not be best to cast down the barriers that separate us from you, and whether, do what we will, our best acts do not merely tend to bring us nearer to you and to accelerate our ultimate absorption within the sphere of spiritual influence emanating from you? I ask myself whether my life, in so far as I am directly “patriotic,” has not been wasted; whether I am not wasting it now; and whether it is not all a delusion? You are fortunate, my friend, for you need never have these doubts which bring sadness to the very core of man’s heart; for you belong to the great nations which manifestly, admittedly, beyond all doubt, represent the best that man has thought out and acted out up to this day. You can frankly be a “patriot” at all times and in every mood. For you can remain confident that when you advance the interests of your own country you are ultimately in harmony with the world’s great good, you are advancing the highest ideas which nations have yet attained politically.

56 The Expansion of Western Ideals

I quote these words because they express fully what the unbiassed thought of foreign nations must concede to us.

Now if we ask the same question in Great Britain or the United States, though many of us admire many institutions, customs, intellectual habits and attainments characteristic of other nations, and should like to see these replace our own, we should find it difficult to meet with any responsible person who would seriously and deliberately like to see our own social and political institutions replaced by those of any other nation. We do occasionally meet with impatient outbursts against the very core of our political life, namely, representative or parliamentary government; especially when some definite abuses in individual cases, and the slow and cumbersome procedure in view of practical issues, have aroused such a burst of impatient indignation. But these are never the expression of deliberate opinion as regards the ultimate tenets of representative government. I have even occasionally come across positive admiration of the results of autocratic government and a momentary desire to see it applied to our own difficulties.

We have all of us occasionally longed for the "intelligent autocrat"; but I doubt whether any one in his senses would have been satisfied with an unintelligent tyrant. Such a desire, moreover, meant that this ruler should be placed over people who have themselves been for many generations trained in self-government under advanced conditions of life and order in the communities—the outcome of our political institutions. This momentary revulsion against parliamentary forms of government among our Western nations has generally been expressed by those who have definite practical and administrative ends in view, which, for the nonce, they see retarded by the

cumbersome and sometimes corrupt machinery of representative government. They are the administrators or diplomats, those with whom it is natural that the means of government should be made the end,—dealing with questions of internal administration or foreign conquest which are so readily solved and answered in the simpler and ruder forms of autocratic government. They ignore, under the pressure of the immediate task before them, the ultimate goal at which their government aims, namely, the spread of individual liberty, the education of the people in all the ideas which stand for the highest civilisation. Yet it is because we were more likely to fulfil these great tasks which are ultimately conducive to security of life and to freedom of action, and thus to the happiness of those governed, that the intelligent foreigner prefers our institutions—because Great Britain and the United States represent these ideas.

If the English-speaking people are thus the representatives of the highest civilisation and are reaping its blessings, it is their duty, as well as their privilege, to hand on the torch which has thus been placed in their hands by their ancestors, even into districts where at present total darkness reigns supreme.

These views are more or less consciously held throughout the whole of Greater Britain; and though there be a small party of Little-Englanders, this party is a “negligible quantity.” I have no doubt that they are also the views held by the majority of citizens in the United States, whose numbers will become still greater the more Americans realise the state of the world's politics and the position they are bound to take in it, as well as the duties which their prominent position in the world's affairs imposes

58 The Expansion of Western Ideals

upon them. But my present stay in the United States has shown me that there is a not inconsiderable portion of the American people who are opposed to what is called Expansion; and these are far from being recruited from the least intelligent and high-minded citizens—in fact they are made up, to a considerable extent, of men actuated by the highest motives and representing, as they honestly believe, the truest and noblest traditions of American liberty. Their chief objection to Expansion, as we shall see, is that we are losing sight of our ideals in following its allurements. Yet I maintain emphatically, and I hope to succeed in showing, that the best Expansionists and the best Anti-Expansionists are both ultimately guided by ideals; only that the Expansionist's ideals are wider than those of the Anti-Expansionist and, being greater, include them.

In considering the objections raised against Expansion in the United States we discover three main grounds upon which the objectors stand: the first is distinctly and exclusively that of their native soil; the second is that of their supposed traditional American ideals; and the third, more negative and modest, is that of present unfitness for the wider task.

It would not be fair to maintain that the bulk of American Anti-Expansionists hold this first ground: it is purely selfish, narrow, "back-yard." "We are well enough off at home, why trouble about things outside?" It is readily understood how every thoughtful and far-sighted citizen, not to speak of statesmen, must realise, that if the United States is sufficient unto itself, materially and morally, at the present day and for some years to come, the enormous growth of industry, the increase of population, the intensifying of international relations, economically and morally,

make such an isolation in the future, not only disastrous, but absurd. A Chinese wall round a community living under the highest conditions of modern civilisation does not only debar it from the introduction of advantages offered by other nations, but may also lead to the disagreeable surprise of finding closed doors when it is found advantageous to issue out of the Chinese wall. And it is not reasonable to expect that he who has consistently sat at home within his four walls, while others have been paving streets and forcing doors, should at some late period, when it happens to suit him, find these streets ready for his pleasant perambulations and the doors complacently held open for his easy entrance. This whole view seems to me so fatuous and puerile, that I cannot conceive of its being held by thoughtful people. Meanwhile, it is necessary to point out that this materialistic ground of objection is in fundamental contradiction to that of the idealistic Anti-Expansionist; and that nobody can consistently and sincerely urge the two grounds together or a coalition between those actuated by either of these two motives. You cannot conceivably find any element of the Ideal (American, or otherwise), in the purely selfish view which maintains that you need not expand because you are happy enough at home.

I hope I am not wilfully caricaturing the views of those serious and noble Anti-Expansionists in America, among whom are some of my most honoured friends, if I maintain that there is, nevertheless, some link, some half-conscious analogy of reasoning, between their views and those of the "back-yard" Anti-Expansionists. They seem to hold, that one of the specific elements in the American ideal is this separateness and aloofness from the great current of

60 The Expansion of Western Ideals

international affairs throughout the civilised and uncivilised world. As if the framers of the "Constitution," and those who formulated the "Monroe Doctrine," had forever debarred the United States from its share in fashioning the world's destiny—or, rather, as if they had granted them in perpetuity immunity from the heavy burden of tasks which the *noblesse oblige* of civilisation puts upon those who enjoy its privileges. "The Russian, the Italian, the French, the Dutch, the Belgian, the German, and the British may all carry the fruits of their civilisation into distant parts. We have no such task before us. Our ideal is to stay at home!" If the "back-yard" Anti-Expansionist is materially selfish, one who argues thus is morally selfish.

He must, moreover, realise that in this diffusion of influence there is practically but one alternative to choose, namely, the system of colonisation followed by the Continental nations of Europe, most prominently represented by Russia, as contrasted with the system followed by the English-speaking peoples, hitherto represented by Great Britain. As Mr Kidd has put it¹: "More clearly than in either England or America, is it perceived [on the European Continent] that, as the result of existing developments, the world outside of Europe tends in the future to be controlled in the main by only two sets of forces, those which proceed from the peoples who speak English, and those which proceed from the peoples who speak Russian." When now he realises that, of the two, the English-speaking system, as well as the institutions and ideas enforced by it, is the higher and better, and that his state is one of the most prominent representatives of these institutions and ideas, he cannot possibly leave the task of the expansion

¹ *The Control of the Tropics*, by Benjamin Kidd, p. 27.

of these ideas to the British section of the English-Speaking Brotherhood and self-complacently remain at home.

History, however, is too much for these doctrinaires. The unstemmable tide of great events has proved kinder to the United States, in view of its honourable place in the future history of mankind, than the most well-meant advice of many of its teachers. We are in the midst of what may be the most thrilling moment of the world's history in our own century and perhaps of many centuries that have preceded ours. The Heracles Soter stands at the crossways; and it is of supreme importance which direction the wielder of great strength will take. Now, a new direction has been given to the drift of international affairs within the last two years, and this essential modification in the current of the world's politics is caused by the advent of the United States of America among the powers which fashion the destiny of nations. In spite of the extent of its territory and population, in spite of its great wealth and the intellectual vitality of its people, creating and solving so many problems of internal national life, the United States, up to our own days, was considered a "negligible quantity" by the European diplomat in all that concerned the vaster issues of international policy. It might have been used as a blind factor, as a pawn in the great game, but never as an active and determining agent.

All this has been changed within the last few years. I am not referring solely to the Spanish-American war and its immediate results, still less to the mode and methods of its beginning. It is to the results of conditions preceding, and incidental to, this war that I attach this supreme importance of the United States as a determining factor

62 The Expansion of Western Ideals

in the world's politics. To understand this we must go further afield into the study of recent European politics; and we shall then understand what part the United States played and what part she is likely to play in the future.

Whether Mr Stillman¹ be right or not, the attitude of the United States towards Great Britain, as displayed for many years past, not only enabled Continental diplomacy to ignore any check to its anti-English policy which might come from that quarter, but even to count upon this very opposition as a means of neutralising any vigorous action, offensive or defensive, on the part of England. To any doubts as to whether this state of unfriendliness—if not animosity—was not accidental and passing, an answer was given which has some foundation in the experience of social psychologists. It was said: "Oh, there is no greater rivalry and antagonism than that of cousins; family quarrels are the last to be adjusted; physical and moral proximity, besides constantly creating conditions fostering irritation and the loss of temper, make the differences, even the slight ones, stand out the more strongly, because of the same plane of comparison, which is quite absent where people are remote from each other in every sense, and the differences are so fundamental as to give full sway to the sympathetic faculty." Historical facts have constantly borne this out. It was, is, and—in spite of all recent changes—will be, upon this factor that Continental diplomacy is likely to count. Is it merely a coincidence, a mere matter of chance, that the petty Venezuelan question should have twice turned up so opportunely to enable the enemies of England (surely, in this case, also of humanity) to checkmate that

¹ See his letter on "Germany and the Armenians" in the *Evening Post* of New York, of May 20, 1899.

country in its endeavours to solve the Armenian question? According to Mr Stillman, England had the support of Italy, and the consent of Germany and Austro-Hungary, in its plans to help the Armenians in 1887; and it was the Venezuelan question which then occurred to distract the attention of England and to occupy her hands, so that she had to desist from her noble task. Again in 1896, when the English government had practically pledged itself to put a stop to Armenian oppression, and was, at the same time, entangled in one of the most difficult crises of its foreign history (the South African imbroglio almost threatening a great war, difficulties in Egypt, warnings in India)—at a moment when the American nation ought to have joined her to give security of life to the Armenians, and the majority of the American people were actuated by the same unselfish enthusiasm in the cause of humanity and civilisation—it was at this moment that the “Cleveland Message” came, and the American jingoes brought war with Great Britain within sight. If this was a mere coincidence, then such a conflux of conditions favourable to the policy of Russia has never before occurred. It is not to be wondered at that some people in England and on the Continent, who are prepared to attribute any methods to a country which has no account to give of its foreign action to Parliament or to the public, should have suspected that the action of the United States was more or less directly brought about by Russia. At all events that “Cleveland Message” led the Continental diplomat to realise that even war was not impossible between Great Britain and the United States, and that a good understanding, or anything like common action between them, was far removed on the distant horizon-line of the Barely-Possible. I remember

64 The Expansion of Western Ideals

discussing the European situation with a German diplomat more than two years ago, and when I said, that the whole character of civilised politics would be changed when once the United States entered the arena and came to a closer understanding with Great Britain, he answered: "No fear of that!" and a knowing smile was on his face, "the 'Rheingold' is appearing in the Northwest of the American continent; and that will keep them asunder effectually, if nothing else will." Let us sincerely hope that he did not speak truth.

But the whole face of the diplomatic world has been changed since 1896. The past two years have marked the great crisis in the world's history, the turning point in international politics. This is due to the advent of the United States and of American ideas as factors in European diplomacy. Negatively, this great step was prepared for by a comparatively smaller event, the Græco-Turkish war.

I cannot, nor need I, enter here into all the intricacies of the Cretan question which led to the Græco-Turkish war of 1897. Suffice it to say, that the Cretan troubles existed for many years before they led to that war; that by many diplomats Crete was for many years looked upon as the touch-hole to the Eastern question, at which any great conflagration in the Near East might easily be set ablaze, if such a conflagration proved convenient and desirable at that moment to the powers that directed European affairs. Moreover, we have reason to know that the pretensions, and even the revolutionary agitations of the Cretans, were far from being discouraged by the Russians up to that moment. At no time were the Cretans, and their Greek kinsmen with them, more justified in claiming the support of the Powers that had directly or indirectly

encouraged them in putting forward their just demands than in 1897. The prompt action of the Greek government in the Vassos expedition ought to have made the intervention of the European Powers all the easier, as it also intensified the sympathies of the European peoples. At all events it made it impossible for the Greek monarchy to recall Vassos and to maintain itself in the country. It was then that the European Concert, headed by Russia [and backed by the German Kaiser], ordered the Greeks to withdraw Vassos, and showed a decided antagonism to the whole Hellenic movement, thus bringing about the Græco-Turkish war. England was distinctly favourable, if not to the granting of all the requests made by the Greek government, at all events to a course which would have facilitated the partial retreat of the Greeks under conditions most favourable to the stability of the monarchy and to the gradual remedy of Cretan evils. But the European Concert opposed the action of England in this respect, and the most curious irony in the eccentric course of diplomatic history was then illustrated. Russia, who had hitherto found her ready, obliging, and most helpful ally in France, in the Dual Alliance, which for some years had successfully wrestled with the Triple Alliance on the one side, and England on the other—Russia found as complaisant, nay, a more energetic, agent of its policy in Germany (Austro-Hungary following in the wake) than it had before found in France. And, more singularly ironical still, France, whose national sympathies were all with the Greeks, found herself joining hands with Germany in obsequiously doing the will of Russian diplomacy. The result was that not only was Greece left to its fate, but the whole moral—nay, even more than moral—support of Europe was thrown

into the scales in favour of Turkey. And when Greece was beaten, was thus "set back" in its national aspirations, and had been taught its lesson of humility, the privileges begged and fought for by the Cretans were granted, and were wrested from the Turk, who had meanwhile been victorious and was supposed to have gained a new lease of life. These privileges were, moreover, graciously granted to the Cretans and to the defeated Greeks at the manifest initiative of the Russians. What may have appeared puzzling, if not inexplicable, to the uninitiated, is the unfriendly and relentless attitude of Russia towards Cretans and Greeks before their defeat, when the Cretan question (to a great extent made what it had become by Russia in the preceding years) came to a climax. This is not the place to enter fully into this question. But it will be enough to suggest to the intelligent and thoughtful, that, in view of the geographical and ethnological conditions of the Eastern Mediterranean shores (the Greek population predominating, from Thessaly round through Constantinople, down the whole coast of Asia Minor, not to mention the islands), the national aspirations of the Hellenic people had grown too rapidly and too strongly within the last few years, when considered in their relation to the interests of the Slav nations in the southeast of Europe. These national aspirations had found a manifest, though quite peaceful, expression in the Olympic games celebrated at Athens in 1896, and, still more powerfully, in the secret National Greek Society which played so sad a part during the Greek catastrophe in 1897. It appeared high time that Hellenic aspirations should be repressed and not allowed to prove too dangerous a rival to the Slav predominance of the future.

I venture to maintain now, in the light of what has happened since, what I believed and urged, so far as I was able to do so, before these events happened, that it would have been possible for the British government—without in any way falling a victim to the bugbear of a great European war—to have settled the Cretan question fully as well, if not better, than it has been settled now, without allowing the Greek war to have taken place at all, and, without the severe disasters that have befallen the Greek monarchy and impaired the outer prestige and the inner self-respect of the Greek nation.

It is, however, important to consider the further results of these events upon the position of England in the European world during the six months following the Greek defeat. Russia, with Germany as well as France to back her, stood supreme as the leader, if not the dictator, of the world's affairs. England, completely isolated, had absolutely lost her prestige in the Near East (through her failure in the Armenian and Greek affairs), and was in imminent danger of losing it in the Far East as well. In the West it had but shortly before been on the verge of war with its kinsfolk of the United States, and the cause of discontent was far from being removed. In South Africa it had to adjust a complicated and humiliating imbroglio, and, meanwhile, stormy clouds appeared on the northern boundary of its Indian empire, where the Russian antagonist lies ever watchful, in the serious Afridi rising.

Never was the position of Russia stronger, and that of England weaker. This, therefore, was the moment for the colonial expansion of the Continental Powers, as opposed to that of Great Britain. It looked like the easy victory of the old Continental system of foreign possession and

68 The Expansion of Western Ideals

of "closed doors," over the English-speaking system of colonisation with "the open door."

This was indeed a most dramatic moment in the world's history. And it was then that the United States entered the arena and for the time being saved the situation. I say entered, but I ought rather to say was pushed or sucked in by the force of circumstance, and perhaps by the over-hasty diplomacy of Russia. As a matter of fact they had over-reached themselves. The rapid succession of diplomatic victories which had flowed in with an ease and readiness that must have appeared like a chapter in the *Arabian Nights* to the Russian Foreign Office; the good fortune, the good cheer, coming alike to the pampered appetite of Russia glutted with empire, and to its allies, starving for foreign possessions, seemed to go to their heads and to produce a hasty, manifest voraciousness, which at last startled even those who had a good store of provisions for the present, but began to feel apprehensive about their sustenance in the future. If not Russia, then, at least, her helpmate in the overthrow of the poor Greek, Germany, revealed these signs of aggressive expansion with an energy and haste which has characterised its action of late years. The partition of China among the Continental Powers began; the main point being to diminish, so far as possible, the influence of England there as well as in Africa—in fact, over the whole world. But the very violence and haste of this action began to arouse the people of the United States to the consciousness that they too had paramount interests in the Far East; that, considering their Pacific coast, they had vital interests at stake in China with which an intimate commercial relation exists, and must necessarily grow in the future. And the far-sighted among the American

people, who know and are familiar with history in the past and can apply its teachings to the future, realised that they owed it to the future generations of their countrymen, if not to themselves, that the United States should not be shut out of the world's commerce in future years—an event which the action of the Continental Powers made only too probable. And from this just apprehension they turned to realise positively that the system of expansion of Great Britain with the "open door," was the one which conformed completely to their present and future interests—that, in short, there were two clearly defined systems opposed to one another, the one that of the English-speaking peoples, to which the United States belongs, the other that followed at present by the Continental European Powers headed by Russia.

I need not enlarge upon this fact in view of the admirable exposition which it has received at the hands of Mr Benjamin Kidd¹. But, while naturally accentuating in his book the question of commercial and material interests as represented in the two systems, I am glad to find that he has done justice also to the political, social, and ethical aspects involved in the adoption of the English-speaking or Russian system. He has shown how the one responds to the fundamental spirit of the self-governing peoples in considering the ultimate good of those who are thus to come under the rule of expanded empire; while the other system primarily and essentially considers these "colonies" as possessions which are to be exploited for the good of the expanding country. To him the acquisition of such territory and power is primarily to be conceived as a "trust for

¹ *The Control of the Tropics*, by Benjamin Kidd, New York. 1898.

70 The Expansion of Western Ideals

civilisation" with the full sense of the responsibility which such a trust involves¹.

In the crisis brought about by the aggressive Continental Powers in China, the people of the United States further realised that, beyond the community of material interests, they had, in common with Great Britain, the spirit which would modify the expansion of their interests in contradistinction to that inherent in the methods followed by the other nations.

And then, at last, with renewed force, which seemed to have gained additional strength from the long delay and the wilful oblivion of its existence, they realised their kinship in national, more even than in racial, character, the political, social, and moral kinship which binds them together. Then came the war with Spain, and by the action of Great Britain in contrast to that of the Continental Powers, all these ties which make for union were manifested by deeds, as before by feelings and their expression. We must leave it to the future to make clear to the American people to what extent, and how effectually, this national kinship was manifested by Great Britain during the Spanish War. It would, however, be vain for those whose interest it is to oppose the closer affiliation between these two great peoples, to point to the accidental community of material interests on the part of England and the United States in order to account for the warm feeling of kinship which has grown up between them within these days. The fact remains that such feelings could not exist between them if they were not based upon, and did not arise out of, the kinship of political, social, and moral views, the fundamental identity of character, as well as the community of ideals.

¹ P. 53.

The Spanish War thus brought to an intense, if not passionate, climax, by a final appeal to sentiment, the recognition of a community of interests between the United States and Great Britain, which the action of Continental Europe in China awakened. The united aggression of these powers against England, which at that moment appeared isolated and helpless in the face of these combined forces, had already appealed to the national sentiment of the American people, who, in spite of Venezuelan and Behring Sea complications, would have been unwilling to stand aside and look on while the British Empire, and all it means to civilisation, was dismembered and overthrown, or even weakened in its influence upon the affairs of the world. The sentiment of the British people would not have, for a moment, brooked the interference of the combined Continental Powers to check the advance of American arms, which were taken up in Cuba (whatever the nefarious spirit of "yellow" journalism may have done, however bungling the diplomacy which preceded the outbreak)—which were taken up by the people in a sincere wish to further the cause of humanity.

At the same time the United States demonstrated to the world its great military and naval capacity, especially when it has time to prepare, and when it has set on foot an adequate military and naval organisation. The *quantité négligeable* at once manifested itself to the European diplomat as far from negligible. Moreover he began to see that "family quarrels" are often "made up," especially when outer enemies become manifest; and that the united family then turns upon the interfering neighbour. And what happened then? The Czar's manifesto of universal disarmament was announced by the Russian Foreign Office.

72 The Expansion of Western Ideals

Now, I do not for a moment mean to imply that the Czar was not sincere in his humanitarian enthusiasm, and that he did not also realise the great economical and social problems calling for all the energy the Russian government could expend for home use—in a country which has greater need of its inner resources, and perhaps is nearer bankruptcy than the world at large realises. But we must also remember that no government possesses a Foreign Office which carries on its own tradition and its long-matured plans of campaign without regard to any other department or authority as does that of the great Autocrat. All must make room to this iron machine, moving on relentlessly in spite of Czar and nation.

Well, is it again a mere coincidence that the Czar should have been urged to publish his manifesto to the world through the Foreign Office just at this moment? That moment was marked by the fact that a new English-speaking Nation had entered the lists as a naval and military Power and had distinctly shown its intention of joining the other side.

At the same time it was a curious and fortunate coincidence that, just at that moment, France had completed its part in furthering Russian interests and was becoming inconveniently exacting to see some return of courtesy on its side. A proclamation of universal disarmament must be, in the eyes of a people whose political life centred round the claim of *Revanche*, and the readjustment of its boundaries by the force of arms, a clear hint that the contract is over, the alliance ended. No more convenient means of getting out of the disagreeable relation to France could ever have presented itself to Russia. Could there be any harm in weakening the military parties in all

countries possessed of representative government by strengthening the parties opposing them and swelling their numbers? Might it not help the Peace advocates even in the United States (besides the Anti-Imperialists in England and Germany) and ultimately produce an Anti-Expansionist movement there? Meanwhile the whole situation left nothing to be desired. Russia had staked out all its "claims," all the districts it ever hoped to hold, including the *Hinterlands*; and all it need ask for from a Supreme Court of Arbitration, should the Conference succeed, was a maintenance of the *Status Quo* when such a court was once formed. And the interval between the Czar's manifesto and the meeting of the Peace Conference—not to speak of any authoritative body that might issue out of its deliberations—was this employed by Russia in preparing for its own disarmament? On the contrary, it was spent in increasing the number of "claims" and, in breathless haste, staking out as much as possible.

Now let me revert to the development of affairs and of national feeling in the United States. The inevitable course of events, which, for a time had raised the American people aloft into the purer region of ideas and ideals, and had, through such tortuous channels, finally led the stream of international feeling flowing between the United States and Great Britain into the broader current of sentiment in which the kinship of ideas and ideals was uppermost—the same course of events again forced this current back into the definite material channel of colonial expansion. A new aspect of this question was now forced upon the American people, new, not only because, after the fortune of war had delivered into their hands Spanish possessions which could not simply be left to themselves, the responsi-

74 The Expansion of Western Ideals

bility of their good government had fallen upon the United States; but new in that the United States had now realised the broader and more general aspect of the whole question of colonisation and expansion in its international relation. It has had forced upon it all the experiences in the general development of modern international politics which I have just endeavoured to outline in part. It must now face these questions with the full knowledge of all that has been done in European politics as it affects the question of colonial expansion; and this must necessarily modify its own individual attitude with regard to any individual district or people with which the Spanish War has forced it into immediate relation. It is thus forced to choose to which of the two systems, standing directly opposed to each other, it is to adhere,—whether it is to be the English-speaking system of colonisation, or that of the Continental European Powers headed by Russia. This question has at once come to a head in a most acute form in the case of the Philippines. And it is naturally here that the opposition of the Anti-Expansionists in the United States has arisen.

We have here reached the really critical point in the development of Anti-Expansionism. Many who oppose the policy of the present government might say: "We agree in principle with your ideals of Expansion as you have just put them; but we do not approve of the means you apply for their realisation as seen in our treatment of the "Filipinos." And having said this, by imperceptible phases of fallacious reasoning, they will gradually move round the circle until they will end, as the German phrase goes, "by pouring the child out with the bath water," i.e., by violently opposing the whole policy of Expansion, because

they disapprove of the government's action in the Philippines. Still more powerful and misleading are the arguments of those who oppose Expansion on the ground that it contradicts the fundamental traditions and the fundamental ideals of the American people. "You must not," they say, "buy the blessings you enumerate at the cost of war; you must not even benefit people against their will; you must not impose your rule upon others at the sacrifice of the very idea you wish to expand, namely, that of self-government."

Now I will not, though this would be the most effective way of showing the groundlessness of their arguments, call upon them to state clearly and definitely, with the possibility of its early practical application, the line of conduct which they would have the government follow in each individual case presenting such complicated difficulties in view of the far-reaching intricacy of the problems before us. Were it possible thus to compare the two rival schemes of administration, I believe the intelligent public would soon recognise the amateurishness of the criticism offered at this stage.

But I deny their right of appeal to American tradition and American ideals. Among the great deeds of the past which come nearest to embodying American ideals, two stand forth most clearly in the world's history. These justify the high place which the United States can ever claim in fashioning the world's destiny for good,—the one is the War of Independence, the other is the Abolition of Slavery. Yet both these ideas were realised by means of war,—moreover, fratricidal war, carried on with all the rigour and harshness of warfare. And in both cases we were using force to confer upon the people at large ultimate

76 The Expansion of Western Ideals

blessings, which, at the time, a large number of them were unwilling to recognise as such,—the Tories in the War of Independence, and the Secessionists in the Civil War. And the initiators of these great deeds were certainly *unconstitutional* in the Revolutionary War, and possibly so in the Civil War. At the present moment, moreover, the United States is at war with the Filipino insurgents; it is an accomplished fact; and it is disloyal for any American citizen to counteract the success of American arms, materially or morally, while the recognised government of the country has raised them against an enemy at war. Should the spirit of humanity which actuates these protesters detect methods of warfare applied by his own country which are opposed to the essential spirit of civilisation and humanity, to the national conscience of this country, he is justified in his protest—but in no other case.

Still more misleading is the appeal which the Anti-Expansionist makes to the fundamental principle of the American Constitution, the principle of self-government. There has been more nefarious abuse of this term, and what it is supposed to imply, than of any other I can recall. The glorious proclamation of the Declaration of Independence—"All men are created equal"—does not mean, that we give the right to govern to each individual at his birth or for some years after this important event in his personal history. On the contrary, we take great care to defer the period in which he is to exercise his function of contributing to the government of the country to an advanced period in his life, when we have reason to believe that he will exercise this function, not, at least, to the detriment of his neighbours. Nor do we admit the

insane or the criminal to these privileges of self-government. It is important for us to realise that, in principle as well as in practice, the United States has always maintained essential limitations to the general principle of personal liberty and of self-government. And it is important always to remember that "self-government" really implies the governing of our neighbour. One of the chief tasks of our law-making bodies is constantly to define, to restrict as well as to safeguard, the rights of the individual, his personal liberty and his function of self-government. Now, what applies to the individual applies *a fortiori* to larger recognisable bodies of individuals in the form of communal bodies and states. And as little as we remain content with the past definitions of personal liberty in common and criminal law, so little are we justified in expecting to remain stationary in our dependence upon the past in constitutional law.

It is the natural and justifiable tendency for the legal mind to be, not only generally conservative and to worship that which is, but even to regard the dead word rather than the living spirit, the anatomy rather than the physiology of human existence. I have before me a very able essay dealing with the present Philippine situation from the point of view of constitutional history and law, by one who is manifestly a master in these departments of juridical science¹. Professor Freund analyses the protectorates of the past, from those of the ancient Romans, through the Ionian Islands, the States of the Balkan Peninsula, Egypt, Tunis, Madagascar, Anam, Tonquin, the native States of the Dutch Indies, the native States of

¹ *The Control of Dependencies through Protectorates*, by Ernst Freund, Boston, 1899.

78 The Expansion of Western Ideals

British India, and the Samoan Islands. He then points out forcibly the difficulties of fitting a new colonial system into the legal conditions of the present American Constitution. But important and useful as the exposition of such difficult tasks is, the question must be asked: "Whoever expected, or had the right to expect, that these new tasks would not be fraught with difficulties?" Have we a right to expect that we shall be able at once to find the proper constitutional status for new bodies called into the world by such new conditions of national life, and that supremely mark the vitality of our national existence? That we shall do this in one day, without having to retract and to modify in the future, sitting peacefully in our secluded studies surrounded by our reference books on constitutional law and history,—one system, perfect and complete in itself, which shall suit all cases? And can we ask for this in face of the fact that the British Colonial Department, after many generations of colonial expansion and experience in the government of dependencies, has to deal with the list of colonies presenting, as regards the nature of their government, a variety at once confusing, and, at the same time, creditable to the good sense of the British people and the colonial administrators¹?—

At the head of it come the great self-governing States like Canada, Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, the Cape Natal, New Zealand, and others, all colonies in the true sense of the word, off-shoots of England in temperate regions of the world, many of them engaged in the practical solution of some of the most advanced political and social problems which occupy the attention of the modern world. If we look further down the list, we have a strange medley. Vast territories in tropical lands, acquired at various dates in the course of war:

¹ Kidd, *o.c.* pp. 33, 34.

and trade; countries inhabited by different races and governed under a variety of constitutions; regions representing every type of administrative problem—questions of war, of defence, of finance, which raise the whole modern policy of the Empire, questions of responsibility to weaker races, of the relations of the governing power to great systems of native jurisprudence and religion, which take us back to the very childhood of the world, and in which the first principle of successful policy is that we are dealing, as it were, with children, are all grouped together as “colonies,” in common with those modern self-governing States, the reproductions of England in temperate regions.

Whether the Philippine Islands are now to be called colonies, dependencies, protectorates, possessions, or dominion States, is immaterial. The future, as well as the moral and political conscience of the United States (and it is here that the noble section of the Anti-Expansionists will, *in the future*, be called upon to manifest their ideals), will decide this question. But at this juncture there are two points that stand out clearly and that must determine the present policy of the government; and due regard for these is to be had in the interest of the Philippine people themselves, as well as for the preservation of peaceful relations of the United States to other powers, and, consequently, in the interest of the world's peace. The first is, that the American possession of these territories be complete, and its rule unquestioned in the eyes of the inhabitants, as well as of the outer world; the second is, that no rash promises be made as to what will be done in the future.

Once granted the right, and the duty, of the United States to expand its influence into regions not yet possessed of Western civilisation, the first steps in carrying out this

80 The Expansion of Western Ideals

policy are so intricate and complicated, and demand so much intimate knowledge, wide as well as thorough, of facts that are essentially technical, that the general public is most likely to err at every stage when attempting to deal with them, and must leave them to the responsible heads of government which it has chosen to solve these technical problems. Yet we can all of us realise how disastrous would have been the effect of granting absolute "self-government" to the population of the Philippine Islands the moment they were freed from the Spanish yoke, in view, not only, of the complicated internal conditions of that country, but also of our experience by analogy in countries on the same (some of them on a much higher) level of political education. And the recent history, while our occupation was effected, and the present troubles in Samoa, force us to appreciate to what international complications a title of possession that is not clear may lead. It is important to remember the advice¹ given by a German authority, Baron von Lüttwitz, to Germany, "that the prevailing conditions in China and the unstable condition in many South American States offered opportunities for German expansion in these regions." But the danger of a hesitating occupation of such countries is far from being restricted to the attitude of Germany; it will apply, at least potentially, to any other State. In view of future danger from within and without, it is not only wise, but also charitable, to make the first stages of occupation as clear and unequivocal as possible. Let us remember what would necessarily be the waste of blood and treasure if, in the future, the United States was forced constantly to intervene between the belligerent factions within such a country, or

¹ Quoted by Kidd, *o.c.* p. 47.

to make real the claims of its own inhabitants, who, by the action of the Philippine Legislature, were hampered and repressed by laws dealing with them as Uitlanders.

The same applies to any promises which any government might make for its future action with regard to occupation or the degree of self-government to be granted in the future. England's experience in Egypt ought to teach a great lesson. Such promises on the part of a statesman are either insincere or foolish. For the true statesman must know that the force of circumstance and the altered conditions demand new treatment, perhaps new concessions; and that it is always easier to grant more liberties than to retrench existing ones.

When once the union of these countries with the United States is made clear to their inhabitants and the outer world sees that they are beyond all doubt an integral part of the United States, then will be the time for those actuated by the high ideals of the noble section of Anti-Expansionists to raise their voice and to maintain constantly an attitude of watchfulness and criticism, to give an upward direction to the administration of these countries. Yet even here it will be wise for them to learn from the experience of those who, for generations past, have been struggling with the solution of similar problems. I would recommend all interested in this subject to read what Mr Kidd says in commenting on the institution of the English Indian Civil Service¹, and will select a few passages here, which the present Anti-Expansionist might bear in mind for his *future* efforts. Speaking of the responsibility of those who "colonise" distant countries, he says²:

If he has any right there at all, he is there in the name of civilisation; if our civilisation has any right there at all, it

¹ Pp. 53-60.

² P. 54.

82 The Expansion of Western Ideals

is because it represents higher ideals of humanity, a higher type of social order. This is the lesson which, slowly and painfully, and with many a temporary reversion to older ideas, the British peoples have been learning in India for the last fifty years, and which has recently been applied in other circumstances to the government of Egypt. Under a multitude of outward aspects, the one principle which separates the new era from the old in India, a principle the influence of which has come to extend even to the habits and dress of the governing class, is the recognition of the fact that the standards according to which India must be governed have been developed and are nourished elsewhere. The one consistent idea which, through all outward forms, has in late years been behind the institution of the higher Indian Civil Service on existing lines is that, even where it is equally open to natives with Europeans through competitive examination, entrance to it shall be made through an English University. In other words, it is the best and most distinctive product which England can give, the higher ideals and standards of her Universities, which is made to feed the inner life from which the British administration of India proceeds.

And further¹:

But in this, as in all other matters, the one underlying principle of success in any future relationship to the tropics is to keep those who administer the government which represents our civilisation in direct and intimate contact with the standards of that civilisation at its best; and to keep the acts of the government itself within the closest range of that influence, often irksome, sometimes even misleading, but always absolutely vital,—the continual scrutiny of the public mind at home.

And finally²:

A policy in such relations is a matter beyond the control even of governments; it is ultimately regulated only by the development of a people, by standards which are the slow

¹ P. 57.

² P. 59.

growth of time. If the English-speaking peoples do not mean to shirk the grave responsibility which lies upon them in this matter, they must act at once, with clear purpose and with courage. Neither the purpose nor the courage should be wanting to those who possess a conviction of the far-reaching importance in the future of the ideas and principles for which these peoples now stand in the world.

It is at this very point that the third group of Anti-Expansionists come in, those whose ground of opposition has all the strength of modesty in its favour. "Great Britain," they say,

may be prepared to rule distant colonies, for that people have set their house in order at home, which we have not yet done. They have a well-organised Civil Service, with a firmly rooted tradition of integrity and honour inherent in the very offices themselves, and thus they have been able to devise an admirable Indian Civil Service which we, at least for the present, cannot aspire to. We must learn to govern ourselves honestly and effectually at home before we think of extending our government in distant lands. For, at present, the addition of a long list of offices in distant parts, removed from the watchful, critical eye of those at home who are earnestly exerting themselves to counteract corruption here, will only add to the wealth of "spoils" which the unscrupulous party politician already possesses as a means of corrupting the whole nation.

May not this Anti-Expansionist be putting the cart before the horse? The "spoils" system existed in England not so very many years ago in its most cynical form, and British party politics were as corrupt as they could well be. I maintain that the gratifying reforms which have been introduced during the last two generations were in great part due to the reactive influence of colonial administration upon the Home government, until they gradually formed new national traditions. Corruption,

84 The Expansion of Western Ideals

when circumscribed and local, may shock with great intensity the inhabitants dwelling within the immediate limits where it is active, and may lead to intense protests and indignation. There may be, as in the case of Tammany frauds, periodical risings of those representing the purer and higher public opinion. But it is far from being a paradox to say, that such inquiries into local corruption tend ultimately to debase rather than to elevate the public conscience. For radical and lasting reforms have not yet been introduced, and the inability to extirpate such vicious growths, root and branch, is to be sought in the more remote, yet fundamental, spirit of national political life. And when a community has ultimately to acquiesce in the retention of even a portion of the corrupting forces, the community, as such, becomes party to the corruption itself. Public spirit is thus ultimately robbed of the keen edge of its conscience, its moral substance becomes blunted, and lower traditions become fixed and firmly established. The newspapers all over the country may find abundant "copy" in the inquiry into local frauds of one city or district, and the sensationalism inherent in the trials may stimulate the curiosity of the readers all over the Union; but this form of reading matter soon makes room for the newest sensation, and the trouble really only concerns a definite locality or department.

It will not be so with the maladministration of a protectorate or colony; this is not a purely local or departmental affair. Nay, the watchful criticism will not be confined to the nation itself; but the whole world, all other nations, those inimical and covetous as well as those friendly and sympathetic, will be ever present to reveal hidden corruption and to call for justice and redress for the colonists

protected or ruled. I venture boldly to predict that in the future the department which will lead the way, as regards efficiency and integrity, in the whole United States government, will be the "Colonial" department¹.

Moreover, the creation of such new offices will, directly and indirectly, accelerate Civil Service Reform in the United States. For, on the one hand, it will demand, on the part of officials, qualifications of a technical and un-local character which will necessarily raise the standards for the applicants to such offices. And, on the other hand, in itself, in its immediate bearing upon the Department of State, and, ultimately, upon the whole administrative machinery of government, it will, from the nature of the issues raised, call upon the educated intelligence of politicians and those aspiring to political honours, and thus will make it practically impossible for the ignorant "ward-politician" to face the public at all without making himself manifestly ridiculous in the eyes of the whole public. A timely appeal to the immediate interests of any class of audience which such a politician may be addressing, in connection with even the widest economical or fiscal issue in national politics, may always help him to hide his fundamental ignorance and unscrupulousness. This convenient loophole is not so likely to present itself when American politics have developed out of the infantile stage of national provincialism.

Here we come to the more indirect, though none the less

¹ Since this was in type I have had the privilege of making the acquaintance of General Wood, and have heard from him what he has done at Santiago and intends to do in the future. I can only say that if the United States can produce more men of this stamp, there will be no fear for the "colonies," nor for the good fame of the home government.

86 The Expansion of Western Ideals

important, influence which expansion will have upon the political and social education of the nation as a whole; it will enforce a wider view of politics upon the whole people. It has often been pointed out that one positive reason for the wide-spread political corruption among the American people, possessed as a nation of comparatively so high a standard of social and commercial morality, is to be found in the great and growing prosperity of the country itself and the all-absorbing attraction of its active life outside of politics. The supreme abundance of opportunity, the alluring and clamorous appeals to the advance of individual prosperity are within the reach of all its freeborn citizens; and thus no time and energy remain for direct participation in public affairs to those best fitted to struggle in life's battle. This very wealth and prosperity within the country, which thus absorb the best men and draw their moral and intellectual power away from politics, make the results of political mal-administration, which would be keenly and painfully felt in an older and poorer country, less sensible to the actual life of the American people. But if these be truly the positive reasons, the negative cause, it appears to me, lies in the absence of wider political issues which break through the narrow bounds of local interests and produce more attractive as well as elevating political ideals.

With all its disasters and incidental inhumanities, the Civil War aroused and satisfied the higher cravings for wider political ideals on the part of the nation. The period succeeding this, down to our own days, has been one of unprecedented economical development and prosperity. But the moral and ideal side of national life has been starved, and these national faculties are gradually ap-

proaching a stage which pathologists designate by the term atrophy. All questions have pre-eminently had a topical, and, hence, a personal character. Even the great questions of general economical and fiscal policy, far-reaching in their effect upon the world though they be,—the questions of protection or free-trade, of gold or silver currency,—can always, and will always, be reduced to the personal, “back-yard” view.

Altho this has favoured a national tone of cynical self-sufficiency which leads the American not so much to feel pride in his glorious freedom and independence, as to assume an almost negative attitude of mind towards the rest of the world, and to cultivate a growing emasculating habit of self-admiration. Now, there is death from congestion and hyperæmia, following the inner concentration of vital forces, as well as from attenuation and anæmia, following the diffusion and dispersion of such vitality. Whatever may be said against the motives and methods of “yellow” journalism and those whose opinions it represented, the spirit which moved those who called the Americans to arms to better the conditions of the oppressed Cubans gave a new lease of life to the national morality of the American people.

I verily believe that if the American could have seen himself before, as in a mirror, and realised what sort of a political physiognomy he had in the international world, he would have been astonished. While meeting Americans in Europe I have often heard the naïve complaint, with the suggestion of wounded vanity underneath, that the European newspapers did not contain more news from the United States. Beyond despatches concerning presidential elections and wider questions bearing upon federal policy,

88 The Expansion of Western Ideals

with commercial and financial news, there was very little. But such a complainant did not stop to ask himself, whether, in the news he craved for, there were any events or facts that concerned or affected, even the whole people of the United States, not to mention the other nations of the civilised world? The complaint, and the ideas which caused it to be made, emanated from what, after all, we should in sober judgment call provincialism, which always implies an absence of the sense of proportion. On the other hand, it appears to me that the newspapers of the United States have, in spite of growing facility in the means of rapid communication, reduced the proportion of impersonal news (they have unfortunately used the facility for communication to increase the publication of matters of a personal nature)—news bearing upon the international life of the civilised world. I am not referring to foreign events which have attained a sensational stage, such as actual war; but to facts which, though less satisfying to grosser curiosity, have the most important bearings upon the world's civilisation,—events, for instance, in a small state like Bulgaria or Roumania, or in a distant “colony” in Australasia—an enormous and important empire of the future with most vital bearing upon the civilised life of the world. I am often astonished to observe how even the most educated, not to mention the people at large, are ignorant of the most rudimentary notions in these affairs.

A perusal of the leading English newspapers, on the other hand, and a consideration of the choice they make of the abundant news from all over the world, a choice not affected by the sensationalism of events, but by the well-considered bearing of events upon the wider issues of the world's politics, illustrate the political education of the

people whom in turn they tend to educate. Besides the "news," they frequently contain exhaustive and well-matured accounts of different countries, each filling several columns and dealing with the social, political, and commercial life and prospects of these distant communities. These are generally written by special correspondents sent out for the purpose and well-qualified for the task, or by scholarly and experienced travellers, such as the present Viceroy of India, whose studies we may often find the more profitable from the fact that they are not written by professional journalists.

The English people as a whole thus command a wider horizon for their political interest and judgment. And this training has come to them chiefly because they have expanded in the past into an empire with distant and diversified interests and duties. Nay, even the distant investment of capital and infusion and diffusion of commerce, though they arise in every individual case out of purely selfish and personal motives of gain, have this ultimate good for the nation and for the world at large (and this to many of us is their only justification from a national and universal point of view)—that they increase the knowledge of distant countries, the interest in them and the realisation of duties toward them. They ultimately make clear to the nation standing in such relation to the distant colony that they hold this relation as a "Trust for Civilisation."

In the United States the first effect of such a widened sphere of political activity and responsibility will be that it will strike the death-knell to the rule of the "ward-politician," which has hitherto been the corner-stone and the key-stone to the whole of national American politics. If the timid fear that the United States is at present not

90 The Expansion of Western Ideals

prepared for such high tasks and grave responsibilities, the answer is: that it never will become so if it remains under the bane of "back-yard" politics. The life of nations and the life of individuals have shown that those who are possessed of real vitality and strength are always elevated by the loftiness of the aims which they hold before them, and that they ultimately live up to the high standards which an idealism not divorced from reason sets before them. And so long as the Expansionists in the United States remain conscious of these ideals and never lose sight of the ultimate duties which they have towards their new dependencies, holding them as trusts for civilisation, the effects upon the American nation, and, through it, upon the world at large, can only result in blessing.

When the question of Expansion is viewed in this light it must be realised that the claims, implied in the criticism of the best Anti-Expansionists, namely, that they are moved by American Ideals which others have forsaken, are absolutely groundless. And if it be thought, by some who pride themselves upon possessing a sober and practical mind, that these Expansionist ideals are rather vague and remote as forces which directly move the interested action of a nation, and have no power to check its aggressive action when passionate interest strongly urges it on in the wrong direction; if they doubt whether these ideals are sufficiently proximate and tangible to enter into the conscious life of the individual and to affect his actions, I will sin against the dictates of good taste and will make a personal confession, confident as I am that there are thousands who feel as I do.

So far from being remote and ineffectual, I solemnly

declare that these ideals with regard to the aims of Western civilisation form the foundation of my conscious existence even in the most practical aspects of my life. That, if I were not aware of their existence at the base of my consciousness, I could not pursue the vocation of life to which I have hitherto devoted myself, and by means of which I gain my subsistence. If I did not believe that ultimately all individual efforts culminate in the increase and strengthening, as well as in the diffusion, of Western civilisation and its highest and most subtle attainments, the best that man's intelligent efforts has yet devised,—I should wish to spend my life in lotus-eating, if not to seek peace in Nirvāṇa.

As I have arrived at this lofty sphere of aspiration, I will draw one last conclusion in the direction of ideals from the policy of Expansion as it ought to be followed by the United States; and I do this at the risk of being considered a "mere dreamer." But there are different kinds of dreamers; there are rational and irrational dreamers. Those who have succeeded in attaining the highest achievements in the world's history might all be called, and generally were called, dreamers. No man—and for that matter no nation—can do great things unless his imagination can produce, and hold up both before the intense discriminating power of his intellect, and before the untiring and unflinching energy of his will, some great ultimate goal to lofty endeavour. In so far all great men are idealists. But the difference between these idealists and the mere dreamers is that the latter spend their lives in the contemplation of their ideals, whereas to the former the ideals illuminate their lives. The dreamer gazes upon the brilliant sun until his vision is dimmed, and his whole brain lapses

92 The Expansion of Western Ideals

into an hypnotic state. The world outside the immediate radius of this brilliant sun is one great darkness, and he expends the weakened energy which is left to his somnolent nature in railing at this darkness and despising it. He is even unable to detect the lighter shades and half-tones, the infinite gradations which lie between the brilliancy of his distant sun and the darkness below and behind his feet. The idealist, on the other hand, having raised high aloft on the pinnacles of existence his brilliant beacon-light, does not spend his time in gazing immediately at it; but allows it to shed a lustre of illumination upon the whole roadway of life over which it shines; and instead of casting what is immediately at his feet into greater darkness, this distant light searches out every nook and cranny of existence, and enables him to pursue his path unfalteringly, to recognise the size and dimensions of each object in his path, its power of facilitating or impeding progress, of yielding or resisting; and, finally, it gives him a clear notion of distance itself. And thus he is patient, and not petulant, as regards what lies immediately before him, knowing that he has beyond a clear, lofty goal which lights and warms.

It is thus that the expansion of Western ideals will ultimately tend towards the supreme goal of the World's Peace; and I maintain in all sincerity of conviction, that it is through the introduction of the United States into this great expanding movement, and through, as a first step, the realisation of the English-Speaking Brotherhood, that this ultimate goal is most likely to be attained.

When, within the last decade, colonial expansion more and more asserted itself as the dominant motive power in the policy of European nations, the lovers of progress

and peace were struck with horror at the appearance of this new Leviathan, this great enemy of humanity, that threatened to furnish a continuance of causes for internecine warfare after the dynastic rivalries had died away, and when the racial and territorial differences seemed to be gradually losing their virulent energy in Europe. It looked as if we were entering into a chaotic period of Universal Grab, in which each nation would rush in to seize all the spoils it could carry, and would frequently have to drop them in order to fight its equally voracious neighbour. This gloomy view has been completely dispelled by the prospect of a real English-Speaking Brotherhood. For, as regards colonial expansion, I can see the English-speaking conception of colonisation in clear opposition, in the domain of material interests as well as in that of ideas and ideals, to that of the Continental European Powers. And this common ground of thought, feeling, and action will of necessity tend to bind the English-speaking peoples together. Through it I look forward to much more than an Anglo-Saxon Alliance. I can see the day when there will be a great confederation of the independent and self-governing English-speaking nations, made clearly recognisable and effective to the outer world by some new form of international corporation, which statesmen and jurists will be able to devise when the necessity of things calls for it. For, day by day, this union of the English-speaking peoples is becoming more of an accomplished fact in the social and economical life of the people themselves. Consider the strength of such a confederation! Who will say nay to it? And the stronger it is, the better for the peace of the world; it will ensure this more effectually than any number of Peace Congresses convoked by the mightiest of monarchs.

94 The Expansion of Western Ideals

Step by step this power will advance, binding the nations together, not severing them. For it will be based upon ideas which unite, and not upon race which severs. And all those who share these ideas are *ipso facto* a part of this union; Germany, which stands before the world as a great leader of human intelligence will be with us. France, which overthrew mediæval feudalism and first raised the torch of freedom, will be with us in spite of the tragic crisis through which it is at present passing, when vicious reaction is contending with delirious anarchy;—for it must never be forgotten that the France of to-day produced the Picquarts, Zolas, and many other heroes who fought for the sanctity of justice. Thousands of Russians, their numbers constantly swelling, will be with us in spirit, and the spirit will force its essence into inert matter; these leaders will educate the people until they will modify (let us hope gradually) the spirit of their own government.

Then we shall be prepared to make an end of war; because behind the great humanitarian idea there will be the power to safeguard these ideas. “No right without might” is a cynical aphorism of which history has proved the truth. To be effective, the law must have behind it the power to enforce its decisions. It is so in national law, and it will be so in international law.

Let us allow our “dream” to materialise still further. I can see this great Confederacy of the future established permanently with its local habitation, let us say on one of the islands,—the Azores, Bermuda, the Canaries, Madeira. And here will be sitting the great Court of Arbitration, composed of most eminent men from all the nations in the Confederacy. Here will be assembled, always ready to carry into effect the laws enacted, an international army,

and an international fleet,—the police of the world's highways. No recalcitrant nation (then, and only then, will the nations be able to disarm) could venture to oppose its will to that of this supreme representative of justice. Perhaps this court may develop into a court of appeals, dealing not only with matters of state. The function of this capital to the great Confederacy will not only concern war; but peace as well. There will be established here "Bureaux" representing the interests which all the nations have in common. As regards commerce and industry, they will distribute throughout the world important information concerning the supply and demand of the world's markets, and counteracting to some extent the clumsy economical chaos which now causes so much distress throughout the world. Science and art, which are ever the most effective bonds between civilised peoples, will there find their international habitation, and here will be established the great international universities, and libraries, and museums. There will be annual exhibitions of works of art and industry, so that the nations, comparatively so ignorant of each other's work now, should learn fully to appreciate each other. And at greater intervals there will be greater exhibitions and international meetings, the modern form of the Olympic games. The Amphyctionic Council of Delphi, as well as the Olympic Games of the small Greek communities, will find their natural and un-romantic revival in this centre of civilisation, this tangible culminating point of Western Ideals. Thus will the World's Peace be insured, the nations be brought together, and the ancient inherited prejudices and hatreds be stamped out from the face of the earth.

III

THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING BROTHERHOOD

A LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE IMPERIAL
INSTITUTE, LONDON, THE EARL OF ROSE-
BERRY, K.G., K.T., IN THE CHAIR, ON
JULY 7, 1898

100 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

itself were to gain importance, such an alliance would be jeopardised in its leading purpose, and for all time its vitality and durability would be threatened. For an effective and close amity, if not a federation, between Great Britain and the United States has been one of the dreams of my life, which appeared remote, sometimes very remote; yet which, whatever may happen, has now fortunately been brought near to realisation in the minds of the best and even the most sober people in both countries.

Mr Davitt has shown that the American nation cannot be considered to consist of Anglo-Saxons. He has pointed with force, perhaps with some exaggeration, to the people of Irish birth or descent as a strong component element in the American nation. That this is so as regards the Irish cannot be doubted, and it can be extended to other nationalities within the American people clearly not of Anglo-Saxon origin. Whatever the practical reasons or interests in speaking of such an alliance as an Anglo-Saxon Alliance may be, as a matter of truthful and accurate statement such terms can never be used to convey and to cover adequately the ideas which they are meant to impart. An alliance between the British Empire and the United States of America can never rightly be called an Anglo-Saxon Alliance; nor do we mean Anglo-Saxon when we have in mind the British Empire or even the English people—still less the American nation. They *can* all be called English-speaking nations.

Take the case of the English people. Who can define, with any claim to scientific accuracy, the ethnological elements to be found in the earliest pre-historic inhabitants, followed by Celts, Romans, Angles, Jutes, Danes, Saxons, and Normans? Who would compute and give their accurate

The English-Speaking Brotherhood 101

value in the formation of the English people, its government, policy, its intellectual, social, and economical life, to the subsequent immigration of Dutch and Flemish, French Huguenot, Italian, Jewish, weavers and craftsmen, bankers and traders, thinkers and artists? All these elements combined and intermingled, merged and fused into one another in the social and political unity of this people, have made the British Empire of to-day.

It profits little to disintegrate these component parts and weigh them separately in the scales of abstract science; it mars much, however, to turn this inaccurate abstract thought into action, into practical life and politics, and to use its theoretical dryness to fan the flames of a misguided political passion. If this be true of the dwellers in England itself and of the English people of the present, it is still more true when we consider Great Britain and Ireland, not to mention the transfusion of the Anglo-Saxon in Scotland with Celtic and other ethnological elements.

Unfortunately the misdeeds and blunders of those who governed England in the past, as well as the leading questions of actual politics in our own days, have made the Irish Question synonymous with the measure of separateness claimed by, or to be given to, the inhabitants of Ireland. But there is another side to the Irish Question which, if political passions and interests allowed of it, would be recognised as equally interesting and instructive. This Irish Question would consider the actual and historical claims which Irish people have to be an integral and important part in the wholeness of the British people and in the making of the British Empire. And if there be glory in the making of such an Empire, and justified pride in the strength and superiority of such a nation, the Irish people,

whether they accept it or not, have an undeniable claim to such glory. I am not only thinking of great individuals who made, framed, or modified the lasting fabric of this Empire, not of Wellington (who is and remains an Irish Briton more than William the Conqueror and his successors were Englishmen), of the Wolfes and Goughs, and Dillons, and Inchiquins, the Bourkes and O'Connells, the Grattans, and scores of others. I am not only bearing in mind the huge number of great Englishmen who inherited their personal greatness perhaps more from their Irish mother than from their English father; but I am thinking of the compact army of Irish Britons who fought our battles and who force us to recall the heroism of the Connaught Rangers, the Royal Irish Regiment, the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, the Royal Munster Fusiliers, and many others, while we glorify the Gordon and Seaforth Highlanders in their recent victories. Moreover we must not limit our estimate of the Irishman's share in the making of Greater Britain to the consideration of the fighter's in war; but there are the armies of working men who have contributed by their skill and the sweat of their brow to the supremacy of our manufacture and trade in Manchester, Liverpool, and all the industrial centres, and who had so great a share in the early formation of our thriving colonies beyond the seas.

Can we, even after a hasty consideration of these facts, use the term Anglo-Saxon in connection with Greater Britain in anything but the sense of a figure of speech, and a very inaccurate one at that? And when such a figure of speech is not only misleading in thought, but may work upon the feelings of great masses of people, cripple or stultify or misdirect action, what use can there be in applying it at all?

The English-Speaking Brotherhood 103

If now we turn to the United States, the term Anglo-Saxon with its faults and pedantic suggestion of ethnological fundamentality is still more inaccurate and misleading. It is true, and will always remain so, that the substructure of American national life is English, English in language, in its social and political institutions. But ethnologically the American nation presents a huge and unequalled mixture of different European races; and I venture to hold that upon this very mixture depends its ultimate strength, though it may be the source of occasional weakness and danger when the national fusion is not recognised as paramount. Nay, I venture to say that, in the present phase of American historical evolution, the incomplete state of national unity in the process of this fusion is the greatest national danger. It is, for instance, well known and readily recognised, that the preponderance of Irish influence in the politics of our own day has, on more than one occasion, given a serious turn to the gravest questions of federal politics, as it constantly and continuously affects local administration. And it will readily be seen how this may in turn evoke similar groupings and antagonisms of the other national components, which, to say the least, do not contribute to the compactness and political unity of a nation. Whenever in the United States one or the other of these would-be racial elements rises up as a majority, or even as an effective minority, and carries its separateness into political action, we shall have distinct cases of national disease and of national crises. The geographical vastness of the country is not, as De Tocqueville anticipated, the chief source of danger to American unity, not even the stereotyping of opposed interests in the East and West and the recognition of such

104 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

an opposition on the part of the people. It is only when this difference of so-called interests¹ is fixed and intensified and appeals to the passions and prejudices of the people, when it becomes social in character and develops Chauvinistic antagonisms, that it acts as a real revolutionary force. The moment the Westerner is recognised by the Easterner as distinct from himself, and recognises himself as such, the seeds of disruption are sown².

Of this there are and have been dangerous symptoms in the United States, never quite clear and clearly defined, but there all the same. It is not only that the Western

¹ I do not mean to say that when such material interests can be clearly grouped according to districts or social divisions they do not tend to strengthen tenfold the existing antagonisms; as, on the other hand, the recognition of common interests increases amity and the need for alliance, in fact, brings these uniting currents to a head. That is why the Far East, as a common fund of material interest between Great Britain and the United States, has given a consistent, firm, and strong immediate impulse to the idea of such an alliance. Such common interests will ultimately strengthen amity into alliance. But this is only because these material seeds fell upon the fertile ground of a common civilisation, national sympathies and ideals. Conversely we must hold that the Franco-Russian Alliance will always remain precarious, because it is purely opportunistic and is only based on material interest.

² The careful student of politics will realise that the fundamental danger to Italian unity, as well as to the stability of government in France, lies in the dualism and antagonism between the Northerner (Piemontese) and the Southerner (Neapolitan), the Northerner in France and the Meridional or Southerner; just as, in the first stages of the contemporary German Empire, the differences between the Prussian and South German was the most potent factor against German unity. These differences and antagonisms of temperament only become effective in the world of politics when they mean differences of social institutions, tastes, and aspirations, of tradition and ideals. They make real and full understanding impossible; and most quarrels grow out of misunderstanding.

farmer is opposed in his interests to the Eastern merchant and manufacturer¹, the Western borrower to the Eastern capitalist. These differences may no doubt create severe competition and legislative struggles; but there is no reason why they should penetrate deeply into the most complex developments of social life, and there produce, not rivalry, but actual antipathy and social antagonism.

Now this social antagonism between the East and West of the United States, so far as it may exist, is chiefly due to the very same conceptions as might be grouped round such vague and pernicious terms as Anglo-Saxon. In spite of the great emigration from the New England States to the West, and though the most active element in the West may be of New England origin, the obtrusion of such New England origin in the West and the recognition of "May-flower pretensions" in the East are at the bottom of a great part of this social antagonism. It is no doubt true that a great deal of the active opposition against England in America within the last few years was immediately excited by the Irish enemy of the Saxon. But though this Irish opposition accounts for a good deal of the anti-English feeling in the East, it is not so in the West. In the West the antagonism to England was very much the same as the Western opposition to the pretensions to, perhaps the possession of, superior education, manners, and breeding prevalent in the Eastern States of the Union. Nay, with a large section of the population in the East itself, it was not Irish sympathy which produced the anti-English feeling, but elements of a social nature which, consciously

¹ As a matter of fact, it would be more natural to assume that the Western farmer and the Eastern merchant or importer are combined in economical interest against the Eastern manufacturer.

106 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

or unconsciously, aroused antagonism, and which might be defined as the English or Anglo-Saxon elements. It was a protest and reaction against the wave of Anglomania which has made itself felt as a social force in those classes which were socially predominant. The gibes and witticisms grouping round the catch phrases such as "'T is English you know," or the New York street-arab's query, addressed to the "dude" whose trousers were turned up, "Is it raining in London?"—the report that in certain fashionable clubs card and betting debts were computed in sovereigns and shillings,—all this is clearly indicative of social antagonisms.

When the social pretensions of such classes were thus expressed in "Anglo-Saxon" terms and when the ethnological, quasi-feudal, basis for such social distinction was fixed upon pure English descent, the internal, local, social antagonisms in the United States itself were, on suitable occasions, readily turned into strong antagonism against the original *corpus vile*, namely, England. Not only the Irish, but the Americans of German, French, and Dutch descent, and the mass of population coming from other European nations, all are naturally opposed to any Anglo-Saxon assertiveness.

What really unites all these different peoples, massed together in this great country, are the actual political institutions, the basal views and habits of life and living, and the common language. To remind them of the English origin of these at a moment when the English part of them is used to mark a distinction between certain groupings in their national society, to call upon the rivalry which comes from separateness and exclusion in the common life of social bodies—produces discord where the result ought to be harmony. For there can be no doubt that

complete national and social assimilation into the American people is reached when the foreign emigrant and his descendants,—who were at first stigmatised by cries of “Mickie” for the Irish, allusions to *Sauer-Kraut* for the Germans or Dutchmen, Dago for the Italians,—when these are no longer grouped together in distinct quarters in the larger towns, and when the English language, which includes or suggests common ways of thinking and habits of living, has been fully mastered.

If these differences are felt in the East, and are in great part responsible for English antagonisms, their original meaning has become still more comprehensive in the minds of the Westerner. To him the Easterner stands in a relation similar to that which obtains between the social Anglo-maniac and his opponent in the East. He must recognise that the conditions of Eastern life are more favourable to higher education and to all the amenities of culture than those of his own younger and ruder home, and he is on the lookout for, and on the defensive against, any arrogation of higher claims on the part of the Easterner whom he may meet. This may often blind him to the fact that it evokes in him a peculiar form of assertiveness which is frequently less dignified than it is boisterously manifest. The Western stories which turn upon the ridiculous unfitness of the florid New York “dude,” the “Harvard man,” or “the young lady from Boston,” to adapt themselves to the healthy and unostentatious simplicity of their own life, illustrate the prevalence of feeling which goes deep down into the life of the people. Similar differences exist in England between, let us say, the Public School and University man and those who have not spent their youth in such institutions.

108 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

Now the term Anglo-Saxon, besides being inaccurately pedantic and fundamentally untrue when used to denote the uniting element between the two great peoples, is as misleading in America as it is in Great Britain and comes dangerously near to the natural prejudices of both peoples. These prejudices can be skilfully awakened and intensified, and will be effectively used on the numerous occasions which will present themselves, by those whose interest it is to keep the two nations asunder. How much such people are aware of this, and how readily such ethnological differences can be used to sow the seeds of discord, is illustrated by a telegram to *The Times* quoting a letter signed by a well known Russian writer in the *Novoe Vremya* on the occasion of Mr Gladstone's death. He says:

The strength and weakness of Mr Gladstone consisted in the fact that he was not an Englishman but a Celt, with a great soul and a great mind, but a mind without English cruelty, narrow-mindedness, and unscrupulousness in the choice of means towards an end. He was able to inspire the souls of others, but his ideals were too much for the average Englishman, in whom the spirit of the old Saxon and Norman robbers is still to be traced. He would have felt himself more at home in Russia than in England, had he known our country, but it was felt that he was attracted to our side. Little by little, the scaly covering of the Englishman left the soul of the great Celt, and he became convinced of the necessity of liberating his kinsmen the Irish. The English, however, refused to join with him when they felt that he was not one of themselves, and he died with French words upon his lips. Peace to his ashes! He has been a grand elevating example to all humanity.

I object to the term Anglo-Saxon when used to qualify the amity or alliance between Great Britain and the United States, because the ideas it conveys are inaccurate and

untrue, and further because it opens the doors to that most baneful and pernicious of modern national diseases, which has disseminated its virus through most European States and from which we have hitherto enjoyed comparative immunity, namely, Ethnological Chauvinism. The slightest infusion of such a spirit suggested by the term Anglo-Saxon will not only stultify the efforts towards closer national amity, but may, if insisted upon and strengthened, produce disintegrating disturbances in the internal national life of these countries.

It is interesting to note that the extreme and unbalanced form of so-called patriotism which is now designated by the term Chauvinism had its origin in the time of Napoleon, when Chauvin lived as the unbounded admirer of that great leader of men. But Chauvinism can in no sense be called an outcome, or even a modification, of patriotism. They are two distinct, if not opposed, ideas, the following of either of which points to characters and temperaments as different as the generous are from the covetous. Patriotism is a positive attitude of the soul, Chauvinism is a negative tendency or passion. Patriotism is the love of, and devotion to, the fatherland, to the wider or the more restricted home, and to the common interests and aspirations and ideals of these. Chauvinism marks the antagonistic attitude to all persons, interests, and ideas, not within this wider or narrower conception of the fatherland or home. Patriotism is love, Chauvinism is jealousy. The one is generous, the other is envious. The loving temperament makes for expansion, the jealous tends towards contraction and restriction. While the patriot who loves his people and his country is therefore likely to be tolerant, even generous and affectionate, towards the stranger, the

110 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

Chauvinist is likely to turn the burning fire of his animosity inwards, within the narrow spheres and groupings of even his own country. Now this vice of hatred and envy which may, alas, be ingrained deep down in human nature, may have existed in all times and places of human history and may have been predominant in some; yet in our own times it has received a peculiar character, a special formulation, with an attempt at justification. I have tried to qualify the general Chauvinism in the form predominant in our time by the attribute *Ethnological Chauvinism*.

The origin of this social disease within the nations of Europe may be traced back first to Napoleon, when, with the inner growth of France and its power, and his successes in Italy, he coupled the designed enfeeblement, if not the destruction, of the German Empire by splitting it up into insignificant principalities under his own influence. There is no doubt he conceived the bold idea of the predominance of the Latin race and Empire over the Teutonic race and over the world in general. But he found himself wedged in between two forces which checked the advance of this Latin Hegemonia, and which ultimately crushed him. On the one side was the Slav, on the other side there was the Anglo-Saxon. He succeeded for the time in repressing the Teuton, but he failed both in Russia and in his struggle with Great Britain.

As a reaction against this Latin wave which submerged the Teuton Empire, the German patriots endeavoured to restore the vitality of the sturdy Teutonic oak. But while the Latin Crusade had for its inspiring preacher the great leader and man of action himself, the Germanic revival fell to the lot of the theorist and thinker, and a German philosopher and professor, Fichte, in his *Reden an die*

The English-Speaking Brotherhood 111

Deutsche Nation, is the fullest exponent of these views. These again are further formulated and carried into the realms of romantic thought, theory, and science by the learned enthusiasts who led the Revolution of 1848 in Germany.

But again there turned up a great man of action who, knowing his countrymen and the trend of the times, utilised all these currents to weld together the separate blocks,—smoothly polished and florid marbles of prince-ridden principalities, and clumsy unhewn stones and rubble-stones of independent cities and towns,—the huge edifice of the German Empire. The scientific spirit which was pervading the civilised world of Western Europe was recognised by Bismarck as a useful force which could be turned into practical advantage for the great purpose he had in view. He called upon the German professor—even the ethnologist, philologist, and historian—and they obeyed his command with readiness and alacrity. The theoretical and scientific lever with which these huge building blocks were to be raised in order to construct the German Empire was to be the scientific establishment of the unity of the German people based upon the unity of Germanic races. An historical basis for German unity was not enough; an ethnological, racial unity had to be established. The historical and philological literature of German university professors belonging to the time of Bismarck's ascendancy can almost be recognised and classified by their relation to the problem of establishing, fixing, and distinguishing from those of other races, the laws and customs, literature, languages and religions, the life and thought, the productions and the aspirations of the Germanic race.

This influence went beyond the bounds of Germany: by

112 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

sympathy in England, the Freemans, and those who felt with him, thumped the Saxon drum; while, by contrast, in France, the *Fustel de Coulanges* played variations in softer strains on the theme of the *Cité Antique*. In course of time and of events Russia, in the growing vigour of its racial and national expansion, formulated and developed its Pan-Slavistic theory and war-cry.

The distinctive feature in this modern version of the old story of national lust of power is, that it now assumed a more serious and stately garb of historical justice in the pedantic pretensions of its inaccurate ethnological theories. The absurdity of any application of such ethnological theories to the practical politics of modern nations at once becomes manifest when an attempt is made to classify the inhabitants of any one of these western nations by means of such racial distinctions. What becomes of the racial unity of the present German Empire if we consider the Slavs of Prussia, the Wends in the North, and the tangle of different racial occupations and interminglings during the last thousand years within every portion of the German country? And the same applies to France and England, Italy and Spain.

But the German professor, with his political brief wrapped round the lecture-notes within the oilcloth portfolio, pressed between his broadcloth sleeve and ribs, as he walks to his lecture room, was forced further afield and deeper down in his "scientific" distinctions. The divisions he established for the purposes of national policy were but minor subdivisions of broader ethnological distinctions. Here the philologist took the lead and established "beyond all doubt" the difference, nay, the antagonism, between the Arian and the Semitic, which makes the Hindoo more closely related

to the German and Saxon than these are to Spinoza, Mendelssohn and Heine, Carl Marx and Disraeli. We can perhaps now appreciate the singular oversight of the last named statesman in not having made use of the scientific establishment of this fact in order to strengthen his imperialist views of the Indian Empire as an integral part of Great Britain.

This last named classification could further be turned to practical advantage by those in Germany whose interest it would be to set one part of the German people against another section, and to create a new party or to strengthen the hands of decrepit old ones. And thus there grew up the anti-Semitic parties in Germany and elsewhere, who could give strength and some semblance of sober dignity to their party passions or violent economic theories by so respectable a scientific justification as a racial distinction fixed thousands of years ago. This step once made, however, has necessarily led further afield into wider and unsafer regions, the exploration and exploitation of which may ultimately lead to most disastrous results. For, when once the distinction between Arian and Semite led to the anti-Semitic movement, religious prejudices, or, at all events, religious distinctions, are necessarily carried in the wake and tend to serious complications. Were it not for the clamorous interests of recent politics in the East and West, as well as in Africa and the Far East, which absorb the attention and the passions of the nations of Europe, I venture to believe that the current Ethnological Chauvinism would have drifted more and more into the channels of religious Chauvinism. And we need but recall the history of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century in Europe to realise the effect of religious and

114 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

sectarian elements when mixed up with international partisanship!

There were striking indications within the last few years that the ethnological game was played out. In Russia the Pan-Slavistic cry was growing feebler and feebler and was gradually merging into something like a Pan-Orthodox movement, which carried very practical, if not material, plans and purposes within the religious breast of its spiritual devotion. Feeble echoes of Pan-Anglicanism made themselves heard; while the Catholic Church followed its old tradition, and the national and Germanic ardour of Berlin, if not of the whole of Germany, was diverted from the monster statues on the hills of the Rhine and the Teutoburger forest to the national Protestant churches in the German capitals. Arminius was after all a Pagan! And if this new old cry is silenced for a time beneath the din of Gatling guns, the axes of the coloniser, and the hammer of the colonial prospector, they are not silenced for good and all, and will shortly be raised again.

The result of all this is, that old antagonisms have been intensified by the introduction of these ethnological distinctions, and that new ones, non-existent before, have been created to swell their nefarious phalanx. No doubt other passions have been added to them, the greed of gold and the lust of Empire.

The result is that, with all our printing-press and the rapid exchange of thought through its channels, with our railways and telegraphs, which are supposed to bring us together and to thwart invidious distance standing between human hearts and brains, there has never been a period in the world's history when, in spite of triple and dual alliances, every nation feels more opposed to the other,

its hand ready to strike. Ask a typical Frenchman whom he loves and feels at one with? The Russian? One would like to answer him in his own vernacular: *Qu'allez vous me chanter là!* And whom does the German feel a brother or a cousin to? Surely not the Englishman! Let every one go through the list for himself and appeal to his past experience. The conception of Humanity as a really potent thought, with meaning and significance, calling forth definite feelings if not images, a conception which pervaded the thought and feeling which were supreme in the second half of the eighteenth century and moved whole nations to action, these are disused and unheard in our day, or are pityingly and incredulously smiled away as cant.

If we cannot resuscitate and infuse the spirit of life into the corpse of Humanity, we can at least prick the ethnological bubble and recall the sane nations to the reality of their inner history and the truly effective elements in the actual national and social life of our times.

Patriotism is the love we bear to our country and its people, represented by its government; the love of order and law; and the submission of the interests and the life of the individual to the State and its government, because they stand for order and law. The modern State is a product of modern history, and we need not go to the nebulous regions of pre-historic ages to seek for its *rationale* and the order and law which are its essence. If you wish to go back to the ethnological foundations, you must ignore and wipe out the history of centuries in Germany, France, Italy, England, and the United States. You must ignore the language and literature and the thought and feeling they embody and convey, the form of government evolved, the freedom and integrity of the citizen that are established,

116 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

If you wish to build your commonwealth upon racial distinctions. Arminius did not make the modern German Empire; the Anglo-Saxon did not make the England of to-day. But government, laws, institutions, customs, habits, language, thought,—these are clearly defined in each State. Every day of our lives these facts are impressed upon us in the streets of the towns and in the lanes of the country, they make up our feeling of home, our feeling of belonging to this country and not to another. These are not evoked by the stagey picture, all out of drawing, of a Saxon in wolf's-skin with spear and club, which the ethnological brush of a sign-painting politician holds before the eyes of the masses.

England is the only country in Europe which has not yet been affected to any harmful extent by this disease of Chauvinism; and there is no fear that, in spite of all the provocation which the attitude of other nations towards us arouses, we shall respond to them in the same tone. But, to call an alliance, or the growing amity between Great Britain and the United States an Anglo-Saxon alliance, and to accept such a term as embodying the essential bond of union between these two great nations, would familiarise us with evil ideas, if it did not create the evil passions. What brings us, and will hold us, together is something quite different and far more potent than the empty words and the unsound theories with regard to our racial origin.

If the forces we have just considered lead to Chauvinism, and are not the essential elements which hold people together, the question must be asked, what these binding elements really are? Sir John Seeley maintained that "the chief forces which hold a community together are common

The English-Speaking Brotherhood 117

nationality, common religion, common interest." I believe that this epitome er'is in being too narrow and in omitting some elements which are, perhaps the most efficient in binding people together, while at least one of the three, is not essential to national unity or national amity.

I should prefer to summarise these elements under the following general headings: A common country; a common nationality; a common language; common forms of government; common culture, including customs and institutions; a common history; a common religion, in so far as religion stands for the same basis of morality; and, finally, common interests.

Now I maintain that when any group of people have all these eight elements in common, they ought of necessity to form a nation, a political unity, internally and towards the outside world; and when a group of people have not the first of these factors (the same country), but are essentially akin in the remaining seven, they ought to develop an international alliance or some close form of lasting amity. In the case of the people of Great Britain and of the United States seven of these leading features that hold a community together are actively present.

It may even be held that the first condition, a common country, which would make of the two peoples one nation, in some sense exists for them. At all events a country is sufficiently common to them to supply sentimental unity in this direction. For, as regards England, Seeley has well remarked, referring to a period when steam and electricity had not yet reduced the separating distance of the ocean, there is this fundamental difference between Spain and France on the one side and England on the other, that Spain and France were deeply involved in the struggle of Europe, from

118 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

which England has always been able to hold herself aloof. In fact, as an island, England is distinctly nearer for practical purposes to the New World and almost belongs to it or at least has the choice of belonging at her pleasure to the New World or to the Old.

As for the proximity between the two countries for persons travelling and goods interchanged, I can only say that, from continuous experience, the expenditure of money, nerve-tissue, and comfort is higher in a trip from England to Greece or any of the Balkan States, than in a voyage to New York; while it is a significant fact that the transport of goods from an American to an English port is not only cheaper than from any point in England to a short distance on the Continent, but even from one point of England to a comparatively near point on the same island. But if we turn from this question of mere physical propinquity to the feeling of the American people as regards the country, the actual soil of the British Islands, we come to a sentiment far deeper and more cogent in its binding power. It would be a very small minority of the American people who would not be overcome by a sense of home the moment they arrive on British soil, be it at Cork or Liverpool; and, after a short halt at Chester, during which they have walked through the streets of that picturesque city, they settle down in London and set foot in Westminster Abbey, passing by the monuments of patriots, statesmen, and poets whom they can rightly all claim as essentially their own! To all these people Great Britain is the "Old Country." But I will go further and venture to say, that this does not only apply to the Americans of distinctly British origin; but also to those of German and French and Dutch descent, or from any of the other European peoples, whose home has

The English-Speaking Brotherhood 119

been sufficiently long in the United States for them to have become thoroughly nationalised through the language with its literature, the customs and institutions which are practically the same in both countries. Such an one has read his Shakespeare, Macaulay, and Walter Scott from his childhood upwards; and thus Westminster Abbey and Stratford-on-Avon, and Kenilworth, and Scotland strike an old familiar tone in his mind and his heart,—whether his name be Sampson or Schley or Shafter.

Leaving the question of a common country, the bond of union becomes closer the further we proceed with the other essential features which make for unity, when once we drop the misleading and wholly illusory ethnological basis of nationality and, instead of flying to the nebulous and unknown regions of pre-historic ages, we take into account the process of real history. We then must acknowledge that the people of Great Britain and of the United States are of one nationality. I say this in spite of the Revolutionary War, and, if I did not fear to be too paradoxical, I should almost say because of it. I mean by this, that the establishment of independence in the British Colonies of North America marks a phase in the expansion of international freedom, as the advance of representative government marks the development of national freedom; and that, as the recognition of the separate household of an adult son, who has been fretting with growing animosity against the domination of parental authority, re-asserts, on a new and more propitious basis, the kinship of the two, so is it in the relation of the two nations since America is free.

There is but one real and material fact amongst many to which I wish to draw attention in view of the claims of

120 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

common nationality between these two great peoples, and that is, the question of kinship and intermarriage. If statistics could be established concerning the citizens of each country, as to those who have some member of their kith and kin, however remote, residing in the country over the sea, the numbers of these would be found to be astonishingly large—at all events, much larger than such relationship between any other two nations. And in this respect the importance of the continuous process of intermarriage, which promises to grow even more frequent and effective in the future, cannot be overestimated. For, in the making of nations, intermarriage is the most important factor in welding the diversity of race into the unity of nationality. In the history of England, Germany, France, and Italy it was chiefly this custom which enabled the numerous and discordant ethnological elements to fuse into national unity. Where larger masses of the population, as with the Hungarians and the Austrians, or smaller sections within a nationality, are kept from intermarriage, from whatever cause, the unity of the nation or of the smaller community is not complete, and no amount of government action and of administrative pressure can supply this want.

As regards the actual intercourse between the two nations, a great deal can here be done by individuals to improve and strengthen the relations between us. I would recommend a little more tolerance, intellectual sympathy, and fairness of judgment to Americans as well as to Englishmen. We must shift our standards of judgment if we mean to be fair to those who have not put themselves within the pale of our own social—often extremely provincial—laws. Such provincialism argues a want of education in some and a want of imagination in others. To put it tritely

and epigrammatically: Let us charitably remember that there is still some salvation for the man who wears a frock-coat and a round hat—if he be a foreigner! We may be ever so sure that our own rules of life and habits and fashions are the best, but we cannot judge those by them who have never recognised their sway. Also it is well for us to remember that, whatever we may justly feel with regard to our national greatness, the individual citizen—even the least distinguished—is not necessarily responsible for the superiority of his nation and country.

I would recommend every Englishman to read Lowell's essay "On a Certain Condescension in Foreigners." He there strongly impresses the fact, that a first-rate American must not be confounded with a second-rate Englishman. And I should like to add: that a second-rate Englishman will never make a first-rate American. The difficulty will remain, how to recognise "the first-rate American or Englishman"? Well, there is no wholesale tag attached to them. They are not known through the paragraphs in the newspapers, nor are they always recognised by their own estimate of themselves. We can only meet each other courteously and generously, and find out for ourselves. It takes some time and acuteness of perception to realise that there is a native dignity and quiet modesty in the American, though he may successfully hide it under the boisterous ebullience of his vigorous life and manner; while, I hold, that there is a native fund of amiability and genuine cordiality deep down in the Englishman's nature,—only it is often so deep down that it never appears on the surface. It is effectively checked by a narrow, "provincial" education, continued and fixed by stupid social traditions slavishly accepted and followed by all classes.

122 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

The unity of nationality is expressed in the State, in the laws and the forms of government, which actually hold the people together. Now, though England is a monarchy and the United States a republic, the fact remains that the inhabitants of both countries feel that they belong to the freest nations of the world. This freedom is the outcome of representative government, an idea and a fact born in England, to the development of which the history of the British people is one continuous illustration. It does not diminish the glory of the framers of the American constitution to say, that the central idea of liberty and self-government, which that document embodies and develops, was the natural evolution of political principles sunk deep down in their hearts and minds by their English ancestors. And the reality of a common foundation for the government and all political institutions in the case of the United States and of Great Britain impresses itself upon us, not only when we ponder or generalise on things political, but when we are living our ordinary daily lives and follow the natural interests and calls of our several avocations. It is not merely a question of political theory and speculation, it is eminently one of practical experience and of the action of life, individual as well as collective. At every step, while the Englishman or American travels abroad, even in the most civilised countries, he meets with administrative enactments, privileges, restrictions, injunctions, and directions, sent from the summits of government into the busy plains of ordinary daily life, which are foreign to him and which evoke a sense of criticism, if not of irritation and revolt. The same feeling of strangeness and of foreignness constantly comes over him, if he attempts to follow their political life, though the American considers

The English-Speaking Brotherhood 123

the legislative and administrative proceedings of a European republic, and the Englishman observes the laws and enactments of some other constitutional monarchy. On the other hand, every Englishman becomes readily familiar with the political system of the United States, and feels at home under its rule, as the American lives happily under the laws of Great Britain and can at once follow with interest the legislative work of the House of Commons.

Far more potent, however, than the ties of common descent, country, and government, is the all-comprising bond of a common language. Nay, so much do I consider this the chief force of union and amity, that I would substitute for Anglo-Saxon, or even Anglo-American, the title English-Speaking Brotherhood. For this conception is at once so wide that it comprises, not only Great Britain and Ireland and the United States, but every distant colony where English is spoken and the same thoughts and feelings, laws and institutions are therefore bound to prevail.

But with the comprehensiveness of this term we also at once come to the most important, the central and essential manifestation of a common life necessarily leading to close relationship.

We may differ from those philologists and philosophers who have exaggerated the supreme importance of language, and maintain that it actually covers the whole of human thought, so that it is supposed to precede thought. We may hold that there are other means of communicating thoughts and feelings, through the channels of other senses besides the ear. But it is an undoubted fact that language is the chief vehicle of human thought and its communication. For none covers the whole range of human experiences,

124 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

from the highest to the lowest, as does language. And if we compare the more emotional, the artistic aspect of language, with that of the other arts, which are all such powerful exponents of the national and historical life of a people, we must assign to the literary arts an exceptional position, as conveying the distinct individuality of a nation with more directness and precision than any of the other arts. I would but suggest one important distinction among many, namely, that while sculpture and music and painting and decoration can all reflect the past and express the present, literature is the only art that, with these, can also foreshadow, nay, directly evoke, the future of a nation's life.

But in art we are, no doubt, approaching the international, the common sphere of all humanity. It is on the more purely linguistic side that language becomes such a force in national life and gives such distinctness and solidarity to the communities which have the same language in common. Great statesmen have ever recognised this. We need but consider the efforts made in Prussia to introduce the German language into Poland; we need but follow in our own day the troubles of the Austrian Empire, in dealing with the Czech and German languages in Bohemia, or the power of the mere Italian language in giving substance to the cry of *Italia Irridenta* in districts nowise Italian and with populations of ethnological origin quite distinct from the main bulk of the Italian people.

We can never feel fully at home in a country where our own language is not spoken. *Das Land das meine Sprache spricht* is our true fatherland. We need the language of our parents and, still more important in the creation of national sentiment, the language of our childhood, used by those about us, our nurses and the friends of our child-

hood, in our first work and play, associated with our earliest daily impressions and—prejudices.

Here we come to the very root of national sentiment. This is the very core and centre of our thought and feeling, and it takes a considerable development of mind and experience to make us realise that other languages can exist. We need not merely laugh at the young people who have just left the schoolroom for a trip abroad and are astonished to find that even the children in the street speak French and German fluently; for this is but a proof of the central, vital position which our language holds in the consciousness of ourselves as social and political beings. When the British or American *pater familias*, travelling with a large family, jumps in despair on one of his numerous boxes at the Naples railway station, worried and harassed to distraction by an army of officials, porters, and beggars, and, frantically waving his hands, shouts: "Is there anybody here speaks *God's own language*?"—we can appreciate of what supreme importance his native language is to him.

It is further interesting to watch how delicate and sensitive an instrument a language is in the formation and crystallisation of its words for the reflection of peculiar, even subtle national characteristics. I would but ask you to consider for yourselves the nature, history, and significance of the foreign words borrowed or domesticated in a language. Such study will tell you a good deal about the position of language in national life and about the national life itself. In the literature of other European nations, besides the whole vocabulary of field sports and pastimes, which they have directly borrowed in their English form, you will find such words as "self-government,"

126 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

"gentleman," "fair play," "the morning tub¹," made quite at home in their foreign English garb in a whole page of German, French, or Italian. And in our books you will find "esprit" and "chic" and "homme du monde" and "roué," as well as "Zeitgeist" and "Sehnsucht," "Gemüthlichkeit"—perhaps even "Bakehish" and "Kismet." If you ponder on such words, and what they stand for, which nation has produced them, and that the other was forced to borrow them, they may tell you much about the national life of the different people. The idea of self-government, of fair play, of gentleman, do not only *happen* to be expressed in English, the facts which the words embody—the soul of the thing—were born among the English-speaking peoples, and these terms of self-government, of fair play, and of the gentleman, correspond to the essential, most lasting, most all-pervading, and most characteristic features of the life of the people in Great Britain and in the United States, whether they were first used in England or America. Purists in language and literature may deplore the importation of Americanisms into English books and periodicals; but the fact remains that they do come, and naturally and necessarily come. They very soon emerge out of the stage of slanghood and quotation marks to fully established and recognised linguistic respectability, and their right of existence is tested by this process and their power of persistency.

The binding power of a common language has never been more forcibly put than in two lines of the poet Davidson:

In all the hedges roses bud
And speech and thought are more than blood.

¹ No doubt you may also find "snob" and "flirt" and similar terms. But it is not my object to point to our national defects on this occasion.

But language in this aspect reflects more than mere words and thoughts, and feelings: it shows the common customs of living as well as of thinking and feeling. People who, besides speaking the same tongue, eat and drink in the same manner, find their pleasure in games and sports and the exertion of vitality, and in contemplating the same plays and pageants, to whom the "morning tub" is an essential instrument of daily life, such people not only live together in peace, but they ought to live together.

Language thus merely reflects the same customs and institutions, the same thoughts and aspirations, the same *culture*. I have already referred to the influence derived from the fact that we read the same books. The people of the United States hardly feel that their debit account to England, with regard to poets and writers, is greater than their credit account; because they consider these authors their own, as the Englishman claims Poe, Longfellow, Hawthorne, Emerson, Lowell, Bret Harte, Mark Twain, Howells, and James. So with the artists born in America, who are fully domesticated in England, and the actors who divide their performances between the two countries; while the chairs in universities and schools in America, are, and have been, held by Britons, and an interchange is daily growing more active and frequent. Day by day our life in every sphere is becoming so thoroughly interwoven and intertwined that, not only the merchant, manufacturer, and farmer, but the author and artist, nay, the student in his remote study, must consider the sister country while he is working for his own.

This inevitable course of the future is borne out by the past. We have a common history. Whatever the Revolutionary War may have meant and means to the people

128 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

of the United States, it can only be regarded as a natural step in the English feeling for self-government and independence. Meanwhile, the whole of American history before 1776 is to be found, not with Red Indians, but with the people of Great Britain. And what Seeley has impressed so vigorously and clearly for the Britons, when they regard Greater Britain, that the British Colonies form an integral part of Greater Britain, and that every English political view which does not include the national life of Australasia and Canada is crippled and distorted,—this applies to the attitude which the Briton must hold to the United States. The United States have not only formed a central factor in the English history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but they are an essential element in the growth of national life in the present; and will become still more vital in the future.

I have more than once quoted Sir John Seeley's *Expansion of England*. There is much in this book with which I heartily agree, still more that I admire unreservedly. But there are two points in which I decidedly disagree with him: first, in the state-making importance he assigns to religion among communities on an advanced scale of political civilisation. I mean the power of religion as a fixed Church or Creed in the formation of state, as an element which binds communities together. I also disagree with him in his assumption that our Colonies are not bound to the mother-country by community of interest.

Though a common creed may be powerful in bringing or holding together people or races or nations in comparatively early phases of political development, this cannot be maintained in the more advanced stages of modern politics.

The English-Speaking Brotherhood 129

Of all Western States, for instance, Italy is perhaps the one in which one definite Church preponderates among the population with hardly a dissentient sect that might not be considered a negligible quantity. Yet it can hardly be said that this common creed was an active agent in unifying Italy in the past, nor in holding together the Italian monarchy of our own immediate days. Germany on the other hand has in our days achieved complete Imperial unity against most powerful separatist interests and traditions; and yet in Prussia, a Protestant State, there are more than one-third Roman Catholics; while in Baden and Bavaria nearly two-thirds are Roman Catholic.

The principle of religious toleration by the state, strangely sinned against by the early Pilgrim Fathers, is one of the fundamental principles in the political constitution of the United States; and, in spite of the existence of an established church in England, this principle is becoming more effective in the political and social life of Great Britain with every day.

Sectarian differences, even in communities where the differing sect forms but a small minority, always act as a severing element, disturbing or endangering the stability of the state and community. On the other hand, religion as a civilising power, as creating or modifying the national conscience, the national ethics, the force and direction of national aspirations and ideals, religion passing through the life and history of a people, is one of the most effective elements in political life. It leaves its deep and broad stamp upon national character, and thus creates or strengthens sympathy or antipathy, spiritual relationship or estrangement.

Thus, for instance, the Pilgrim Fathers, from the depths

130 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

of their religious life, convictions, and sufferings, did give a definite character to the national ethics of the United States: a stern sense of duty, of veracity and honesty, which, in spite of all individual instances in which these have been disregarded or contravened, permeate as leading principles the life of the American people in every phase. This is the historical resultant of the Puritan supremacy in America, and the British people passed through the same historical process in Europe. The Puritanism of the Commonwealth, nurtured by the Hebrew sense of abstract duty, derived direct from Moses, the Psalms, and the Prophets, however violent, coarse, or dry it may often have been, and however much, from an artistic or æsthetic point of view, we may deplore its effect upon the life of Merry England, was and is a most potent factor in the historical evolution of the national ethics of Great Britain of our day.

This and many other religious elements, which in the course of history have made us think and feel as we do, the two nations have in common, and this binds us together more than the mere adhesion to the same dogmatic creed. They make us feel at home in a country where, in the smallest dealings of daily life, we at once realise that the established expectations of truthfulness in word and deed, as well as the ultimate ideals of a high and noble life, are the same as in our own home. This common foundation of popular and national ethics and religion, the American and the Briton who have travelled far afield realise as existing to a greater degree in each of these two countries than in any other foreign land, and this will always act as a real and practically efficient link between the two nations.

The English-Speaking Brotherhood 131

And finally I come to the question of Interests which Sir John Seeley enumerates as one of the three chief elements holding communities together. Yet, strange to say, in dealing even with the British Colonies in their relation to, the mother-country, this great historian has ignored the potency of their common interests, and has even implied that they might normally be opposed to one another. Now what we say of the relation between the United States and Great Britain applies *a fortiori* to that existing between Great Britain and her colonies.

The state of affairs which in the last few months has brought the question of an effective amity between the two great countries,—allies by the fulfilment of all the other conditions we have just examined,—within such close range of possible consummation and at least serious discussion, is the best answer to the doubt concerning the commonness of interest. In spite of all the historical, national, social, and ethical relationship, the most sanguine of us could not have hoped to see the discussion taken up seriously for the next fifty years. And now, by one move in the Far East of several Continental Powers, bound together for the time being by common interests,—and interests only,—and by the thrilling and far-reaching events of the immediate present, the realisation of these common interests on our part has made us see with the clearness of day the essential kinship between us in every aspect of our national life.

And this condition of things is not fortuitous, and isolated, so that it occurs once now, has never occurred before, and will never occur again! Whoever studies carefully the international history of 1823 will see how strikingly parallel the conditions were then to what they

132 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

are now. In the emancipation of the South American States from the oppressive Spanish yoke, imposed with the stupid brutality of the mediæval conqueror of lands, not the modern coloniser, Cuba was the burning question. Then as now England, the self-governing country, stood by the United States against the Continental Powers forming the Holy Alliance; and, but for England, the united action of these Powers would have crushed, not only the independence of the South American States, but would have jeopardised the development of American freedom. The Monroe Doctrine was, in one sense, as much the outcome of Canning's policy, as it emanated from the combined genius and statesmanship of Adams and Monroe. Nay, the Continental diplomacy of the day attributed the authorship of the President's famous message to Canning, and it required his direct denial to discredit the report.

It has been, is, and will be, the policy of Great Britain to recognise and to safeguard the main principles of the Monroe Doctrine as much as it will be in the interest of the United States itself.

But the social and economical conditions in the national life of every people have altered since 1823. The greater the need and desire for independence, the less the possibility of isolation. The increase and facility of intercommunication have made the international organism more sensitive, and with it the commercial interdependence, as affecting, not only manufacture, but even agriculture, has made it impossible for a nation to remain absolutely self-contained, and will in the future, if disregarded in its vital claims, lead to the desiccation and ultimate annihilation of its national prosperity and life.

All great nations have now (some of them tardily)

awakened to this fact. Hence the energetic activity displayed on all sides, and the constant rivalry leading to the growth of Chauvinism. Great Britain, by centuries of continuous activity, probably by a natural aptitude of its people for colonisation, and certainly by long national training of the government and the people, has stood powerfully in the forefront of the colonial and commercial expansion, and has therefore readily evoked the combined opposition of its several European rivals. But, as the late Austrian Premier, Goluchowski, wisely saw and expressed more than a year ago, the Continental Powers in this commercial struggle have to count, not only with Great Britain, but with the United States. These two go together as the most formidable rivals of the Continental Powers. The United States can co-operate only with Great Britain in its material interests beyond its border. For England is the great Free Trader, the champion of Open Ports. As a matter of fact, in South Africa and in all British Colonies, the proportion of citizens of the United States who have introduced American industries and have themselves accumulated great wealth, is much larger than people are wont to imagine. The expansion of England and its opening out of the world's ports to commerce, is *ipso facto* the expansion of American commerce without the cost of blood and substance to the United States.

But these interests have to be maintained and safeguarded against foreign prohibitive encroachment, and herein forces may have to be joined by those who have common interests. What would happen to the China trade of the United States, with its prospective growth in future years, from the mere position of its Pacific coast, if Russia, Germany, and France were to seize the ports and close them practically

134 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

to all competing trade but their own? All American statesmen have realised the gravity of the present situation, and have been led forcibly to recognise the interests which bind them to Great Britain. But looking beyond the United States, and further ahead¹ to future years, the question of the material interests of the British Colonies, Australasia as well as Canada, in the expansion of their trade in Asia must forcibly turn them to look to their uniting mother-country for encouragement and actual support.

And if the unjust exclusion of the expanding United States and the British Colonies is carried on in the future, and right demands the support of might to enforce its claims, where is the might to be found with the peculiar development of modern, especially maritime, warfare? Where will the United States or Canada or Australasia or the Cape Colony find their coaling-stations, not to mention the Navy?

Let us but hope that the United States, now recognising the need of strengthening its forces, will solve the most difficult problem which history presents: to create a powerful army always ready to serve, yet never to rule the nation.

The present Spanish-American war is giving the United States a most instructive illustration of these needs; while at the same time it brings clearly before our eyes, as well as those of the Continental Powers, the strength of an English-Speaking Federation to protect the common interests of each one of us.

¹ Nay, it is conceivable that many of the smaller Powers of Europe, of industrial and commercial importance, yet of defensive weakness, may be forced to join the English-Speaking Federation to guard their interests against the exclusive dominance of the great Continental Powers.

It does not take much foresight for any statesman to see that the trend of national and international life for the last hundred years has been towards the expansion of international trade into regions that formerly did not come actively into the cognisance of the European diplomat; and that each State individually, or those with common interests collectively, must be prepared to guard, and enforce this free expansion. If the United States and any one of the British Colonies disregard this paramount interest of their future, and do not strengthen themselves by firm amity or alliance where such alliance is on every ground natural and imperative, they will some day find their national development and expansion checked. They will then come under the domination or tutelage of one of these great Powers, or a grouping of several of them, and the interests of such leading States will be paramount and will dictate the course of national life to the one held in tutelage.

All this, however, is impossible in view of a great English-Speaking Brotherhood. The Continental Powers know this, and the plan of their diplomacy must be to keep us asunder, by playing us off one against the other. And for this the term Anglo-Saxon must yield them an acceptable opportunity.

If I have succeeded in showing that the element of common interest also exists in bringing Great Britain and the United States together, I fear that, in dwelling upon these common interests as they might be opposed to the interests of other great European Powers, I may have given food to a Chauvinistic attitude of mind or passion, similar in kind, though on a wider basis, to the purely national Chauvinism.

136 The English-Speaking Brotherhood

But, in dealing with the one point of interest, I have merely considered the question of trade and commerce. We must not forget, however, that, after all, commerce is not everything. It is but the forerunner of civilisation and receives its moral justification in being this. So soon as the spread of commerce is not *pari passu* with, does not mean, the spread of civilisation, it has no right to exist, no claims to the full and enthusiastic support of even those who do not immediately profit by it materially.

But there is one undoubted and undeniable cause for joy in being a Briton or an American, namely, that the nations to which we belong stand in the fore-front of civilisation and all that this means; that in political, social and economical education we stand as high as any nation, and higher than any group of nations we can imagine massed against us. In furthering our sphere of influence we are necessarily spreading the most advanced and highest results of man's collective efforts in the history of his civilisation. An English-Speaking Brotherhood will, after all, only be a step towards and link in the general alliance of civilised peoples. Its main principles and final objects will be those to which the highest and most cultured members of the French, German, and even Russian nation would subscribe; and in so far, they would morally be members of this alliance. Ask the most cultured and enlightened Russian, though he be a patriot, to speak the truth before God: whether he would think it for the good of humanity, including the future Russians themselves, that Russia as it is now, or that England should dominate the world? If he is really true to himself, I think he would like to be a member of the English-Speaking Brotherhood.

The English-Speaking Brotherhood 137

If Tennyson has sung—

That man's the best cosmopolite
Who loves his native country best,

I should like to supplement these verses by adding—

He loves his native country best
Who loves mankind the more.

Ideals are the lasting generalisations of past experiences and future aspirations. These will ever govern the world and stimulate men to action in one direction instead of another. These ideals are the same to the people of Great Britain and of the United States, and that is at once the highest and the most lasting bond of union. Here thoughts and feelings and faith of a religious order force themselves upon us. We feel that we are justified in pushing on, and there is no need of casuistry in our patriotism. For we know that what we ultimately desire is *right*, not only in the eyes of the present English or Americans, or a class of them, nor even for present man and mankind,—but in the eyes of the lasting embodiment of all highest good as man can think it and feel it and love it,—that is, God.

IV

THE NEXT WAR

WILSONISM AND ANTI-WILSONISM

1918

AN OPEN LETTER TO COLONEL ROOSEVELT

DEAR COLONEL ROOSEVELT,

• Ever since, about 1886, our friend, the late Richard Watson Gilder, did me the honour to couple my name with yours in saying that, though I had then resided in England ten years, "you and I were the two youngest Americans alive," I have followed with sympathetic interest and admiration your activities and achievements in so many spheres of public life. Throughout all these years I have found myself in complete and cordial agreement with your aims and ideals.

But, from the reports of your recent speech on "The Lafayette and Marne Day" which I have read in to-day's *Times*, I regret to find that I no longer am in agreement with you,—on the contrary your words, and the attitude which you take towards the plan of a League of Nations, arouse the strongest opposition in me. Of course I depend for my information on condensed reports of your speeches in our newspapers here. Were I to see the full account of your speech, I might find,—and I sincerely hope that this may be the case—that there does not exist such a fundamental divergence of views. But, though I agree wholeheartedly with the War Aims which you define for the Allies, your words on the proposed League of Nations can but mean, that you are opposed to any proposal of the kind as militating against national Patriotism, which you appear to consider

the ultimate virtue to which men can attain. Your analogy between the husband and the patriot seems to me to be—as analogies are likely to be—misleading and fundamentally fallacious in the application you make of it. The relation of man to woman is complicated by an essential element, namely the difference of sex and all that this implies. The parental and filial relation, though still imperfect, would be less open to such fallacies. But, admitting your analogy of the good husband, I feel sure you will agree, that an attitude of regard, consideration, even affection towards all woman-kind, and the ever present consciousness of our duty to all women, will in no way weaken our affection and fidelity towards the wife. On the other hand, I believe you will also admit, that loyalty and affection to the wife will not lead the perfect husband to support or condone an injustice or a positive wrong done by the wife to another woman or to woman-kind. I even venture to believe that he will be the better husband for habitually insisting upon a wider justice and kindness towards other women not his wife. The best conceivable son or father will maintain beneficence and justice towards the people living in his own community and country and towards human society in general. Should a father or a son do wrong or commit a crime, his son or father would abide by the law and support the administration of justice, however loyally and affectionately he may stand by the culprit to give him all the help which the law admits and filial or parental loyalty and affection exact. Surely we are not worse husbands, fathers or sons for submitting to wider and impersonal laws and duties. On the contrary, I venture to maintain, that we become less selfish and unjust to those nearer to us, our affection is deeper and more tried and secure, the more we

conform to the wider calls of duty and affection. The man who only cares for his family comes dangerously near to the man who only cares for himself, and, in moments of trial and crisis, we may find that his altruism fails him in his dealings with his very family. I have endeavoured to develop and maintain this thesis in two books which I had the honour of sending you a couple of years ago (*Aristodemocracy etc.* and *Patriotism, National and International*), in what I have called "The Ascending Scale of Duties." Beginning with duties to Self, we ascend to those to the Family, the district in which we actually live, our Country, Civilised Human Society, Humanity at large, and end beyond this planet of ours in cosmical and religious conceptions clearly and adequately expressed and formulated to the best of our capacities of thought and feeling. The higher duties in the scale must confirm, guide and modify the lower. They must confer sanction on the lower, and by such sanction the justification and the effectiveness of the lower are confirmed and increased. The wider our sphere of sympathy, altruism and affection, the stronger and safer does such manifestation become in every minor region or point within this wider sphere.

Now, you seem to me to stop short at national patriotism and to deny the validity and effectiveness of international patriotism. If the State or Country is thus made the ultimate limit, we come perilously close to that philosophy which, in Germany, under the form they themselves have called "*Politismus*," has with the mass of the thinking population replaced all humanitarian ethics as well as religion. In theory *and in practice* it has been the moral ground-work for the mass of the German people as well as of its philosophers, historians and statesmen. Your words,

as I read them, would bring us dangerously near to such politics, philosophy and ethics.

You will forgive me if I suggest as an explanation of your decided attitude of opposition to a "League of Nations" in any form, your impatience with, and your strong antagonism to, the "Pacifist," the Bolshevik and those International Socialists who preach class-warfare and would see the so-called Proletariat rule over every other class and occupation in civilised life,—those who have appropriated the term and the idea of Internationalism as they have wrongfully and untruthfully arrogated to themselves the use of the word Labour.

Well, those who think as I do, who passionately look forward to a League of Nations to secure Peace and Justice among the nations of the world, are equally opposed with you to "Pacifists," Bolsheviks, and International Socialists. We claim that the limitation of the "Sovereignty" of each State by the ultimate dominance of international Justice made corporate and all powerful, will confirm such sovereignty for each State. There is one supreme sovereign on this earth to whom all sovereigns and sovereign States must bow—Justice. And the limitation of the sovereignty of each State to such a supreme earthly sovereign will but confirm the independence and sovereignty of each separate State, as Law confirms and secures the liberty of the individual citizen. And we believe that loyalty and "Patriotism" to such an idea, embodied in a tangible, durable and all-powerful form, will assure, strengthen and ennoble our Patriotism to our own Country and State. Here too the higher idea and passion secure and strengthen the lower. May I suggest to you personally, that I can but believe that, while your devoted work as Governor of the State of New

York may have been a useful preparation for your beneficent tenancy of the Presidency of the United States, the political and moral training, the wider appeal to sympathy and public devotion which your greater office has given to you, have but raised and fortified your patriotism towards your native State and city. So it is or will be with the wider organisation of international justice in the new form which the Future promises to give to the world. I ventured to amend, many years ago, the (for him) cacophonous verses of Tennyson:

That man's the best cosmopolite
Who loves his native country best,

by the supplementary truth:

He loves his native country best
Who loves mankind the more.

A wider patriotism of this kind will intensify, as it will fully justify, the nearer patriotism towards our country and, with its own growth, will increase our effective work for the good of each country and the world at large. We shall know ourselves and be ourselves more truly. Even in the army, where concentrated discipline within each organisation itself is supremely desirable and necessary, the wider organisation with its aims may increase discipline, effective obedience and loyalty as well as a wider efficiency. It has been most instructive to read within the last few days (*Times*, Sept. 4th) the report of a leading war-correspondent on the recent victories of the British Army. He writes:

All this time we have been asking for a victory of the mind, and at last we have got it. The British Army, in sinking its particularism—its provinciality, if we may so express it—has found itself and has achieved a new distinction and a greater freedom under the united command than it has yet had.

The democratic States of the world will "find themselves" when they form part of such a League of Nations or, still better, when they subordinate themselves to a Supernational Court backed by Power. Only thus can Peace and Progress be secured for the suffering world.

I have always admired your courage, your straight-fighting spirit. Well, we will fight with you against the "Pacifists," Bolsheviks, and the so-called International Socialists. But we too are ready to fight, to sacrifice our lives, for the great League of Nations of the future. You are the last man whom I desire to fight.

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

• CHARLES WALSTON.

Newton Hall,

Newton, Cambridge,

Sept. 7th, 1918.

IV

THE NEXT WAR

WILSONISM AND ANTI-WILSONISM

INTRODUCTION

IN all the discussions, official and unofficial, which have recently taken place on the great problem of the future, to prevent war and to secure international justice, the highest form to which we have attained is the suggestion of a League of Nations. None of the serious and responsible advocates of such a League, have dared to go further than this form of international confederation in their boldest flights of constructive political imagination; while not a few—and these among the weightiest authorities—have, for the present at least, remained content with the widening of the international purview of the actual Allies now fighting for the final downfall of Prussian Militarism. None have boldly put forward the plan to establish, by means of international sanction, an autonomous *Supernational Court backed by Power under its own direct control*. When once such international sanction is obtained from the whole, or from a majority, of civilised States, there can be no interference on the part of the constituent States in the course of international justice, and the “supernational police force,” directly under the sole control of the supernational guardians of international justice, must then be immeasurably stronger than the military forces of any individual State or group of States. Now I consider it

of most vital importance that such a plan should be in the very fore-front of the consciousness of those who are concerned in the elaboration and realisation of the one supreme end on which the efforts and the passionate desires of the great majority of the people concerned in this war are now centred. At all events it must be considered along with all the other plans now under discussion.

It may be maintained that such a Court, which pre-demands international sanction, also presupposes the existence of a League of Nations. But this is not so. All that is needed for the establishment of such a Court is the definite sanction of every one of the States, prepared to ensure the cessation of war, for that one international act—a kind of international Referendum. This is a simpler and more practicable aim than the organisation of a new Confederation or Federation of States. The latter may grow out of such an institution of international justice and may, perhaps, *ultimately* lead to the United States of the Civilised World.

✓ But I am convinced that, as in the past, so in the present, no security can be found in Holy or Unholy Alliances. I have given my reasons for this conviction elsewhere and for some years past¹.

I am also convinced that most, if not all, the objections which have been raised by the best authorities against a League of Nations do not hold against such a Supernational Court. At the same time I have maintained before², and I

¹ *Aristodemocracy, From the Great War Back to Moses, Christ and Plato*. See Preface to the first American and second English editions, 1916 and 1917.

² *L.c.* caps. IX, X, XI, pp. 132–167; see also *The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace*, London and New York, 1899, pp. 109–112.

hold this conviction still more firmly now, that the establishment of such a Court and the organisation of such a vastly predominant Police Force (Army, Navy and Air-Force) is not visionary, but eminently practical and realisable, and I have ventured to develop in outline the main features of its organisation and activity.

In any case I claim that, so far from being an idle play of irresponsible theory-mongering or Utopian dreaming, it remains of vital importance, when plans for future reconstruction of international politics are in serious contemplation, and that the ultimate aims in their highest form (however remote their realisation may appear to some) should be faced and considered before premature compromise is resorted to. For *compromise*, however powerful and ever-recurrent a factor in human affairs, must be the outcome of the actual clashing of opposed forces presented by the contending views and aims of conscious and intelligent wills, not a primary force or aim in itself. These contending views and aims of conscious and intelligent wills, however, must, before compromise is reached or accepted, be clearly expressed and advanced into the field of argument in all their logical purity and strength.

The next and last war will be fought either to confirm the full and independent establishment of a Supernational Court backed by Power under its Own Control or on the final issue of converting a precarious "League of Nations," in the form of a Confederation, into a real Federation of States, when the "Secessionists" will be overcome by the "Unionists."

THE AGE OF THE GREAT REFORMATION

IN almost every age of the past there have been writers and thinkers who have maintained that their own age was unique in history and who have pointed out striking similarities between their own times and some outstanding age in the history of mankind. In the same way many individuals believe that their own position and experiences in life are unique, as they have, also with some self-satisfaction, dwelt upon the similarities between themselves and some great personality in history. In the case of both nations and individuals such reasoning is generally proved to be fallacious. Their position and their experiences, so far from being unique, follow the ordinary course of cause and effect, while the leading conditions producing the causes remain the same in each instance. Similarities to great ages and to great personalities may no doubt be detected; but the differences are also there and outweigh in quality as well as in quantity the points of resemblance.

In spite of the truth of this generalisation, I venture to maintain that the period defined by this Great War—or, rather, the age arising out of it—will prove to be unique in history. So I also maintain that there exists the most striking analogy between this period and the age of the Reformation and Renaissance, with additional points of manifest contact with the French Revolution and the founding of the United States of America.

To begin with the latter proposition, it must however be remembered that the periods preceding Reformation and Revolution have generally prepared the fundamental

changes which have taken place and have in so far materially contributed to Reformation and Revolution. We need not dwell upon the numerous analogies between our own times and those of the end of the 18th century. They are too manifest. Nor is it necessary to point out the powerful movements in religious organisation, doctrines, and faiths, as well as in the reconstruction of our social morality, the traditions and customs of life and living, which manifest strong resemblances in our times to those of the Reformation and the Renaissance. Nor even do I propose to dwell upon the fundamenteconomic changes, foreshadowed or actually effected, which to a great extent underlie, or interact with, the social, moral, and religious changes. All these factors together act and react upon one another and all together contribute to what we must call political movements, producing a decided change in the social foundations and the social outlook of human society, of nations and of individuals. It is not my purpose here further to develop this suggestion of a thesis; but I cannot refrain from pointing out that, even in the definite material causes which produced or contributed to the wide social changes, the analogy between our own times and the age of the Reformation exists. For our own age has often—perhaps with some exaggeration—been called *the* Age of Invention. The influence of inventions upon the life of nations and individuals is manifest, as it has also been widely recognised and admitted in modifying the actual warfare of our times. The Reformation and Renaissance were also ages of discoveries and inventions, and we need merely point to the invention of gunpowder and the printing press to remind the reader how powerfully these modified the warfare of those days and effected fundamental changes in the

social organisation and traditions of the European world¹.

If this analogy is readily admitted, it may not be so with the other contention, namely, that our age is unique in the history of such reformatory or revolutionary movements in its distinctive and leading features.

In all ages of reformation and revolution there have been two distinctly opposed forces contending with one another, the governed and the governors, the ruled and the rulers. The ruled, the people, the dispossessed or unfavoured, prepared or encouraged by the thinkers and philanthropists and led by their chiefs, moved forward and fought against their rulers, the monarchs, the aristocracies bent upon retaining their power, supported by their statesmen and protected by their armies to preserve the integrity of their sovereignty. Whatever minor differences there may have been among the thinkers and leaders of the people, they all, and the people behind them, were united in their chief and definite aims for which they fought, as the rulers with their statesmen and their armies were prepared to arrest and to repress their onslaught.

Our own age is unique in that these essential conditions which marked the Reformation and Renaissance in the past do not exist. On the contrary, the thinkers and political leaders of the mass of the people, of "Labour," throughout the world now fighting against German autocracy, are not thus united. This want of unity does not only apply to Russia with its Anarchists, Bolsheviks, Socialists,

¹ I shall here confine myself to the consideration of the political changes and in these again especially to the modification in the conception of the State and nationality, in their relation to other States and nationalities.

Minimal Socialists, Cadets, Democrats, Constitutional Monarchists, etc., but in every country the labour parties manifest decided difference between and even opposition to one another as regards their aims in national reform. There is certainly no definite unity there.

The real claim to uniqueness in this great historical movement, however, is, that there is no difference between the rulers and the ruled with regard to the absolute need for reformation in the conception of nationality and internationality, the relation between the several States of the civilised world,—the need to extirpate, root and branch, the dominance of militarism and the securing of international peace for all times. The recognised personal heads of the great republics, Clemenceau and Wilson, are the leaders of this vast reformatory movement, and the latter is foremost in the definite formulation of the limitation of nationality and the construction and stabilisation of international justice. The sovereigns of the leading States of constitutional monarchy—foremost among them the ruling head of the British Empire—are at one with their own chief statesmen in promulgating the aims and ways and means of international reconstruction. From the early words of Mr Asquith to the clear, eminently sincere confessions of Lord Grey of Fallodon, to the critical and well-balanced expositions of Mr Balfour,—all summarised in the passionate, forceful and epigrammatic declarations of Mr Lloyd George, the need of a League of Nations in some form has been definitely impressed in the clearest language.

And the Allied armies, the soldiers and sailors, who in bygone ages blindly followed the commands of their immediate rulers in order to uphold their rule, are themselves fully and clearly imbued with the ultimate aims for which

they are fighting; while their own sufferings and the horrors which they have witnessed daily have strengthened them in the determination to secure for their children and children's children, even at the sacrifice of their own lives, the cessation of such senseless, wanton cruelty and bestiality, and the assurance of a new period of peace in which civilised man can follow his own right impulses to self-preservation and self-realisation under the restraining and lasting security of the highest and purest justice.

It is in this combination of all forces to bring about the great reformation that our age differs from all others.

INTERNATIONAL WAR MUST CEASE

Only politics for *all* civilisation till this war is won—that is what we all want most. I came out of prison like a baby that has just been born. I know very little about events that have taken place in Canada while I have been in prison. I must begin again. I must learn like a child. But there is one thing that I have not to learn, one thing I know: that humanity must make itself safe now and for all time against another fearful tragedy like that we are now undergoing. That is my politics, and (I say it reverently) my religion too. If I can do something, anything, to bring about the end for which we all pray, then I am going to do it to the best of my ability. That is all! After a visit to my home and my mother I hope to take service at the front with the Canadian forces. Dr HENRI BOLAND (Ex-Postmaster-General of the Dominion after release from German Prison. Interview to *Globe*). From *The Times*, August 7th, 1918.

The above words express the feelings of a patriot and a practical politician who has realised from his personal sufferings what war means. They are not the words of a philosopher, nor of a dreamer dreaming theories in his

study. Still less are they those of a "pacifist." I venture to say these are the feelings of nine-tenths of the thinking men fighting at the front.

They are the feelings of the American people as represented by their trusted spokesman, President Wilson.

They are the feelings of all thinking people in the British Empire.

They are the feelings of practical business men. For it is realised, apart from ethical and humanitarian aims and aspirations, by simple practical men on sober and purely materialistic grounds, that the great aim of this war is to stop war. Whatever difficulties may stand in the way, they must be overcome; and all other considerations, political, legal, national, racial, religious or philosophical, weigh but lightly in the balance, when on the other side the supreme weight of humanity's greatest need is thrown into the scales. The plain business man realises that, apart from the loss in working-power through the death or incapacitation of the flower of youth and strength among all the civilised nations of the world; apart from the obligation to provide for the widows and orphans of those killed, as well as those maimed and incapacitated from work; apart from the absolute destruction of world treasure, the wealth in money and kind, which represents the accumulated labours of generations of men—the repayment of the debts which each nation has contracted during this war will strain the strength and resourcefulness of all civilised nations for generations to come. Even if all these debts are made good, the hands of the clock of civilisation, in its material and its moral aspect, will have been set back, set back for ever in the current of time as measured by human progress and by the ideals of man.

From the simple and sober business point of view, moreover—to go still further into details—the trend of modern labour and business enterprise has invariably been, and manifests itself more strongly every day, towards economy in co-operation. The mere wastefulness in the policing of the world, as represented by the cumbrous and antiquated system of modern nationalities and States—quite apart from the destructive antagonism of internecine war among these civilised States—leads the simplest labourer and the most sober and practical business-man to join the philanthropist and moral reformer in demanding in unequivocal terms the creation of a rational and just body, which, by co-operation and intelligent organisation, will reduce the cost of armament and the support of the guardians of the world's peace, by raising them to an international scale and thus avoid the most senseless waste of human energy, quite apart from the destruction of human happiness and progress.

If a vast majority of civilised people are thus agreed upon this need, the question to be decided concerns the means by which this great need of the world can be satisfied. For it is here that there may be some difference of opinion. Before dealing in detail with the definite objections which have been raised against the practicability of a "League of Nations," it might be as well for those who think as I do to define our own position on the whole question in a summary manner. It may even be useful to note in a bold and general outline the points in which we differ from those who have hitherto defined the claims and limitations of such a League of Nations, and positively to indicate, even in detail, the form which such an international body ought to take to secure the peace of the world:

We are not "Pacifists."

We are not Bolsheviks.

We are not Marxian "Internationalists."

We believe that war between nations *can* cease and *must* cease.

We do not believe that such peace can be secured by a League of Nations with a Parliament of Nations analogous to the government by political parties in the civilised democratic countries. For we believe that such a League of Nations will afford no stability or security of peace.

Yet we do believe that a supreme body can be created or evolved which shall be free from such insecurity.

We believe in Liberty; but we believe that Liberty can only be secured through its limitation by Law.

The supreme international limitation of Liberty must be "Justice," not entrusted to the fluctuating clash of interest and opinion of the several national representatives, ending in an equally fluctuating and insecure majority.

We do not believe in a supreme Parliament—or Sovereign State—dominating and limiting the sovereignty of the individual nations.

• The Supreme International or Supernational Court backed by Power must have no other function than the establishment and maintenance of international Justice; and the members of this Court must have no other mandate. They represent no State and, for the time being, drop their nationality.

In the international world of the future, as represented by this Supreme Court, there is but one Sovereign, i.e. Justice. The Sovereign State of the World is the Highest Court of Human Justice, and therefore the Suzerain of all States.

This Supreme Court must be endowed with power in-

comparably greater than any single State or group of States; and the separate States must disarm (except for internal policing) as in civilised communities individual citizens are forbidden to carry arms.

- * The army and navy, under the direct authority and command of this Supreme Supernational Court, will not be composed of separate national quotas, a congeries of national quotas, combined into one army and navy. The soldiers and sailors will for the time being drop their nationality, as do the Judges of the Supreme Court, and as, by analogy, the civil servant or the soldier drops his politics in our separate States. The national soldiers will all be merged into new units and become one great international army, navy and air force.

With the central habitation and home of this Court, corresponding in some degree to the District of Columbia for the United States, and to Delhi for the Indian Empire, there will also be established military, naval and air stations, dotted over the globe to enforce the decisions of the Court at once and effectually. For this "Supreme Sovereign State of the World" all civilised men will learn in course of time to feel passionate patriotism, as now they are moved by loyalty and patriotism for their own country, for their county, district and town, and towards their family¹. A man is not a bad father because he is a good patriot. *Civilised* man has in all times felt intense and passionate love and has given devotion and supreme sacrifice for an idea or an ideal, especially when such feelings group round a physically perceptible centre. His religion, his church, the idea of liberty, have led him to fight and to die.

¹ See *Patriotism, National and International*, 1917, by the present writer.

We can well conceive that *all* civilised men will some day feel pride in their great centre of civilisation, *the* Capitol, with its international libraries, universities and galleries, as well as its international courts. This will be his home as a civilised man, the embodiment of all that is best in civilisation, and he will regard it with the love and the pride which the northerner and southerner, the westerner and the easterner, from whatever State of the Union he may come, regards the City of Washington and the district of Columbia.

This we do not regard as the idle dream of Utopia. It is the one great primary need of modern life.

Now, before the complete establishment of such a Supreme Sovereign State of the civilised world in the form of a Supernational Court backed by Power, or before this moral sovereign of the world has fully manifested his power, there may be one more war, leading to its final establishment. The causes for such a war will group round the process of the complete and final establishment of the sovereignty of such an international entity in conflict with the antiquated and inherited conception of nationality and sovereignty, to which the world has hitherto been accustomed. Whether it is to be finally confirmed in power or not will depend entirely upon the victory—to use the established terms of past political history—of the Federalists in this international conflict over the Confederates. It will partake of the nature of a Civil War. But it will not be between North and South, between the conflicting interests, material and moral, of the several States, but for the dominance and sovereignty of Justice. If it occurs at all it will be a short war.

If the civilised nations engaged in the present world war

do not become one—all having become clearly conscious that this must be the last war of nations for the dominance of the world, and its goods,—they have not learnt the simplest of all the lessons which this war is teaching us, and the catastrophes which will immediately follow upon this war will be intense. They will of necessity in the end lead to the establishment of the rule of International Justice. But even when this great lesson has been taught, there may yet occur that short civil war before those who are inalienably wedded to the absolute sovereignty of the individual States as they now exist, learn to submit in obedience to the supreme commands of the highest human justice and give expression to this supreme sovereign entity in conferring upon it constraining power to ensure obedience.

THE TRANSITION BETWEEN THIS WAR AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPERNATIONAL JUSTICE

THIS outline is the definite scheme which we conceive to be not visionary but eminently practical, even necessary, to guard against militarism and to ensure peace for mankind in the future. On the other hand, it would be distinctly visionary to expect that such a Supernational Court of Justice backed by Power should be fully and adequately established at once—in fact, should stand before the suffering world full grown and fully armed, as the new-born Athene appeared at birth before the admiring gods. Such a world organisation will most probably not be called into existence by a single act of designed creation and organisation on the part of the several States, but will be evolved, perhaps during a lengthy process of organisation

and compromise among the several sovereign States even if they were each at once willing and desirous of calling it into early existence. Perhaps even—as we may have an opportunity of suggesting more fully when dealing with the industrial and commercial need of the future—it may be materially advanced, if not originated, out of the clash of commercial and industrial interests among the several States, out of the chaotic and internecine commercial warfare which may follow upon this war of bloodshed between nations. It may be realised by all nations that the inconsiderate pursuit of their own interests, even though modified and to some degree held in check by the common interests of the league or alliances which will arise out of this war, will of itself make it absolutely necessary to call in the guiding and directing, if not the constraining, power of reason and justice made effective and supreme¹. I even venture to believe it possible, if not probable, that the question of the treatment which Germany is to receive at the hands of the victorious allies at the end of this war will, step by step, on the purely economical ground of necessity, evolve some form of effective international justice to meet with the momentary demands of the peace-settlement, which again will prepare the way, if not lead to, the full establishment of such an international court in the first instance. It will thus not be created by one designed act of creation by patriots, jurists and philosophers; but will be naturally evolved by the logic of events out of the peace negotiations of this war. For these peace negotiations will be a lengthy and complicated business, especially on the economical and commercial side. Consider merely the task of indemnifying Belgium, France and

¹ See *Aristodemocracy*, p. xxi.

Serbia for the direct losses which they have sustained in contravention of all International Law, of public morality and justice!

Now, in establishing the claims for indemnification and the physical possibility of exacting them, the financial and commercial capabilities of the Central Powers will of necessity form the material basis of all action. I may at once say here that it seems to me puerile and premature now to argue, from a purely moral and legal point of view, as to whether Germany will be admitted into the League of Nations or not. She will *have to be admitted*, because the judges will have to decide as to what it is possible for them to exact in the way of indemnification from these Powers. Having decided this on the grounds of law and equity they will—*volentes volentes*—be driven on to the consideration and adjudication of the international opportunities for wealth-production; and the peoples of the world will have to force such authority of adjudication upon them. The whole question of raw material, of credits and general finance, will necessarily arise and obtrude itself during the peace negotiations, until an international, industrial and commercial court will be necessarily evolved and be made the ruling factor in imposing its judgment on the world.

But this Supernational Court backed by Power has not yet been created or evolved, and it would be unwise to expect that it will be established for some time to come. The question, therefore, arises as to what is to be our attitude with regard to the defence of our own national interests, the maintenance and development of our whole national life in the States of which we are citizens? To avoid all misunderstandings those who think as I do must

clearly define their position towards the States of which they are patriotic citizens during the interval preceding the full establishment of such a Supernational Court.

Having made it quite clear that, as a guiding star, or rather a sublunary beacon-light within the actual range of realisability, we must clearly face the line of action which we should support for the welfare of our own country and State during this interregnum:—We maintain now that British sea power has saved the world from Prussian militarism and autocracy in this war, as it has policed the seas for the advantage of all nations before; and that it must be maintained in its full strength and predominance until the whole world is free from the danger of military aggression and commercial tyranny on the part of any ambitious nation. In the same way the armies and the aerial forces of the entente powers must be maintained and even developed further until such security against all aggression in the future has been definitely established. On the economical side each country and the countries leagued together against German commercial dominance and penetration will have to protect themselves commercially and agriculturally against the aggressive system which this war has clearly revealed to be the economical complement of German military ambition towards world domination,—again, until internecine antagonism has been removed and a more rational adjustment of economical independence, securing the development of every nation, is definitely and lastingly assured.

If thus we must guard ourselves against any confusion as regards our own ideals with those ideals of internationalism as are held by "Pacifists," Bolsheviks and doctrinaire Socialists on the one side, we must equally

guard ourselves against, and give timely warning of the danger threatening us from the other side, namely, the growth by reaction and by one-sided and blind opposition to such ideals, on the part of Chauvinists, Junkers and ruthless commercial egoists who exist among us as they dominate Germany. This section of "patriots" in our midst will more and more cast off all international ideals, oppose the League of Nations and gradually glide into the attitude of the Germans before the war which has brought this catastrophe upon the world. There will arise a strong party of British, perhaps American, French and Italian, *junkers* who will stigmatise as, not only impracticable, but as dangerous dreams, all attempts at further realisation of the aims and ideals for which we are fighting, the aims formulated by most of our Allied statesmen, but most clearly defined by President Wilson. There will arise—the date may not be far distant—a marked dualism between Wilsonians and anti-Wilsonians. This dualism is slowly showing itself on the horizon. It will be most clearly defined when once peace is discussed or declared. Already in the various discussions on the League of Nations the division and antagonism on these essential views are adumbrated in accordance with the rejection or the purely negative criticism of a League of Nations.

It is therefore most important that our ultimate attitude towards such a league be taken and made manifest now, and it is also of great practical consequence that the conception of such a final organisation to secure the peace of the world be clearly formulated and impressed upon the wider public in its purest and highest form and not in a temporising spirit of compromise by the acceptance of any intermediary scheme which does not fully guarantee such lasting peace.

Before, however, we venture to construct in imagination, tempered and guided by experience and reason, the essentials of such a Supernational Court backed by Power, it is instructive to recognise and to meet the criticisms which have recently been directed against the League of Nations, a term and an idea which we favour merely as a stepping stone to the efficient organisation of international justice and peace for the future.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

OBJECTIONS AND CRITICISMS

LET us now consider the objections which have been raised against the League of Nations. These will of course *a fortiori* stand against our still bolder plan of the Supernational Court which goes much further in advance of existing political organisations of national and international life and makes much more serious incursions into the sovereignty of the modern State and the claims of international law hitherto admitted. These objectors may be grouped under three heads:—First, those who are decidedly opposed to any attempt at realising such a League of Nations, either on nationalistic or Chauvinistic, or, on what might be called, romantic grounds. In the second place we have the distinctly juridical opposition of those who, through an inopportune obtrusion and exaggeration of the admitted letter and spirit of the law, as well as from the domination of the purely legal attitude of mind, are not always cognisant of the true origin of laws as the expression of the needs of a changing and developing society, while they are still more incapable of realising

fully the paramount and constraining claims of the future need of society in its growth and progress. And in the third place, we have the objections of those statesmen who are too much impressed by their experience of the past and the reality of the organisation and working of the State in the present. The result is that the difficulties and impediments, which they rightly discover in the path of future reforms and new organisation of society and the State, are unduly exaggerated by them, and that, their habit of mind, enforced upon them by the actual machinery of government, is apt to rob them of faith and courage in boldly facing new issues which are imperiously demanded by the people themselves whom they are to govern.

All these three groups of critics and objectors together have in common the fear and mistrust of the doctrinaire, the constitutional or habitual repression of the impulse of constructive imagination, however much the imagination may be permeated with and produced by thoroughly practical observation and experience.

THE CHAUVINIST AND THE ROMANTICIST

There exists, as I have indicated above, in every country a strong Junker party. In Germany this Junker party, which is the nucleus of the *Alldeutsche* party, consists of the undiluted "aristocrats," chiefly the country gentlemen, and the smaller or larger landowners and "agrarians," the members of whose families constitute in the greater degree the military body, the officers of the army, as well as the civil officials, the bureaucrats. By a singular development of modern times they have transformed into an alliance their previous and essential antagonism to the industrial

and commercial classes with the leaders of industry, finance and commerce, the present *Schlotbarone*, the captains of industry and finance. By a still more singular development of these latter days they have absorbed into their expanding Pan-German body a certain section of the Socialist Party; the "majority"-leaders of the world of labour, who, while in the past and, when occasion demands even in the present, coquetting with Marxian internationalism of labour and of the whole proletariat world, are chiefly moved by a conviction that the interests of the German labourer as such are identical with those of the captains of industry and—paradoxically—even of the agrarians. For the one outstanding fact, which they recognise and strive to further, is that the wages and prosperity of the German labourer are identical with, and are certainly advanced by, the realisation of Pan-German ideals, the expansion of German industry, the domination of the world's markets and the consequent increase of wages and prosperity to the German artisan and labourer. By a facile process of sophistry they have moreover persuaded themselves that, with whatever misfortune and misery to the workers of other nationalities all over the world the dominance of Germany is accompanied, its realisation will ultimately be for the world's good; they uphold this thesis under the banner of the convenient phrase "German Kultur," which they assume is the highest form of civilisation and the diffusion and predominance of which must ultimately tend to world-progress. At certain unguarded moments all these classes in Germany, in their public and deliberate statements entirely repudiated the validity of this more spiritual element in national and international life, they have thrown the banner of Kultur on the dust-heap of antiquated shibboleths, and they have

then proclaimed an unadulterated creed of pure materialism and selfishness¹.

Now these Junker parties exist in every nation. They rarely venture outside Germany crudely to express and to publish their true convictions and political faith. But in moments of irritation, aroused by the upholders of the League of Nations, or any tendencies which this implies and which they readily stigmatise as "Pacifism," Bolshevism or Socialism, they are led to repudiate *in toto* all such tendencies, motives and ideals: national and imperial aims and ideals are quite enough for them. To make their own nations strong and prosperous is, according to them, the highest and all-sufficient aim of true patriots. Whatever counteracts or limits such aims is anathema. They are always prepared to look upon any other nation or State as their natural or potential enemy; and, however sincere and intense their loyalty towards their allies for the time being may be, it takes very little to turn their friendship into enmity and peace into war. Even in their internal life they are logically and consistently led to narrow the limits of their loyalty and sympathy, and their "nationalism" takes a more isolated and antagonistic form of a political party at home as it readily degenerates into Chauvinism in relation to all other States. As in Germany for the past few generations *Germanenthum*—in spite of its ethnological absurdity when applied to the half Slav Prussian and other German States—insisted upon the limits of political privileges by means of a caricatured and exaggerated form of internal "nationalism," and has borne and bears its fruit in the poly-ethnic Austro-Hungarian empire with its

¹ See, by the present author, *What Germany is Fighting For* (1917), pp. 43 seq.

growing internal disruption, so we can notice the growth of such would-be national parties in the allied countries as well, whose watch-word is and will be—"England for the English, France for the French," nay, even "America for the Americans"—whoever they may be.

How actually to define these Englishmen, Frenchmen or Americans ethnically or by individual descent or by religious beliefs is a problem which cannot be seriously and conscientiously faced and, if it is, will at once be reduced to absurdity.

✓ It is needless to dwell upon the fact that people possessed of such a political and social attitude of mind, who constitute the vast mass of national Chauvinists, look with contempt or mistrust and with undisguised antagonism upon all ultimate ideals and immediate schemes for international unity and justice; and it is superfluous to deal with criticisms and objections which are raised in this camp. But where these are clearly manifested and published they, at least, have the merit of establishing fundamental differences of points of view, so fundamental that agreement can never be hoped for; and it then means a clear contest as to which moral view will prevail in the end.

• The group which I have designated as Romanticists cannot be classed as pure materialists; social and national egoists and cynics. They have in their favour—and in so far deserve more sympathetic consideration—a certain poetry, an intense and vivid realisation of history, a reverence for the past and faith in the unalterable and, in so far, justifiable leading characteristics of human nature and social institutions. To them war has ever existed and will always exist as an integral part of human nature. The fighting and courageous side of man (*τὸ θυμοειδές*), the passionate force out of which all action and creation

grows, is one of the greatest assets for good in human nature. In its highest form it leads to chivalry and to courage in the upholders of the supreme social virtue—Patriotism. Without this the higher life of human society would be, if not inconceivable, at all events the poorer and meaner. War—besides being pre-ordained in the divine revelation of the past—especially when dominated and moved by the spirit of chivalry, is one of the greatest and noblest educators of mankind. Such is their reasoning.

When, however, we realise that even in this horrible war of machine guns, high explosives, bombs and tanks, longest ranged ordnance and the decisive power of every chance invention in modern destruction on the part of one side or the other—when we realise the poetry inherent in this point of view (which is to some degree eloquently upheld by Mr Hilaire Belloc) we cannot withhold a certain degree of sympathetic consideration. But this sympathy must needs be short-lived. For if we but realise, first, that there was but little poetry in all the wars of the past; that cruelty, deceit and meanness predominated; and, secondly, that in spite of all the heroism and sacrifice of the men fighting in the trenches (who further sacrifice their lives for the one great cause of doing away with war in the future) this war has sung the dirge of all chivalry, justice and fair-play, that it was prepared for, and is being fought, with all the means of deception which has spelt nothing more than the undoing of all the standards of truth, humanity and virtue which generations of peace and civilisation laboriously built up for us,—then the poetry vanishes and the horror and disgust alone remain.

Finally, I would remind Mr Belloc of the simple fact, that if we can enforce the laws of fair-play and chivalry

upon the fighters of future wars we can equally enforce upon them complete desistance from war¹.

THE OBJECTIONS OF THE JURISTS

Other objections (or rather doubts and criticisms) to any league of nations naturally spring from a legal attitude of mind. However deeply the jurist as such enters into the causes or origin of laws and contemplates the need for change or reform, the bias of the legal mind is always conservative and is naturally, though unduly, concerned with the formal aspect of laws and institutions arising out of the varying need of a growing, progressive society.

The supreme task of the legislator and jurist is to fix equity by law. His aim must always be to convert equity into law, to establish it as law. He thus gives it the most essential of all its elements, that is its security. He must also endeavour to give to it clearness. Formal drafting and establishment of a law aims at the avoidance of all misconception. The jurist must eliminate all loose statements, all that may admit of varied interpretation. That absolute success in this endeavour cannot be obtained is proved by the innumerable and continuous lawsuits, however clearly and with however great pains contracts, wills, etc., are drawn up by legal experts. The legal mind thus of necessity becomes formal, suspicious of ideas and of feelings and desires as such, however much these may be justified on

¹ I have developed this thesis in *Aristodemocracy*, pp. 59 seq. and 144 seq., as I have also there shown that the true analogy to was among nations is the duel and that the duel has been entirely eliminated from the life of civilised people in our day—at least in Great Britain and America.

grounds of morality or utility or even equity, and however much they may respond to social and political needs. The importance—nay the sanctity—which is thus attached to a definite legal term may often block the way to the acceptance of reforms in the constitutional rights of a people, warranted by the moral consciousness of the whole people and springing from the most pressing need of an age.

One of the most striking illustrations of this influence of legal mentality is furnished by the all-important significance given to the term "Sovereignty" in recent discussions on the League of Nations. I venture to believe that it is to a certain degree the worship of such legal formality which underlies most of the objections raised against the definite scheme to secure international peace by so great a jurist, so deep a philosopher and so humane a philanthropist as was the late Lord Parker of Waddington¹.

¹ This is also the opinion of Mr Ernest Barker in his reply to Lord Parker's article. See *The Times* of June 25th, 1918. "The sovereignty of which he writes seems to me to be a definition rather than a thing. It is a definition, as far as I know, invented by a canon lawyer, Innocent IV; expanded by a French lawyer, Jean Bodin; and popularised in England by another lawyer, John Austin. I have a profound respect for the lawyers, and I think I can almost understand their conception of sovereignty. But it is a conception, like legal conceptions in general, which is formal. If one asks what real sovereignty is, and where the real force resides that ultimately determines political action, one finds it not in a determinate person exercising a determinate complex of rights, but in

All thought, all passions, all delights,
all the ideas, thoughts, and volitions (by whatsoever name they may be called, whether it be 'public opinion' or 'the general will') that sway the frame and determine the action of a community. Sovereignty is a mental force. It resides in the minds of men who believe certain things to be good and by their wills translate these things into action. If our minds can believe in a League of Nations,

In his critical consideration of Lord Grey's pamphlet on the League of Nations, Lord Parker (*The Times*, June 23, 1918) points to the constitutional difficulty involved in the creation of such a league:

Viscount Grey admits quite candidly that the government is and states willing to join the League must understand clearly that it will impose some limitations on the national action of each. In other words the creation of the League must involve, as a condition, precedent surrender by each member of a portion of its sovereignty. Such a surrender must always be a matter of very grave import, and it is not always easy to see to what it may ultimately lead.

From a very different quarter this fact has been clearly and effectively insisted upon. Mr Belloc, in his reply to Mr Archer's article in the *Westminster Gazette*, singles out as the chief point in the whole discussion the "sanction" of the new international system proposed.

"There are," he maintains, "two answers to this question, and only two. Either the force must be an international force acting upon disarmed nations, or it must put the use of national armies combined in alliance to enforce upon one recalcitrant member the will of the majority.

The common objection of confused intellects that human affairs are too complex for the admission of exact principles, etc., etc., cannot be used here even by those least willing to reason.

You cannot have a mixture of the two systems, for one or the other solution will preponderate. Either you have an international armed force in comparison with which the national forces are so weak that the majority decision will certainly be obeyed; or you will have an international force so weak

and our wills co-operate in its institution, the real sovereign will have created a living fact, and the formal sovereign must be adjusted, by a new definition, to that fact."

that certain national armies in alliance against others would be the true sanction of the majority vote; or you will have an international force not supreme but strong enough to be pitted against national armies.

In the first case you have a working international society imposing peace.

In every other case save that of an international force acting upon disarmed nations you have the challenge of war.

That is why I call all this loose talk perilous. Men are in danger of setting up a positive instrument which will clash with the profound instinct of patriotism, directly challenge it, and inevitably provoke resistance.

If you decide boldly for the only solution satisfactory to those whose ideal is international; if you believe that the world has now become virtually one nation of which the old nations are only provinces, then you must consent to see the nations completely disarmed (a large order!), and you must set up some external armed body (with the three branches of air, land, and sea) which can coerce any nation recalcitrant to its orders."

There is no doubt that no scheme for the establishment of anything of the nature of a League of Nations can be conceived without some diminution of the sovereignty of the existing States. With this in view Lord Parker enlarges upon the difficulties inherent in such a scheme in the following terms:

Now let us consider for a moment what the League of Nations, as conceived by its most prominent advocates, involves. First, there is to be an international tribunal administering international law. Secondly, there is to be an international force by which the decrees of the tribunal are to be enforced. Thirdly, there is to be something in the nature of an International Legislative Council, revising and enacting international law. Fourthly, there is to be something in the nature of an international executive, charged with the duty of raising the international force and giving effect to the

international tribunal's decrees, a duty, which, if it is to be carried out successfully, must involve the right of levying men and money in the territory of each member of the league. No one will deny that in order to bring such a scheme into operation every member of the league will have to sacrifice a considerable portion of the sovereign rights which it has hereto enjoyed. It should be noticed, too, that such a surrender must be permanent in its nature. No really sovereign power can exist on sufferance merely. To admit the right of its members to withdraw from the league would be as fatal to the league's sovereign power as would have been the recognition of the right to secede from the Union to the sovereign right of the United States. If, finally, we remember that in constituting a League of Nations we shall not be dealing with more or less homogeneous parts of the same Empire, but with a number of different nationalities with distinct traditions and distinct ideas, I doubt whether the practical difficulties in the way can be exaggerated.

One of the most valid objections, with which we shall deal as we proceed, is the fourth one enumerated by him, namely, the levying of the forces or the establishment of an international executive within the several nations constituting the League. This would certainly imply an infraction of the independence or "sovereignty" of the several nations, which would be intolerable. But it must be clearly understood that contributions in money and men will not be exacted from the several sovereign States by this supernational body periodically of the nature of a tribute paid to the over-lord. The terms of foundation of this Supernational Court by the free consent of the sovereign States will give to these terms the nature of law. After this foundation any question concerning these contributions will be decided by the Court *as a matter of Law*—not as a question of administrative authority. The

admission of the authority of Law will not be derogatory to national sovereignty. I may at once anticipate, what will become evident as we proceed, and say, that in any effective and lasting scheme to ensure international peace, relative disarmament of forces designed for international war will be an essential condition; while the international tribunal, however fully organised as an international entity, will not require an executive corresponding to that of our established national States in the present. The Supernational police, the Army, Navy and Air-forces, will be directly under the orders of the supreme tribunal merely as a police force to carry out its orders in the establishment of international justice. Lord Parker, and others who agree with him, are really deterred, in spite of their sincere desire to see established a league of nations in some form or other, from following the idea to its full and ultimately logical consequences by their worship of the term and conception of "sovereignty," to such a degree, that they would entrust the guardianship of the peace of the world to the precarious trusteeship of the present alliances with their varying interests and with their fundamental differences of national character, national outlook, and national interests. All these to guard the sanctity of the so-called "sovereignty of States."

Let us examine this term and the idea it conveys. The term itself has never been clearly defined in its true legal and constitutional significance; and if it has, it has never been accepted in such a final sense by legal and constitutional authorities.

In Professor Oppenheim's lucid sketch of the history of the conception of sovereignty¹ he shows that

¹ *International Law*, A Treatise by L. Oppenheim, 2nd edition, London, 1912, p. 115.

...it becomes apparent that there is not and never was unanimity regarding this conception. It is therefore no wonder that the endeavour has been made to eliminate the conception of sovereignty from the science of politics altogether, and likewise to eliminate sovereignty as a necessary characteristic of statehood, so that States with and without sovereignty would in consequence be indistinguishable. It is a fact that sovereignty is a term used without any well-recognised meaning except that of supreme authority. Under these circumstances those who do not want to interfere in a mere scholastic controversy must cling to the facts of life and the practical, though abnormal and illogical, condition of affairs. As there can be no doubt about the fact that there are semi-independent States in existence, it may well be maintained that sovereignty is divisible.

If we omit theories concerning the earliest evolution of the idea out of tribe and tribal confederacy to the city-state, and if, for the moment, we defer the consideration of Aristotle as representing the Greek conception, as well as the constitution of Imperial Rome, we find that in the medieval conception we come dangerously near to the essential principle underlying the plans and the hopes of the most modernist and futurist advocate of the League of Nations. In the theories prevalent in the Middle Ages, the whole of mankind was conceived as forming a unity of people with the Pope and the Emperor at the head: the universal Church and the universal Emperor were supposed to rule the world. When there was practically only one Church and one religion "providing spiritual unity" and one emperor representing "the temporal power" we have to deal with a unity far greater than even the most fanatic upholder of the League of Nations in our days can dream of. Yet this conception was familiar and ruled the minds of the world for centuries, even in the

'time of Leibnitz. Still the idea of Sovereignty was in those days imperfectly defined.

Its real definition, partaking of the nature of a legal term, dates from the second half of the 16th century¹:

' The term Sovereignty was introduced into political science by Bodin in his celebrated work *De la république*, which appeared in 1577. Before Bodin, at the end of the Middle Ages, the word "souverain" was used in France for an authority, political or other, which had no other authority above itself. Thus the highest courts were called "Cours Souverains." Bodin, however, gave quite a new meaning to the old conception. Being under the influence and in favour of the policy of centralisation initiated by Louis XI of France (1461-1483), the founder of French absolutism, he defined sovereignty as "the absolute and perpetual power within a State." Such power is the supreme power within a State without any restriction whatever except the Commandments of God and the Law of Nature. No constitution can limit sovereignty, which is an attribute of the king in a monarchy and of the people in a democracy. A sovereign is above positive law. A contract only is binding upon the Sovereign, because the Law of Nature commands that a contract shall be binding.

It must be noted that even in this more absolute and autocratic conception the sovereignty of the State is limited at least by "the Commandments of God and the Law of Nature." We may at once anticipate and say that the Commandments of God can be variously interpreted, and, as is shown in history and even in the present day, present no intelligible unity for the practical execution of the law. As regards the Law of Nature in regulating human conduct, it might readily give justification to the principle that "Necessity knows no law."

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 111.

In the 17th century Hobbes went even beyond Bodin, maintaining that a sovereign was not bound by anything and had a right over everything, even over religion. Hobbes had his followers; but Pufendorf denied that sovereignty includes omnipotence, and held that it may well be constitutionally restricted. In the 16th and 17th centuries, however, "sovereignty" is indivisible and contains the centralisation of all power in the hands of the sovereign, whether a monarch or the people itself in a republic. Yet the way for another conception of "sovereignty" is prepared by Locke, whose two treatises on "Government" appeared in 1689 and paved the way for the doctrine that the State itself is the original Sovereign, and that all supreme powers of the Government are derived from this Sovereignty of the State.

Owing to the political constitution of the numerous States of the German Empire in the 18th century, constitutional authorities developed the new theory of "full sovereignty" on the one hand, and "not-full or half sovereignty" on the other. When, towards the close of the 18th century, the United States of America turned from a confederation of States into a federal State, the division of Sovereignty between the sovereign federal States and the sovereign member-States appeared. Though Rousseau defended the indivisibility of Sovereignty, its divisibility became the dominant view during that period.

In the 19th century (especially since the Russian Czarism no longer exists), sovereignty with absolutism belongs practically to the past. Moreover the example of the Federal State set by the United States has been followed by Switzerland, Germany and others. The member-States of the federal State remain sovereign States; and thus the divisibility of Sovereignty is recognised.

One fact stands out most clearly from the review of the deliberate conception formed of the idea of sovereignty by publicists and jurists of all times, namely, that the sovereignty of the State is never conceived to be *absolute* even in the Middle Ages, the power of the sovereign is, at least in theory, limited by the Will of God and Law of Nature. Whatever interpretation may be given to this conception, the Law of God on earth is justice. To put it negatively: no theory of Government would admit that the sovereign power can avowedly be wielded against justice. To Aristotle the fundamental maxim of all government is that law should reign. But law itself is subject to justice and morality. To him private and public morality can never be divorced. The State must act like a just man, and the justice of the State is the same as the justice of the individual man. In the most definite form this theory of government has been enunciated as underlying the most decided act (the declaration of war) of one of the most powerful and prosperous governments of the world by President Wilson as the chief and practical motive which led the American people into this great war.

Moreover this principle has found direct recognition in the constitution of all modern democracies and is the point upon which all theorists and writers on constitutional law are agreed, however divergent their opinions may be on many fundamental principles of the theory of government. To whatever school of political theorists we belong, whatever writer on this subject we accept as authoritative, from Aristotle to Austin and Maine, Mill and Spencer, there is no one who would maintain that in modern democracies the judicature must not be independent, that government can ignore law and justice. Whatever freedom

and authority are granted to the King, the President, the Cabinet, to Parliament and the people as a whole in the making of the laws—all must submit to the laws they have made and all must bow to justice; and the administration of justice must be independent. This is borne out by all the constitutions of the leading modern democracies. Of the three departments of Government, legislation, judicature and administration, judicature stands alone in its absolute independence. In the British constitution the Bench is always conceived as being independent. In the constitution of the United States the Supreme Court is in reality supreme. As the supreme courts of the several States are the guardians of the constitutions of those States, so the Supreme Court of the United States is the guardian of the federal constitution. It has even to judge whether a measure passed by the legislative powers is not void by reason of being unconstitutional, and it may therefore have to veto the resolution of both the Houses of Congress and the President. The political consciousness of the public mind of the British people as well as of all democratic nations in modern times has become so thoroughly familiarised with this notion of the ascending scale of authority from the lower to the higher courts ending in the finality of authority of a supreme court, that it requires no strain or effort to carry on this natural and logical process of reasoning and conviction beyond the limits of local habitation and even of national boundaries to the sphere of international justice.

As a matter of fact the sovereignty of each body and of the State itself is confirmed and strengthened by the sanction given by justice, by its limitation and subordination to the power of the law. Without such limitation sovereignty becomes tyranny and licence,—whether it be the tyranny

of the autocrat or of a body of anarchists and Bolsheviks. In the life of the individual, even from the purely juridical point of view, there exists a most striking analogy which, through many centuries of social and political evolution, has become fixed in the body of the English law and has permeated the individual life of the British people and of every single subject of the King. It is to be found in the confirmation of the individual liberty of the subject by the restrictions of the *Magna Charta* in all the successive modifications of the *Habeas Corpus Act*. Fully established in the time of Charles I and passed by both Houses in 1627, followed by the abolition of the Star Chamber in 1640, it can even be traced back to the 12th century. In the second half of the 17th century, arising in the first instance out of the impeachment of Lord Clarendon, Lord Shaftesbury was chiefly instrumental in passing "A Procedure Act for empowering the legal mechanism to guard constitutional liberty." Further developed in the 18th century, the whole tendency of such legislation was, to restrict and *legalise* the restriction of personal liberty by a court and not a king or the executive or a political department, and thereby to safeguard personal liberty. Finally, by the legislation of 1816 and of 1898 (further restrictions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act) and of 1906, steps were taken to put an end to all forms of legal detention in public or private custody.

By such restrictions personal liberty is secured. The people know this. Now, what liberty is to the individual, sovereignty is to the State. The people of civilised and democratic nations know, or will have to know, that by legal restriction of the sovereignty of each State they will secure national sovereignty.

But in the history of human institutions it has been found that laws could not be effectually imposed, however much they harmonised with the moral consciousness, and even the physical needs, of the people, unless they were backed by power to enforce them. It has even been found that the rules and elaboration of the laws themselves to meet all contingencies of life were not systematically and completely formulated until the power to enforce the law was itself established and organised. If this is shown by the history of municipal and State law, it cannot be otherwise with international law.

So much however we may assert: that from the juridical point of view there is nothing in the spirit of the law, in the past as well as in the present, there is even nothing in the position which we may accord to the conception of sovereignty in the life of each nation and State, to prevent the establishment of international sovereignty, of a Super-national Court backed by Power to limit the sovereignty of each independent State.

THE OBJECTIONS OF STATESMEN AND ADMINISTRATORS

If the legal mind is, by its very nature, opposed to the acceptance of new ideas which fundamentally alter the existing state of things as formulated in existing laws, the same applies, in a different sphere of public life, to the statesman and administrator. The opposition to the League of Nations is in this case not theoretical, but practical. The executive and administrative officials are oppressed by the weight of the actual conditions, their inherent complexity, and the still greater complexity and inter-

dependence of all the forces which actually make up the international and national government. It may perhaps be an almost universal experience in the personal history of every statesman and administrator that, however open to great ideas he may have been when in his youth he entered upon a political career, however definite and vital his determination may have been to be guided by ideals and to realise ideas in political practice, as he proceeds in his work, in observation and experience of the actual conditions of government, of the things that are, he more and more loses faith in his power of realising great ideas and even in the ideals themselves. He becomes more and more impressed with the urgency of the definite demands before him, with the difficulty of satisfying each one of those demands, with the amount of energy which is required in order to deal effectively with even the minor material conditions and personal considerations which surround the definite task itself, and with the ever-growing, avalanche-like number of such immediate questions, problems, and tasks, that not only does he lose sight of the broader, fundamental principles and ideas, but from doubt and resignation he turns to contempt and opposition as regards their desirability and practicability. "He cannot see the forest for the trees." The danger is that he thus loses the sense of proportion, that the definite tasks before him and the difficulties which these present to the realisation of wider ideas and ideals, cause him to lose sight of, and faith in, the wider ideals themselves to which they ought to be subordinated, as, on the other hand, the visionary or doctrinaire is apt to neglect and underestimate, if not to despise, the definite tasks and the practical difficulties which lie between him and his great ideas.

It would be grossly unfair to maintain that this has been the case with the Statesmen and executive officials who have recently taken part in the public discussion concerning the League of Nations, notably in the case of those who, in the debate on Lord Parmoor's bill in the House of Lords and in the public pronouncements from eminent members of the House of Commons, have pointed out the difficulties which actually prevail when such a fundamental reform in the constitution of the country is to be carried into effect. These leaders of thought and of public life have all of them recognised the need for some action of the kind in the immediate future, they are fully alive to the moral, social and political necessity of some such reform, and yet they have thought it their duty to warn the enthusiast of the innumerable actual difficulties which lie between the conception and the realisation of a consummation devoutly to be wished. In this they have no doubt done great public service; while they have, also doubtlessly, in no way swept aside the great scheme as set before the world by President Wilson and by Lord Grey from the platform of interallied politics.

• Still, if I venture to believe that in their attitude of mind "they are sicklied o'er with the pale cast of" experience to such a degree that they have given undue prominence to these undoubted difficulties, I in no way wish it to be believed that those who think as I do, do not fully recognise the numerous obstacles which must be overcome before any scheme, especially one so revolutionary as the establishment of a Supernational Court backed by Power necessarily carries with it, is accepted. I may be allowed to add that I have received the strongest and most unexpected encouragement from the public recognition given to the

bold scheme which we advocate, by one of the greatest administrators of our time, whose eminently successful life was passed in carrying into actual effectiveness reforms and laws under the most overwhelming difficulties and complexities in the social and political conditions of the people among whom he lived, so that no man was ever better able to judge of what it was possible to achieve in adapting great principles and reforms to the actual exigencies of popular and political life. I mean the late Lord Cromer. In dealing critically with the scheme for the establishment of such an international tribunal as published by me he wrote:

✓ It would indeed be a mistake for practical politicians to brush aside summarily proposals of this nature on the ground that they are unpracticable and can only be regarded as dreams of Utopian idealists. Not only moralists and thinkers but also the general mass of the public are yearning for the discovery of some means to prevent future wars and to relieve the heavy burden of taxation due to the maintenance of enormous armaments¹. ✓

Now if we consider the debate in the House of Lords on June 26th and in the House of Commons on August 1st of this year (1918), we find that the leading statesmen (in this case Lord Curzon and Mr Balfour) are agreed that "something must be done," and that they were honestly bent on giving tangible and effective form to Lord Parmoor's bill. This view is emphatically confirmed by the remarks of Lord Curzon:

The noble viscount (Lord Bryce) reminded us just now that it has received the formal acceptance of the majority of the leading statesmen who are fighting in the cause of the Allies. He mentioned the speeches and pronouncements of

¹ See *Spectator*, June 3rd, 1916. Review of *Aristodemocracy*, etc.

President Wilson in America, of Mr Balfour, of the present Prime Minister, of Mr Asquith, and the pamphlet recently published by Lord Grey of Fallodon. There was one utterance to which the noble viscount did not refer, but of which it may be worth while to remind the House. In the reply of the Allies to President Wilson on January 10th, 1917, there appeared the following passage which I quote as covering a much wider area and therefore carrying a much greater authority than the individual utterances of statesmen: "The Allies said they associated themselves whole-heartedly with the plan to create a League of Nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world." So much for the opinions expressed by Allied statesmen. Among the neutral States we have had similar expressions of opinion, and among our enemies lip service has been rendered to the idea in the speeches of Count Hertling and Count Czernin. It is unnecessary for me to analyse the difference in motive or phraseology of these various utterances. They may have been animated by different convictions, but I think that they do show that the idea itself cannot be ruled out, that it has come into the world of international politics and relations to stay, and that if there were any disposition on the part either of nations or of statesmen to treat it as an inconvenient intruder and sweep it on one side, the public opinion of the countries they represented would protest and insist on it being maintained. . . .

There is one most encouraging reflection to which no allusion has so far been made. To a large extent a League of Nations is already in existence, or rather there are two Leagues of Nations in existence at this moment. The first is the League of the British Empire, comprising something like 450,000,000 of people, or one-quarter of the entire population of the globe. No fresh constitution is required to call that League into being. Its governing body is already in existence, and is sitting in London in the shape of the Imperial War Cabinet. There are the statesmen from all parts of the world representing the views, the aspirations and the hopes of this great aggregation of mankind. There is also the League of the Allied Nations, who have combined together to resist the

militarism of Germany. Those States number between 20 and 30. There is in existence at Paris the machinery by which the representatives of the four most important of these States—Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States—already take common action in respect of military matters, finance, shipping and food. This League possesses its own armaments. Those armaments have actually been placed under a single commander. The organisation is happily elastic. It has been a good deal perfected in recent times and it may develop into something larger in the future. I am not including in this League China and the other great Allied States who are not directly represented at Paris. These two Leagues embrace within their ambit something like 700,000,000 people, or about two-fifths of the human race. It is quite true that those Leagues have been designed for the prosecution of the War, but it may be that in the last resort they may be useful for the maintenance of peace. I concur in the observation that if the larger scheme in which we are all interested fails to materialise, here, at any rate, is a nucleus from which it may be possible to proceed.

The noble viscount pointed out that there are a great many schemes in existence to constitute a League of Nations. In so far as these contemplate a more consistent application of the recognised rules of international law in ordinary international disputes, they are merely an extension of the principle of arbitration which has already made such progress during the last 20 or 30 years. For that kind of work no sanction is required, and it does not much matter if you are merely going to extend the principle of arbitration whether you appoint a new tribunal for the purpose or whether you have an ad hoc tribunal for individual cases as they arise, or whether you continue your references to the Tribunal at the Hague.

But I agree that we want now and henceforward to go further than arbitration. We want to deal with cases and with the constitution of a tribunal that may not merely settle disputes when they arise, but that as far as possible may render war, if not impossible, at any rate more difficult and more risky in the future. That we shall not do in all probability

merely by measures of persuasion or of arbitration. In the last resort you must contemplate the use of force, in other words, you must contemplate having some sort of sanction in the background. That is the new element in the situation which differentiates these proposals from earlier schemes for an extended settlement of international dispute by arbitration alone. The kind of cases for which you want this new body are the cases which the noble viscount described to us—the kind of case which there is no existing law to decide, which is outside the scope of international jurisprudence as laid down in definite rules, the kind of cases in which the honour or sentiment or the political ambition of a State are engaged, and which have in history, as we all know, been the most prolific sources of war. In these schemes I find a general concurrence in certain features. Firstly in the institution of a court or conference or tribunal, to which all the signatory parties pledge themselves to refer their disputes before going to war; secondly the imposition of a moratorium for delay pending decision, during which no hostilities are to be permitted and any Power commencing or continuing hostilities is to be regarded as an offending party; and thirdly, the existence of a sanction for enforcing the decrees of the supreme body.

Mr Balfour gives the same general support, though in his speech in the House of Commons he was chiefly concerned in reminding the enthusiastic supporters of the bill, of the many difficulties in the actual creation of such a League of Nations. The following passage confirms this:

I am one of those who, while keenly alive to the difficulties of the subject, are most convinced that something of the sort must be done, and that civilisation will be bankrupt, will have proved itself utterly incompetent to carry out the duties which it recognises itself are its duties, unless it can within a measurable time evolve some methods which will prevent a repetition of the world catastrophe under which we are all groaning. Therefore I am one of those who are

prepared vehemently to preach, and to the best of my ability I have preached, the doctrine of the League of Nations.

In the same debate Sir Mark Sykes has most forcibly impressed the urgency of the world's need for such a body:

Colonel Sir Mark Sykes said, that if the civilised world was to continue to develop it was an absolute necessity that some machinery should be found to prevent wars. Quite apart from ideals, if he was the grossest epicurean he would say the same thing. Comparing the devastation wrought by the Frederick-the-Great wars with the Napoleonic wars, and that of the Napoleonic wars with the American Civil War, and comparing the destruction of that war with that of the present war, it would be seen that a war 50 years hence would not merely shake the fabric of civilisation but would bring it to an end, and unless some device was discovered to prevent the catastrophe we should sink not merely into spiritual barbarism but into material barbarism and the grass would grow in our streets. Therefore, if the League of Nations was the machinery to prevent war, then the idea would have the good wishes of the whole of the civilised world.

In considering their criticisms, however, I must at once insist on a most important point in our favour, namely, *that most of the objections raised hold against the League of Nations; but would not hold against the Supernational Court backed by Power.*

The first and most general objection raised by Lord Curzon concerns the question of sovereignty with which we have already dealt.

"Some people," he says, "seem to imagine that you can set up an International Court with an International Police. It is supposed that the Powers in general are to represent only such forces as the Court may decree, and that the whole of such forces are to be at the disposal of the Court to deal with any offending nation. I doubt very much whether Sovereign

States would submit to this restriction, almost derogation, of their sovereignty."

Mr Balfour puts the objection in a different form:

It was said that the business of a League of Nations was to enforce treaties and prevent wars. For that purpose it was hoped to see established a kind of supernational High Court of Justice in relation to the various nations as the various states in America are to the Supreme Court of America, and that this Court would secure the enforcement of contracts between nation and nation and prevent wars, just as the Courts of law in civilised countries enforced contracts between citizens and prevented recourse to the methods of personal violence by the use of the legal methods carried out by the police. That is just where the parallel actually breaks down. The right hon. gentleman who made the suggestion did not tell us where the international police were to be found which would enforce contracts between one nation and another. A scheme for enforcing contracts between nations failed when it lacked the basis on which the enforcement of contracts depended—namely, the power that lay behind the decision of the Court.

The question is one of fact, as to what the peoples of the civilised world would or would not do. I venture at least to doubt whether, if there were a referendum or *plebiscite* of the peoples of the civilised world, it might not yield unexpected results as to their readiness to curtail national sovereignty. If it can be proved that such a Supernational Court with power to enforce its enactments were the only means of assuring peace to the world, and if it is conceded that peace *must* in the future be assured, such a court and such supernational power must be accepted by the world.

The next difficulty, pointed out by Lord Curzon as well as by Mr Balfour, regards the constitution of such a

league and the question, whether it is to consist of all the Powers, including the smaller Powers, or only of the Great Powers? In the latter case is Germany to be included or not? As I have maintained above, the introduction of the question with regard to Germany is premature and needless. The Germany that has brought about this war and the Germany that is now carrying on this war with its actual methods and future aims cannot be included. Unless the militaristic disturber of the world's peace is removed from the family of nations, it is useless to speculate on anything of the nature of a League of Nations at all. It is also useless to speculate on the nature of the Germany which will emerge from the ruins of this war and out of the victory of the Allied Powers who stand for the securing of the world's peace in the future.

Now, it is important to remember that our international or supernational supreme Court will in no way be analogous to any one of the greater or lesser Powers and States actually in existence; but will, in fact, only be a court dealing with the international relations of civilised States and only with the international aspects of such relations. The Supernational Court will be chiefly a court of equity, more than a court of law; and the members of the Court will in no way be chosen exclusively among jurists, however important their presence may be within such a body. These members will not sit as representatives of the several nations great or small; and will, above all, not approach their judicial duties with any mandate to represent the interests of their own nation or State. He would indeed be bold who would come before the world with a fully matured, cut and dry, system for the selection and organisation of the Court itself. But I may nevertheless be allowed to remark that

the difficulties presented by this problem are in no way insuperable; that the several civilised States, as well as self-governing Colonies, can each be represented on the ground of the percentage of their inhabitants counted by the million. The real difficulty arises when Mr Balfour points to the fallacious reasoning on the part of those who see a parallel between the several courts of law in civilised countries, whose enactments are carried out by their own police, and that of such an international court. He maintains that a scheme for enforcing contracts between nations fails when it lacks the basis on which such a contract depends, namely—the power which lies behind the decision of the court.

I admit that all depends upon the nature of this international police. If the force behind the League or the Court consists of the whole or the majority of the several national armies and navies combined against a recalcitrant culprit, the whole scheme is in danger of falling to the ground and the door is opened to all the usual rivalries, intrigues, and fortuitous combinations with which history is familiar in the past in the form of holy or unholy alliances. Moreover the intrusion of outside authority, from wheresoever it may come, into the government of independent nations as they now exist, and the direct ordering of their military and naval forces, would indeed be an intolerable incursion into national sovereignty. But such is not our conception of the supernational police-force. It is to form an independent international force, military, naval and aerial, whose sole duty and business it is to carry out the orders of the supreme court. Nor, in our conception, is this force to be a motley congeries of national units. The national quotas are all to be merged together into a military

unit obeying the orders of its leaders. The armies of the Middle Ages and even later ones furnish abundant evidence that such forces will obey the orders of their superiors. And we may even venture to suggest that the consciousness that they are fighting for the world's justice and the supreme sovereignty above all nations will furnish a moral groundwork leading to conviction and favouring the birth and growth of enthusiasm and devotion.

But here we come upon another fundamental difficulty referred to by Lord Curzon and many other critics, namely the question of the limitation of armaments. Though, no doubt, every State must maintain forces to ensure law and order within its boundaries—in one word a police-force—and though this may have to be extended in the form of a relatively small army and navy, the existence of the supreme supernational court with its own army and navy would imply the practical disarmament of all nations with regard to the forces as now conceived for purposes of international war. This may indeed be considered a fantastic or Utopian condition. But it is not so. The days are not far removed when, practically, all citizens carried arms. This is now illegal in most civilised countries, and the prohibitory law is carried into effect with comparative efficiency. We maintain, with sober and in no way visionary conviction, that it will be easier to disarm nations than it is individuals, as also it will be easier to prevent quarrels and transgressions of the law leading to murder in the mass-murder of war than it is in private assassination or manslaughter. In the latter the law can only act in a deterrent direction by the punishment of the crime when it has already been committed; in the case of nations war can be prevented by adequate forces before it has been

initiated, or at least before it has progressed in its criminal nefariousness. Such efficient prohibition can even be effective, as regards the modern applications of scientific discovery to the instruments of destruction in warfare to which Lord Curzon refers as an insuperable difficulty for the realisation of an effective League of Nations to prevent war. For while land-motors and aeroplanes will develop in the future to a degree which cannot be anticipated by the present imagination, and while such improved instruments of transportation might, when war ensues, be adapted to belligerent purposes, it would be illegal to construct such instruments of war, except directly to increase the belligerent power of the *supernational* police. Whatever may be done in secret, and whatever evasions may be practised by an ill-disposed nation, it is extremely unlikely that means will not be found to neutralise their effect.

As regards disarmament, it must furthermore be borne in mind that the economical aspect of this question was before the war considered the chief argument in favour of securing international peace. The impossibility of continuing to bear the burdens of the ever increasing armaments in those days caused most nations to cry "halt." The stupendous—almost incredible—economic sacrifices which have been made by all belligerents during the war, and the prospect of still further developments after the war (unless peace is absolutely assured) will of themselves force all nations to pronounce their veto. The whole tendency of modern commerce and industry in the direction of pooling expenditure and output, shows the way to the production of international armaments and military forces to secure peace and justice¹. All nations great and small, beyond

• ¹ See *Aristodemocracy*, pp. 153 seq.

the present belligerents, are concerned and directly interested in such a consummation and would, or should, be prepared to bring it about. But here comes the definite and not unimportant question: What is to become of all the valuable material for armies and navies possessed, especially by the Great Powers now at war? Is this all to be lost or annihilated? To this not unimportant problem the Supernational Army offers a solution—the only solution. Each one of the Powers is to be credited with the value it contributes to the Supernational Military Forces. The present neutral Powers, including the smaller Powers (not now possessed of such armaments) will be debited with their share of direct financial contribution to the Supernational Court in partial payment of the contribution which the Great Powers have in part made in kind in the form of armaments. There would be no injustice in such an arrangement, as the neutral and smaller Powers would receive the same protection as the Great Powers without any expenditure in armaments, in armies and navies.

Finally, Lord Curzon has undoubtedly revealed one of the greatest difficulties of all, as Mr Balfour and others have also put the pertinent question, whether the several States as international units are to be definitely fixed in the form of the *status quo* as it existed before this war, or in the form in which they will be placed after the war, in which so much will depend upon the final and complete victory of the Allies. In the establishment of the terms of peace it will be an essential task to fix the geographical and ethnological limits of the several States so as to avoid injustice and just causes for complaint as regards the future. This will be one of the most difficult problems presented to the peace-makers. Beyond this, however,

there arises the indubitable fact that nations cannot be stereotyped in their existence, that they are organic entities with the essential attribute of growth and development in their very existence. As Lord Curzon has put it:

Whatever the result of the present war may be, it is quite clear that the map of Europe, and, to a large extent, the map of the world will be rearranged. Nothing will be quite like what it was before. You must provide for legitimate territorial expansion and rearrangement in the future. You cannot stereotype existing conditions of affairs. You cannot, to repeat the famous phrase, "set bounds to the march of nations."

No one in his senses will deny or underestimate the difficulty of the problem here presented. It is of all, perhaps the most potent cause of war. All the greater becomes the need to modify it by the infusion of justice. The most important safeguard for the future in regulating the organic development of nations possessed of vitality and therefore of internal and external movement and change, is to be found in what in a modern phrase is called "self-determination of nationality." The claims of such self-determination can best be decided by a neutral and perfectly impartial court of equity. No doubt it is here that the functions and duties of such a court become most complicated and difficult, and that the safeguarding of the legitimate sovereignty of each State will constantly present most important problems for equitable solution. For we can readily perceive how international settlement of national law and practice with regard to the foreign traveller or resident in the several countries, even perhaps the fixing of the conditions for naturalisation and the mutual rights and duties of the naturalised citizen, though undoubtedly and distinctly within the authority of each State fashioning

its own laws, may frequently lead to complications between the several nations and to a final appeal for equitable adjustment. One of the prominent aims for which the Allies have been fighting—namely the claims of the weak nationalities—as well as the natural and justified suspicion and repression of the “foreign” elements within the several nationalities, shows a tendency towards a recrudescence of the narrowest and most aggressive “national and Chauvinistic spirit” even in the most liberal States. In so far as this development of “nationalism” is undoubtedly opposed to the firmer establishment and growth of the international spirit, we must repeat, that if there is a genuine and all-surpassing need and desire to prevent war in the future, the appeal to a supreme and impartial court of equity can, in this case, be the only condition to avoid or to mitigate causes of friction and the appeal to force in war.

The difficulties produced in this department of national and international life become still more pointed and active in the region of “Colonial expansion.” The whole question assumes its most acute and immediate form, especially in the view of the distribution of raw material, above all from tropical regions. Here, again, if war is to be prevented, there is the greatest need for international adjustment by means of supreme equity in the form of a commercial department in the activities of such a supreme international court. As I have ventured to maintain above and on a previous occasion¹, the effective organisation of such a court of commercial and financial arbitration may, from the very nature of things and events, be one of the first departments which it will be found necessary to establish

¹ Above p. 158 and also *Aristodemocracy, etc.*, 1st American edition and 2nd English edition, pp. xviii seq.

as a direct outcome of the peace negotiations following upon this war.

THE FUNCTIONS AND THE LOCAL HABITATION OF THE SUPERNATIONAL COURT¹

As we have said before this Supernational Court backed by Power, as we conceive it, will not be of the nature of any one of the existing States. The nearest approach to it, as a recognisable political body with a definite local habitation, is the capital of the United States in the district of Columbia. This legislative, judicial and administrative centre for the whole American Federation is, however, in no way confined to its purely judicial functions. Though our supreme court would have its local habitation (let us assume, in the Channel Isles) this local habitation, though administered quasi-municipally as the district of Columbia is administered, would, like the latter, in no way form a separate State by itself in relation to other nationalities, not even a State within the federation of the United States. On the other hand, though like the Federal capital of America it would be the central seat whence issue the authority and the command for the military and naval forces, it would differ from it in that this international

¹ I had long ago endeavoured to sketch out the actual conditions under which such a court would function in a definite local habitation in my book *The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace*, published in 1899, pp. 110 seq., and again in *Aristodemocracy*, pp. 154 seq. In my first sketch on the subject for the local habitation, I suggested one of the islands such as the Azores, Bermudas, Madeira, or the Canaries; in my second, one or more of the Channel Isles.

police would in its main body¹ be centred and housed on the land of these islands with naval harbours, aerodromes and submarine bases. On the other hand it would not be the seat for the Federal Parliament, the Senate and the Congress; nor would it be the effective federal centre for federal administration, postal service and all the other federal departments of government which make this the true centre of national and not only the international life of the United States. Still less would it become the seat of the distinct national unity as differentiated from, or eventually even opposed to, other definite nations.

In its main essence this would merely be a habitation for the international court of justice; and the administration of this limited district itself would in no way form the essential business of the supreme body, as little as the regulation of the homestead or house in which we dwell constitutes the essential business of the ordinary breadwinner. The business of this body would always be essentially international, in the direct preservation of the peace of nations, including arbitration, adjudication, and international legislation. But in so far as departments and developments of modern life are essentially international the judiciary functions would naturally increase and extend and develop with the growth, sanction and power of internationality over the whole civilised world. It would be useless as well as unwise to attempt to forecast this extension and development in the future; but we must already recognise that there are certain practical and pressing needs in the life and activities of every civilised

¹ As mentioned above, p. 158, there would be minor local centres for the secure policing of the world by land, sea and air forces, distributed over the world, especially in the more remote districts.

nation which are essentially international in character or at least have a tendency to become so. Such for instance are the important departments of patents and copyrights which, from their very nature, tend towards internationality. A still more important, though less manifest and tangible, development of modern life, is that of publicity especially as developed in modern journalism. I have elsewhere endeavoured to emphasise the need for the regulation of this powerful modern development of public and private life as regards the safe-guarding of Truth¹. For Truth, which directly produces confidence, ensures peace, is, when maintained, one of the greatest practical and indispensable assets of modern existence, as its destruction or insecurity is not only the source of material loss and individual unhappiness, but also the ruin of peace, national and international. Had it been possible to enforce upon the civilised world the clear apprehension of the actual facts and conditions and actions which led to this war, the war could never have taken place. Now, we maintain that it ought to be one of the fundamental and inalienable rights and duties of this international body to publish throughout the whole civilised world its findings, decisions, and enactments, and it ought to be one of the fundamental conditions of the sanction of the constituent States founding the international League, that the actual publication and distribution of the findings of this international court be not prevented or impeded in any part of this civilised world. As a logical consequence it may even be that a department of the tribunal be directly concerned with the adjustment of litigation concerning statements made

¹ For further elucidation of this question see *Truth, an Essay on Moral Reconstruction*.

through the existing channels of publicity, and that the jurisdiction be even extended beyond mere "matters of state"; so that ultimately this supreme court may be the final instance of appeal for cases of "slander and libel," private as well as public. In contradistinction to the nature of the laws of libel as they now exist in most countries, in which material loss is made one of the essential conditions for establishing a claim, the direct and supreme aim of this supreme court will be the establishment and maintenance of Truth itself in its most theoretical and spiritual aspect.

It is also probable that this supreme court might be authoritatively appealed to by States, by nationalities, perhaps even by oppressed minorities within a State or community, for an opinion or for arbitration in cases of dispute, without any request for a final decision and, still less, for the enforcement of such a decision. In such a case the mere academic pronouncement of equitable opinion, carrying great moral weight, may be of the greatest use in the intermediary help furnished by such a supreme body.

But we must take timely warning and must remind ourselves that our impulse to call in the help of imagination, though in no way divorced from sobriety and experience, and to illustrate the practicability of such a scheme, should not carry us too far. Suffice it again to state that this court will only be concerned in matters in so far as they essentially partake of an international character.

The habitation of this supreme court will also be of a distinctly international character, as would naturally be the case from the international character of the judicial body ruling there. It would therefore tend to become

the centre of the spiritual and intellectual life of the whole civilised world. Libraries, Universities, Art-academies, Museums, would naturally find here their most prominent and most representative home. It would be the seat for all great international exhibitions, all scientific and learned congresses, and, so far from obliterating the national personality and individuality of the several peoples, it would bring these to full expression and fruition, as it would also lead to the sympathetic understanding and appreciation of the differing national individuality of character and genius among the peoples of all nations. It would be the central home of all progress, of all individuality, and of all tolerance.

Finally, one of the great needs of the world, and at the same time one of the most immediate needs for the practical working of such an international court, would no doubt ultimately be satisfied in the more or less gradual evolution or the immediate and definite acceptance of some universal language. For, as I have maintained elsewhere¹,

I fully realise that there is one great stumbling-block to this advance in civilisation and substantiation of the unity of such international effort and power. This is to be found in the question of language: "It is typified by the Tower of Babel." The ancient Hebrews were led by a correct instinct when they attempted to erect such a tower. But we all know that they failed in this endeavour. Languages will always unite or separate, and difference of language may prevent complete understanding between the peoples. In so far it will prevent complete international understanding and international fusion. On the other hand, as I insisted upon the desirability of developing and maintaining individuality throughout the nations—which of itself would in no way

¹ *Aristodemocracy*, pp. 163 seq.

suffer from wider federation—so I do not think that it would in any way be desirable to check the expression of national individuality by obliterating national language. Still less could it be ever contemplated to deprive ourselves of the treasures of human thought and art which have taken actual form in the national literature of each people. But we cannot doubt that the need of one common language for all civilised peoples remains. Even the Hague Convention has been enabled to do its work in spite of the great divergencies in the languages of its representatives. More and more as time goes on, and the more real the need and the feeling for a great international confederation becomes, until finally we attain to its realisation in such an International Court endowed with the power to coerce all nations into conformity with its supreme decrees, the necessity for one common language, co-existing with all other national languages, will make itself felt.

Whether this linguistic unity is to be found in the accepted dominance of one of the existing modern languages or of a new language like Esperanto, or of an ancient language, especially Latin in a revived form, it is impossible and needless to predict. It may not come at all. But the fact remains that in the interests of universal peace, as well as of the progress of the world, it is highly desirable that an international language be introduced among the civilised peoples. I have ventured to plead for the revival of Latin which commends itself on so many grounds¹:

The Middle Ages, or rather the beginnings of the Renaissance, prove the value and the efficiency of such a dominating language. In this case it was the property of the lettered or learned, or of the superior classes, beginning with the clerks who held in their hands the all-powerful factor in life, namely, the education of the young. Moreover, they had, as a substratum of such international unity, the organisation of the Catholic Church spread over the whole civilised world. Be-

¹ *Aristodemocracy*, pp. 164-167.

ginning with the Church and its priests, however, the knowledge of this common language extended to a considerable degree among the ruling classes. The result was—to take but one type of most definite and direct influence on the national mind throughout the whole world by one man or a group of men, the bearers of great thought—the result was, that Erasmus could travel, converse and lecture throughout the whole of Europe, occupy a chair in the University of Cambridge, influence the leaders of thought, at one with him in his great endeavour of world reform (not only or chiefly, reform of sectarian religion), in his native Holland, in Germany, in Switzerland, and in Italy, directly affecting by his thought and his teaching people of every class in all these countries, and finally fixing and perpetuating this influence in laying down in his books what he had to say in a language intelligible to the readers of all nations. He and the Oxford reformers realised this international power and cherished international aims not very distant from those which we cherish at this moment. He and his fellow-militants also realised fully the power for good which was vested in a Church that was catholic—i.e., universal, international, human. But his chief object was to use it for the humanising of humanity, not the vicious confirmation of separatism, whether nationalistic or sectarian, in religion. The supreme aim of these great men was to humanise and to educate the clerks who were the teachers of the rising generations and, through them, ultimately to raise mankind. So clear and strong was the faith of these men in this final mission, that More really sacrificed his life, because he was opposed to nationalism, to Chauvinism which threatened to rob humanism of its catholic and universal effectiveness, to dehumanise the spirit of refining love in mankind, and to give full sway to the spread of national and local hatred, ending, as it did, in endless wars throughout the world.

Erasmus and his followers possessed the one great asset of a common international language, which, though it was not destined to help them directly and completely to realise their great and beneficent aims, did undoubtedly contribute to what may perhaps be the greatest advance in civilisation

which the world has yet seen since the days of ancient Hellas.

Is it quite impracticable and utterly unrealisable to restore the Latin language to life, and, after spreading it throughout the whole world in the education of the young, to leave it in the course of actual evolution to widen out and modify itself in this process of life, so that it should adapt itself to all the needs of modern intercourse and thus contribute a most powerful element to the realisation of our final ideals?

It cannot be a disadvantage that Latin was the disseminator of great ideas throughout the Middle Ages, and the vehicle of expression of the whole of the Christian civilisation; that it was the linguistic expression of the widest diffusion of civilisation through the greatest organised instrument of civilisation, namely, the Roman Empire. Nor can it even be a disadvantage that it should, to a certain extent, contain and reflect in itself—sometimes only the shadow instead of the reality—the highest spirit of Hellenism. Personally, I confess that I should have preferred Greek to Latin, because I deem those elements of higher culture embodied in the term Hellenism more important for humanity than are to be found in other language. But a moment's thought will tell us that practically this would be impossible. The mere fact of such a difference of alphabet between Greek and Latin would be of the greatest practical effect as regards the comparative facilities of introducing either. But the Latin alphabet and the Latin script have penetrated throughout the whole of the civilised world and must be acquired by every schoolboy and schoolgirl to whatever nation they may belong. It was not merely pedantry or theatrical romanticism which led Bismarck to attempt to drive out the Latin alphabet from writing and printing—as far as he was able to do so—in Germany, and to restore Gothic characters. It was not merely meant to be an aid internally to consolidate Germanenthum: but it was already a direct anticipation of the dreams of the present Aldeutsche party, to force Pan-Germanism upon the whole civilised world; first, by blood and iron; then by gold and commercial concessions and promotions; and finally by

the forcible supremacy of the German Kultur, which even, a Nietzsche considered inferior to that of the Latin races. In spite of his efforts, no German who can read and write is unacquainted with Latin script. Surely we need not construct a modern language in our study when for countless ages and in the present day, the ancient Latin language, never for one moment dead in European history, is still with us, and though asleep, still lives, and can readily be aroused from its slumbers and assist in the great and peaceful battle which will lead to the final victory of civilised humanity.

I have ventured in the foregoing to justify the conviction, which many of us share, that the peace of the world in the future will only be fully secured when a Supreme International, a Supernational Court backed by Power, is established, and is placed in a position to enforce its decisions upon the world. Nothing short of this will ensure peace. Nor can we even approach in any form, even the most inadequate, the solution of this international problem, until this war ends in the complete victory of the Allies and the destruction for all time of Prussian Militarism, which dominates the political and social life of the German nation as it now is.

After such a victory the courses open to the Allies, in order to secure peace, are the following: Either "nothing is done"; and then war is bound to recur within the lapse of a short time. If however "something is done," it may merely be the confirmation and further formulation of the present alliances into a league to secure peace by means of common consent and treaties. Or a League of Nations, in the form of a voluntary confederation of all civilised nations, with or without Germany, is established and organised with cogent binding agreements and concessions. Or, finally, the great and difficult task of establishing a

Supernational Court backed by Power upon the lines we have indicated is boldly undertaken at once.

Now, we should welcome any one of these attempts, and give our loyal support to its realisation, feeling confident that the tendency, the natural evolution of such an idea and purpose will be towards the more complete establishment of such international, juridical power. But we also venture to believe that the full and definite result will not be obtained until the complete form of safeguarding peace in the direction we have indicated is attained. We also think it probable that, before this is attained, the numerous causes of divergence of interests and opinions inherent in all other forms and, especially, the conflict between those who raise national sovereignty to a degree of absolute supremacy, whose conception of common action does not go further than confederacy and will not admit of complete federation, may in all probability lead to a conflict—the next and last war—which will coerce the “secessionists of the world” into the acceptance of the complete and truly lasting Federation of the Civilised World.

In any case we venture to believe that it is of some use to formulate and to make public the highest and most complete form of such a union of all states to ensure peace, to prepare the consciousness of civilised men for the problem and the solution of such matters which lie before them now, even though it may only lead in the immediate future to a less perfect organisation of this union of all democratic peoples.

V

LEAGUE OF DREAMS OR LEAGUE
OF REALITIES?

A SUPERNATIONAL JURY AND POLICE FORCE

(THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER
FEBRUARY 1919)

LEAGUE OF DREAMS OR LEAGUE OF REALITIES?

A SUPERNATIONAL JURY AND POLICE FORCE¹

SIR HERBERT STEPHEN, in his article entitled "The League of Dreams" (in the January number of this *Review*), has detected and exposed with incisive directness the heel of Achilles in the armour of argument with which Lord Robert Cecil defends the League of Nations against the assaults of its critics. Lord Robert Cecil apparently renounces all claim to coercive enforcement of the decisions of such a League; limits its power of preventing war in the future to an agreement or treaty among the members of the League to delay their decision to go to war until the *casus belli* has been submitted to arbitration; and relies

¹ For a fuller exposition of the scheme advocated for a League of Nations I must refer to the following publications: *The Next War, Wilsonism and Anti-Wilsonism*, with An Open Letter to Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, published by the Cambridge University Press, October, 1918; also *Aristodemocracy, etc.*, London and New York, 1916. At a still earlier date the same scheme was put forward and upheld in *The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace*, London and New York, 1899. In this book was published my address on "The English-Speaking Brotherhood" (delivered at the Imperial Institute, London, 1898, Lord Rosebery in the chair) which was designed to bring the United States and Great Britain more closely together as the immediate centre for a wider League of Nations to follow.

ultimately upon "organised and concentrated international public opinion" to take the place of force in carrying out the decrees of the League. Sir Herbert Stephen rightly maintains that if public opinion represents in the body politic the mind, the court of law represents the hand; and that there must be force to back the decisions of the court:

The resort to physical force is the "ultimate sanction" of the decree alike of law and of public opinion. If so much be admitted, we come next to the essential and, I think, insuperable difficulty of the League of Nations. Granted that you have the wisest and most dignified court of law imaginable, supported to the utmost by public opinion of the most enlightened kind, they are powerless unless the decrees of the court can be carried out, if necessary, by physical force. . . . The international court of law is not a real court of law; the mind of the League of Nations has got to do without a hand.

On the ground of these objections, Sir Herbert comes to the following conclusion:

There is every reason to think that, unless mankind and their most profound emotions change into something quite different from what they have hitherto been, the League of Nations, if it ever exists, will fail to prevent the occurrence of war. We are asked to sacrifice the best things we have in order to obtain a remote and exceedingly improbable advantage. Our only wise course is to recognise the truth at once, and destroy an insane project by plainly and openly refusing to have anything to do with it.

To my mind, there is no valid ground for such a counsel of despair with regard to the powerful movement throughout the whole civilised world, summarised under the phrase the League of Nations. Sir Herbert Stephen's writings and pronouncements have the initial advantage, and owe to

it their constraining power in argument, of directness and honesty, still more of a manifest opposition to all cant and false sentiment. They appear to be the mouthpiece of the healthy body of men who uphold British common sense, the strength and sobriety of established law marshalled against the exotic host engaged in theory-mongering, in visionary philanthropy and irresponsible sentimentality. But in this case it is he who is tilting at windmills with heavy armour. In the question before us, Sir Herbert and those who think as he does, do not represent common sense, either British or foreign. They ignore the world of facts as opposed to the world of theory; the world of theory in this case being the absolute supremacy of the law and the legal mind over the needs of modern man and the practical mind of civilised society. Historical instances and analogies are of no use in this case; the Holy Alliance and the body of Sovereigns and statesmen who produced it furnish no parallel. Nor do the various Revolutions of the past and the popular upheavals against established authority furnish any analogy, as little as the wild theories and the rhetorical pronouncements of the Bolsheviks of our own day represent this popular movement of civilised society throughout the world. Sir Herbert must realise that, to use a popular phrase, we are "up against" facts of universal and restraining validity and urgency which cannot be ignored. No amount of legal theory and precedent and the arguments based upon them can remove these facts and their constraining forcefulness on the present issues. Sovereigns and statesmen, soldiers and civilians, rich and poor, capital and labour, are all agreed that war must cease. The grounds for this decision, moreover, are not merely spiritual, religious, philosophical, intellectu-

and philanthropic, but are eminently material as well: they are economical, based upon the essential interests of capital and labour together. Moreover, they are based upon the most fundamental material fact of life, that is, self-preservation. The mass of the people throughout the world will refuse to sacrifice a life for effete and unsubstantial ideas such as national glorification. It is more than a mere boast or rhetorical phrase that the peoples of the United States fought to defend the world against Prussian Militarism and to stop war in the future. This is a great fact and not a theory. This is the common sense of the world. All classes, the governing and the governed, the soldiers and civilians, are agreed on this point. There is no analogy in history for such a universal movement and determination. All the subtle arguments—legal and diplomatic, historical and biological, national and Chauvinistic and romantic—are swept to the winds in the face of this all-constraining need of modern society. Apart from theory and philosophy, logic and morality, which confirm and justify the determination of civilised common sense and of popular need, the material facts must carry this movement to a successful accomplishment.

Now in the criticisms of Sir Herbert Stephen and in the objections raised by most of the critics and even many of the upholders of the League of Nations, one of the many schemes (the one I am about to put forward) that are now before us has not been considered or has been ignored; and this scheme will answer the essential objections to the central argument advanced by Sir Herbert as well as by other pronounced opponents and half-hearted supporters.

Admitting that all attempts to prevent war in the future will fail, unless the international or supernational tribunal

or court of law or jury be provided with physical force to carry its decisions into effect, the question must be considered whether it be not practicable, even absolutely necessary, to create such a tribunal in the future. Those who think as I do, maintain that this is possible, in fact that it is the only solution of the problem; and that, step by step, all the individual and immediate problems with which the Peace Conference will now be occupied will of themselves tend to produce such a condition. There are three essential facts to be borne in mind:

First, that this Supernational Tribunal or jury will not constitute a Supernational State, with supernational executive and legislative as well as judicative powers, and that, even as regards its judicative function, it will be strictly limited to the decisions concerning the purely international aspect of matters on which litigation arises;

Second, that it will not even be a directly legislative body, but only judicative;

Third, that this international body must have direct control of its own international police-force receiving, through one great act of the League of Nations assembled at their Peace Conference, the international sanction for the creation of such a force under the direct control of the court.

As regards the first condition, a closer study of the apparent difficulties in realising any scheme to enforce peace, and the ensuing criticisms and objections, will reveal this fact of supreme central importance: that all critics assume in their minds the creation of a Supernational State, be it in the form of federation or confederacy. The tribunal is conceived to be a "Parliament of Nations" with more or less absolute executive control as well as

legislative function, placed over and above the constituent States and nationalities forming the League. The representative members forming this federal or confederate League are assumed directly to represent the several States by whom they are thus delegated with an avowed or implied mandate to represent each separate State. It must at once be evident to even the most superficial inquirer that the action of such a body will frequently, if not always, constitute a direct encroachment on the sovereignty of each State and nation, and will, according to our present conception of nationality and policy, be intolerable. It will open the door to innumerable complications and conflicts. This direct interference with national sovereignty and independence would reach a climax in the eventuality when the Supernational Tribunal should order the separate States to send forward their armies and navies to coerce a recalcitrant offender against the decisions of the court, and would be reduced to practical absurdity when its own military force had to be directed against the offending State itself. I may at once anticipate the explanation which constitutes the third condition, that the international police-force which we contemplate will not consist of separate national armies and navies, nor even of a congeries of such national quotas combined as separate units into one international police-force. The judges or jurors of this Supernational Court will, in the first place, have no national mandate. They will, for the time being, as regards their international office and function, have dropped their nationality, as our national judges must ignore their local origin within each State, and all personal and local interests with which they have been associated, in carrying out their judicial functions.

The Supernational Court will in no way constitute a State exercising all the functions of a modern State; perhaps it ought not even to be a court of law composed of judges; but merely a jury to ensure equity: and before this jury the litigants will present their several claims for final adjudication.

When this supreme body to enforce peace is thus conceived, most of the objections raised by Sir Herbert Stephen fall to the ground. The same applies to the very able disquisition by Professor A. F. Pollard on *The League of Nations, an Historical Argument*, recently published by the Oxford Press. His objections to a Supernational Court backed by power appear to me all to rest on the assumption that such a court implies the creation of a Supernational State. If, as I venture to believe, his conclusions suffer from an exaggeration of the constraining validity of historical arguments applied to the present and future needs of modern society, as those of other critics suffer from the dominant attitude of mind of the jurist, the statesman, the Chauvinist and Romanticist, I am far from underestimating the great value of his historical contributions to the problem. Among these I would single out the illuminating passages (pp. 52-58) on the enactment of the writ *de pace habenda* by Henry the Second, which he adduces as an analogy to the present conditions of international litigation. He has shown how this writ led by natural social evolution to the establishment of the jury, without doctrinaire "paper enactments" forcing new legal procedure upon the body of recalcitrant freemen, and how this formed a groundwork for the solid edifice of English Common Law and legal procedure. But we must remind him that, though Henry the Second did not enforce a

fixed and complete system of jurisdiction upon the people, he still had behind him all the power of the State to enforce the decisions of the jury. The limitations of the Supernational Court, as we conceive it, are completely analogous to those of the juries to whom the writ, *de pace habenda* applied. Moreover, we may suggest that the process of social and historical evolution which in our *national* life led to the firm establishment of English Common Law in those early days, may *internationally* lead ultimately to the full establishment of a complete and organic federation of States, to the dominance of a Super-State of the civilised world. But for the present we must distinctly limit ourselves to the establishment of a Supernational Court or jury, which, on its part, limits itself, in the first instance, to the enforcement of peace and the settlement of purely international differences. I should also venture to remind Professor Pollard that if, by means of a treaty, the several Powers can of their free will establish a league to delay war or make any effective alliance for any purpose, they can make a treaty, enact and establish a Supernational Court or jury, and provide it with a police-force of its own to enforce its decisions. Only this one free act of the several independent States is needed to avoid all future encroachments upon the sovereignty of the several States.

We now come to the second essential point. If this international court is in no sense to be an administrative body (except to administer the actual *Domus* or residence of the court and its own international police to enforce its decisions), it will not even be a legislative body. It will thus differ essentially from the Parliaments of the several States and even from the Hague Convention of the past,

which set itself the task of discussing problems of prospective international differences, as a prophylactic against dissension and war. The Hague Convention thus was an anomalous organisation, without complete sanction and binding authority from all the participants, but practically in a position to legislate in international law. The body, as we conceive it, for the enforcement of peace in the future, will not directly have the function of drafting and establishing laws, still less of producing a code of international law; but will have the definite task of deciding the individual cases of controversy before it in the spirit of equity, which in no way excludes the consideration of the body of international law as it now exists without binding sanction and authority from the independent civilised States of the world. Its function will thus correspond more to that of a jury than to that of a court of justice, though it would probably be presided over and directed by one eminently conversant with legal procedure. The members of this jury would not necessarily be jurists or parliamentarians. They would be men of the highest intellectuality, character and distinction, deputed from each nation to uphold the cause of justice. This would be their duty and no other. They would have no further mandate from their several nations. They would solemnly declare, on taking office, that they will perform this duty irrespective of all other interests, personal or national. The world could trust them to carry out this task as civilised nations now trust their judges to be impartial. Lawyers and statesmen would argue their cases before them with all the force of their trained intellects, with the knowledge of international law as it exists, and with command of all legal technicalities; but the duty of the jury would simply be to discover the

right and to enforce it when it had been sanctioned by their own solemn convictions. They might individually fail from incompetence and fall or glide into dishonour. No counsel of perfection can be expected in this world of ours. But they will bring us as near to, and help us as easily through, the narrow gates of truth and justice as any conceivable body of men or human institution can do.

We need not enter into the question of how and in what proportion the several States are to be represented. This is a problem of comparatively simple solution. Perhaps the simplest method will be on the basis of the number of inhabitants counted by the million. In the first instance, the nations represented will only be those who have attained a high standard in civilisation and self-government. But eligibility will not be fixed for all times; and, with the process of social and historical evolution, new nations will be admitted into the League and send their representatives. Such a body will once and for all meet the inept and constantly repeated "practical" objection, that Great Britain might, under certain eventualities, find herself in a minority in the court compared with the majority of her national competitors or enemies; and that, in such a case, it is against all reason and human nature to expect a nation to abide by the decisions of such a court and to fight against its own just interests. It is even conceivable that in some cases the representative or representatives of one great nation will vote with the majority against the interests of their own State, while those of their rivals or enemies may vote in the minority.

Thus, though not a legislative body in the literal acceptance of that term, every one of its decisions and enactments will become precedents for future decisions and will collec-

tively, as is the case in English Common Law, form a kind of Corpus to guide the administration of the law in the future.

The third and last essential condition is, that the police-force be under the direct control of the Supernational Court and constitute a complete military force (army, navy and aerial service), not composed of separate national quotas or detachments from the several States in any way maintaining their national separateness, but, as a force, merging their original nationality into new super national solidarity.

Common sense and recent experience (if such were required) will amply justify all the objections which have been raised against the suggestion that the separate States within the League will be willing (or always able even if they should so determine) to transport their own forces to distant parts of the world in order to fight the army of a recalcitrant State because of an issue in which they are in no way directly interested or concerned. Moreover, as I have already pointed out, the direct request or order issued by a supernational body for the mobilisation of the forces of an independent State will constitute an unbearable incursion on the sovereignty of the State. It is futile to reply by pointing to the constraining power of treaties and to the definite and most recent examples of the effect which the breach of Belgian neutrality on the part of Germany had in inducing Great Britain to enter the War, or of the yet more ideal and abstract motives which led the United States to enter the conflict. Great Britain was directly interested in preserving Belgian neutrality; and the United States ultimately determined to declare war because of indiscriminate U-boat destruction, including the

loss of life and property of her own citizens—not to mention more remote, though none the less vital, national interests of her own. As regards a supernational police-force, composed of independent quotas from the several States, it has been rightly maintained that critical, if not disastrous, conditions might arise when such a national unit is ordered to fight against its own State and its own people.

No, the supernational force to carry into effect the decisions of the Supernational Court must consist of a fresh body of men who (like the judges) have, for the duration of their service, dropped their nationality. It must be an entirely new and separate body. The mercenary armies (literally, the "soldiers") of the Middle Ages, and of later times, constitute an argument in fact that the creation of such a force is not only possible, but is in conformity with past events and human nature. The difference between such a new force and the mercenary armies of the past will be of a moral nature, the importance and effectiveness of which can hardly be overestimated. They will not fight simply to obey the commands of their masters in any cause, good or bad, without question or conviction; but they will always be conscious of the essential fact, that they are fighting in the cause of justice and at the behest of justice, and that they form an important part of that great and supreme body which guards justice in the world and the rights of humanity.

These are not philosophic or philanthropic shibboleths, but hard and simple facts of common sense which move and constrain every normal civilised human being, to whatever nationality or class he belongs. I can here cut short the arguments in answer to the criticism of Sir Herbert Stephen and those who agree with him. But I desire to

repeat with emphasis what I have already stated elsewhere¹, that until such an International Court backed by power is finally and effectively established (which necessarily includes comparative disarmament), the several nations, and especially the British Empire, will have effectually to guard themselves against actual or potential enemies who threaten peace as well as their own self-preservation; that Great Britain must retain full "command of the sea" and keep her military forces of every class in efficient readiness and must protect herself against German "commercial penetration." However, if not through the wisdom of those assembled in the great Peace Conference at this most auspicious moment in the history of civilisation, such supernational power to enforce peace is prepared or carried into effect, then economic necessity will in the future, on its part, force the civilised world to take such action, let us hope not at the cost of much intervening suffering to mankind.

In conclusion I desire to repeat, what I have maintained elsewhere, that, should the discussions of this issue at the Peace Conference merely result in the confirmation, and the more deliberate organisation, of the present alliance of the States opposed to the Central Powers, with the chief object of preventing war in the future, those who think as I do will gratefully accept this result as a most important step in the right direction. Even if the only truly positive result were to be a solemn treaty between Great Britain and the United States mutually to keep the peace and to combine in enforcing peace throughout the world, this would be a world-achievement almost worth the sacrifices of the Great War. In 1898 (in my address on "The English-

¹ *The Next War, etc.*

224 League of Dreams or League of Realities?

Speaking Brotherhood" at the Imperial Institute¹) I argued that such a closer union between Great Britain and the United States and of the whole English-speaking world might form the nucleus for a wider League of Nations and secure the World's Peace by natural and historic evolution of ideas, facts and necessities. No doubt an "economic boycott" on the part of a League or of two great Allies must not be undervalued as a weapon to arrest the warlike aggression of any recalcitrant Power. On the other hand, guided by the experience of the immediate past, we must look into the future and realise how difficult it will be to carry out any effective commercial blockade and financial boycott with the development of submarine and aerial navigation and of wireless telegraphy. Means may be devised by scheming, mercenary and selfish people without "patriotism" to evade all restrictions; while such action on their part and the various steps taken by the government to prevent such transgressions will tend to the demoralisation of their own national life. No, the simplest, most rational and most just means of securing peace is by the establishment of a Supernational Court or Jury together with its own Police-Force, such as I have suggested, and it distinctly lies within the province of the Peace Conference now sitting to create this by one act of concerted legislation.

¹ Embodied in my book *The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace*, 1899:

THE END

PRESS NOTICES OF THE FIRST EDITION

"Sir Charles Walston, if he thought it worth while, might claim to rank among the prophets, for though some of the essays which compose this volume date from as far back as the Spanish-American War, they reflect by anticipation views which are leading ideas in the world of international affairs at the present moment. These views are underlined in the essays of post-war date....As one who has a first-hand knowledge of the problems and interests of both hemispheres, Sir Charles Walston writes from wide experience, and also with pregnancy of thought."—*The Scotsman*

"Sir Charles Walston has rendered a public service by his *The English-speaking Brotherhood*. He reprints the suggestive address he delivered in 1898. The volume also contains more recent pieces, including a powerful defence of the League of Nations. Perhaps the most fundamental principle of these essays is that the peace of the world can be secured only through 'the closer Understanding and co-operation between the great English-speaking democracies.'"

The Daily Graphic

"This volume is an effort to meet the demand for a republication of the author's *The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace*, now out of print, which anticipated the foundation of a League of Nations and also looked to this consummation, primarily through the intervention of the United States in the world's affairs, and especially through the closer understanding and co-operation between the two English-speaking democracies. In the present volume are included a lecture delivered at Cambridge on 'Nationality and Hyphenism,' an essay on 'The Next War': 'Wilsonism and Anti-Wilsonism,' an article on 'A Supernational Jury and Police Force' (reprinted), and a lecture on 'The English-Speaking Brotherhood.' The volume gives in a handy form a resumé of the author's more scattered pronouncements."—*The Glasgow Herald*

"Sir Charles Walston writes with the authority of the true cosmopolite, not he who limits his outlook to the tribal instincts of his own country, but who perceives that, in the dying words of Miss Edith Cavell, 'patriotism is not enough.' It is in this spirit that the League of Nations was founded....Sir Charles Walston writes eloquently, justly, and logically; his book of essays is a very present help in the troublous times that lie before the world."—*The Field*

"In view of the perplexities of the present time, the appearance of this book is singularly opportune, and we cordially commend it to all who wish to see the League of Nations develop into 'the Parliament of man, the federation of the world.'"

The British Citizen

Books by the same Author

TRUTH—An Essay in Moral Reconstruction.

Crown 8vo. Cambridge University Press; G. P. Putnam's
Sons, New York.

"This is a book pitched in a noble key. A book to put into the hands of the sixth form schoolboy, and of the politician that now is, of the Statesman yet to be....If anyone will give half an hour from his newspaper to the study of the opening of this book, we shall be surprised if that half hour is not extended until the end, to the moral and material benefit of the reader. All who desire to cultivate in themselves and in their children a sense of the importance of truth, which is clear thinking, a readiness to face the issues of life—un-coloured by emotion, sentiment or prepossession—should read a book like this, a manual of ethics in the highest sense."

The Saturday Review, September 27, 1919

"As a practical idealist, whose *Aristodemocracy* was one of the wisest books begotten of the war, he seeks to point out to the politician, the millionaire, the journalist, the ecclesiastic, how best they may fulfil their functions in the State....His essay will repay careful study, and should exercise a helpful influence in the reconstruction of public life and conduct."—*The Scotsman*, May 1, 1919

"Are we a truthful people? Is there a declension in this virtue? What are the new temptations to mendacity? What professions and callings are chiefly affected by it? Sir Charles Walston discusses these questions with a sense of their gravity and with a keen eye for the presence of the weaknesses which he deplores....We find, as our author develops his arguments, that he has in mind defects in honesty, justice, charity and efficiency, and other virtues akin to, but not identical with, veracity. Still, his contention is clear and startling."

The Times, June 12, 1919

"There is a sense in which Sir Charles Walston's book, a supplement to his *Aristodemocracy* of three years ago, is but a long sermon; but it is nevertheless a sermon of such urgency and weight, wideness of application and charm of exposition, that, argumentative as it is, and as most good sermons are, we welcome it very warmly indeed."

Glasgow Herald, June 29, 1919

"The little volume will be relished by thinkers."

Buffalo Commercial, July 26, 1919

"The essay may best be described as a lament over the decrease of truthfulness throughout the world caused by the great conflict which ended last year....The author holds the press largely responsible for the prevailing indifference to truthfulness which he believes exists....While his discussion of the relation between truth and journalism is by far the most noteworthy portion of Sir Charles Walston's essay, there are other parts for which we have nothing but praise....Especially would we commend the chapter entitled *Trustworthiness*, where he discusses truthfulness in conversation, and that entitled *Honesty*, where he points out the error in the common assumption that 'every man has a right to an opinion.' Indeed the volume is thought compelling throughout."

New York Sun, July 13, 1919

ARISTODEMOCRACY—from the Great War back to Moses, Christ and Plato.

Cheap Edition. John Murray.

"Few of the many books which the war has called forth merit more careful consideration....His long and varied experience, his scholarship, his residence in foreign countries, including Germany, give great weight to his judgments on men and affairs....We know no recently published book which will do more to stimulate this social sense."

The Times, June 1, 1916

"As a positive expression of what we must continue to call the Hellenic Spirit, this brilliantly reasoned sequel to *The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace* will unquestionably rank as one of the most truly hopeful works which the war has produced. The practical quality of Sir C. Walston's idealism, etc."

New York Times, Aug. 26, 1917

PATRIOTISM: National and International.

Crown 8vo. Longmans, Green & Co.

"Sir Charles Waldstein in his book, *Patriotism*, etc., delivers such a rebuke to Chauvinism as one would expect from a man of his cosmopolitan outlook and broadly cultivated sympathies. An American by birth and education, Sir Charles Waldstein has long been eminent as an archaeologist and teacher of art at the English Cambridge. As long ago as 1898 he advocated an American coalition, believing that England and the United States were the 'two civilised powers' best fitted by existing circumstances 'to draw nearer to each other.'"

Springfield Republican, Jan. 10, 1918

WHAT GERMANY IS FIGHTING FOR.

Crown 8vo. Longmans, Green & Co.

"These papers show with absolute clearness the reasons for which Germany provoked, and is still engaged in carrying on, the world's war, as well as the undoubted responsibility, not only of the German Government, but of the majority of the German people for the War."

The Daily Telegraph

"His book constitutes an important war document."—*Punch*

PATRIOTISM AND WHAT GERMANY IS FIGHTING FOR.

"Anything Sir C. Walston writes on the disturbing problems of the hour deserves attentive scrutiny because of his wide and diversified knowledge of social and international politics. His pen has kept pace with events. Two recent works (*What Germany is Fighting For* and *Patriotism*, etc.), following closely his notable *Aristodemocracy*, have emerged in book form above the large volume of his contributions to periodicals. The fact that one of these appears in paper covers at a price of sixty cents does not diminish its importance."

Carroll K. Michener in the Bellman, Minneapolis, Feb. 1918

THE NEXT WAR. Wilsonism and Anti-Wilsonism with an Open Letter to Col. Theodore Roosevelt.

Demy 8vo. Cambridge University Press.

ESSAYS ON THE ART OF PHEIDIAS.

Royal 8vo. With 16 plates and numerous illustrations.

Buckram. Cambridge University Press ;

Century Co., New York.

GREEK SCULPTURE AND MODERN ART. Two lectures delivered to the students of the Royal Academy of London. With an Appendix.

Demy 8vo. With 78 plates. Cambridge University Press.

[P. T. O.]

THE BALANCE OF EMOTION AND INTELLECT.

(Harper & Brothers, 1878.)

THE WORK OF JOHN RUSKIN.

(Harper & Brothers, 1893.)

THE JEWISH QUESTION AND THE MISSION
OF THE JEWS.

(Harper & Brothers, 1894.)

THE STUDY OF ART IN UNIVERSITIES.

(Harper & Brothers, 1896.)

THE SURFACE OF THINGS.

(Small, Maynard & Co., 1899.)

THE ARGIVE HERAEUM (with others).

(Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1902—1905.)

ART IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

(Cambridge University Press and Macmillan & Co., 1903.)

HERCULANEUM: Past, Present and Future (with
Leonard Shcobridge).

(Macmillan & Co., 1908.)

THE POLITICAL CONFESSION OF A PRACTICAL
IDEALIST—A pamphlet.

(John Murray, 1911.)

WHAT MAY WE READ?—A Conversation Story.

(John Murray, 1911.)

Other Books by the same Author

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME ONE: *Revised Second Edition*

VOLUME TWO: *Revised Second Edition*

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
UPANIṢADS

Foreword by RABINDRANATH TAGORE

Revised Second Edition

THE VEDĀNTA ACCORDING TO
ŚAṆKARA AND RĀMĀNUJA

AN IDEALIST VIEW OF LIFE

THE HIBBERT LECTURES FOR 1929

EAST AND WEST IN RELIGION

RELIGION AND SOCIETY

THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ

Edited by S. RADHAKRISHNAN

CONTEMPORARY INDIAN
PHILOSOPHY

LECTURE I

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE : ITS NATURE, AND CONTENT

My first word this evening is one of gratitude to the authorities of the Manchester College, Oxford, especially Principal Jacks, for their great kindness in asking me to speak on the fundamental principles of Hinduism. Principal Jacks's cordial references to my work indicate more the generosity of his heart than any claims which my work has in itself. It is not possible in a course of four lectures to describe the genesis and growth of Hinduism or its philosophical implications. My endeavour is to indicate the central motives of the Hindu faith and show its way of approach to some of the pressing problems of the day, and even this can only be done in a very summary way.

At the outset, one is confronted by the difficulty of defining what Hinduism is. To many it seems to be a name without any content. Is it a museum of beliefs, a medley of rites, or a mere map, a geographical expression? Its content, if it has any, has altered from age to age, from community to community. It meant one thing in the Vedic period, another in the Brāhmanical, and a third in the

Buddhist. It means one thing to the Śaivite, another to the Vaiṣṇavite, a third to the Śākta. The ease with which Hinduism has steadily absorbed the customs and ideas of peoples with whom it has come into contact is as great as the difficulty we feel in finding a common feature binding together its different forms. But, if there is not a unity of spirit binding its different expressions and linking up the different periods of its history into one organic whole, it will not be possible to account for the achievements of Hinduism. The dictum that, if we leave aside the blind forces of nature, nothing moves in this world which is not Greek in its origin, has become a commonplace with us. But it is not altogether true. Half the world moves on independent foundations which Hinduism supplied. China and Japan, Tibet and Siam, Burma and Ceylon look to India as their spiritual home. The civilisation itself has not been a short-lived one. Its historic records date back for over four thousand years, and even then it had reached a stage of civilisation which has continued its unbroken, though at times slow and almost static course, until the present day. It has stood the stress and strain of more than four or five millenniums of spiritual thought and experience. Though peoples of different races and cultures have been pouring into India from the dawn of history, Hinduism has been able to maintain its supremacy, and even the proselytising creeds backed by political power have not been able to coerce the large majority of Indians to their

views. The Hindu culture possesses some vitality which seems to be denied to some other more forceful currents. It is no more necessary to dissect Hinduism than to open a tree to see whether the sap still runs.

The Hindu civilisation is so called, since its original founders or earliest followers occupied the territory drained by the Sindhu (the Indus) river system corresponding to the North-West Frontier province and the Punjab.¹ The people on the Indian side of the Sindhu were called Hindū by the Persian and the later western invaders. From the Punjab, the civilisation flowed over into the Gangetic valley where it met with numerous cults of primitive tribes. In its onward march through the Deccan, the Aryan culture got into touch with the Dravidian and ultimately dominated it, though undergoing some modification from its influence. As the civilisation extended over the whole of India, it suffered many changes, but it kept up its continuity with the old Vedic type developed on the banks of the Sindhu. The term "Hindu" had originally a territorial and not a credal significance. It implied residence in a well-defined geographical area. Aboriginal tribes, savage and half-civilised people, the cultured Dravidians and the Vedic Aryans were all Hindus as they were the sons of the same mother.² The Hindu thinkers reckoned with the striking fact that the men and women

¹ *Rg Veda*, viii. 24, 27.

² Cp. *tam varṣam bhāratam nāma bhārati-yatra saṁtatiḥ*.

dwelling in India belonged to different communities, worshipped different gods, and practised different rites.¹

As if this were not enough, outsiders have been pouring into the country from the beginning of its history, and some have made for themselves a home in India and thus increased the difficulty of the problem. How was Hindu society built up out of material so diverse, so little susceptible in many cases to assimilation, and scattered across a huge continent measuring nearly two thousand miles from north to south and eighteen hundred miles from west to east? It cannot be denied that in a few centuries the spirit of cultural unity spread through a large part of the land, and racial stocks of varying levels of culture became steeped in a common atmosphere. The differences among the sects of the Hindus are more or less on the surface, and the Hindus as such remain a distinct cultural unit, with a common history, a common literature and a common civilisation. Mr. Vincent Smith observes, "India beyond all doubt possesses a deep underlying fundamental unity, far more profound than that produced either by geographical isolation or by political superiority. That unity transcends the innumerable diversities of blood, colour, language, dress, manners, and sect."² In this task of welding

¹ bhāratesu striyaḥ puṃso nānāvarṇāḥ prakīrtitāḥ
nānādevārcane yuktā nānākarmāṇi kurvate.
Kūrma Purāṇa.

² *Oxford History of India* (1919), p. x.

together heterogeneous elements and enabling them to live in peace and order, Hinduism has had to adopt her own measures with little or no historic wisdom to guide and support her. The world is now full of racial, cultural and religious misunderstandings. We are groping in a timid and tentative way for some device which would save us from our suicidal conflicts. Perhaps the Hindu way of approach to the problem of religious conflicts may not be without its lessons for us.

The Hindu attitude to religion is interesting. While fixed intellectual beliefs mark off one religion from another, Hinduism sets itself no such limits. Intellect is subordinated to intuition, dogma to experience, outer expression to inward realisation. Religion is not the acceptance of academic abstractions or the celebration of ceremonies, but a kind of life or experience. It is insight into the nature of reality (*darśana*), or experience of reality (*anubhava*). This experience is not an emotional thrill, or a subjective fancy, but is the response of the whole personality, the integrated self to the central reality. Religion is a specific attitude of the self, itself and no other, though it is mixed up generally with intellectual views, æsthetic forms, and moral valuations.

Religious experience is of a self-certifying character. It is *svatassiddha*. It carries its own credentials. But the religious seer is compelled to justify his inmost convictions in a way that satisfies the thought of the age. If there is not this intel-

lectual confirmation, the seer's attitude is one of trust. Religion rests on faith in this sense of the term. The mechanical faith which depends on authority and wishes to enjoy the consolations of religion without the labour of being religious is quite different from the religious faith which has its roots in experience. Wesley asks, "What is faith?" and answers, "Not an opinion nor any number of opinions put together, be they ever so true. It is the vision of the soul, that power by which spiritual things are apprehended, just as material things are apprehended by the physical senses." Blind belief in dogma is not the faith which saves. It is an unfortunate legacy of the course which Christian theology has followed in Europe that faith has come to connote a mechanical adherence to authority. If we take faith in the proper sense of trust or spiritual conviction, religion is faith or intuition. We call it faith simply because spiritual perception, like other kinds of perception, is liable to error and requires the testing processes of logical thought. But, like all perception, religious intuition is that which thought has to start from and to which it has to return. In order to be able to say that religious experience reveals reality, in order to be able to transform religious certitude into logical certainty, we are obliged to give an intellectual account of the experience. Hindu thought has no mistrust of reason. There can be no final breach between the two powers of the human mind, reason and

intuition. Beliefs that foster and promote the spiritual life of the soul must be in accordance with the nature and the laws of the world of reality with which it is their aim to bring us into harmony. The chief sacred scriptures of the Hindus, the Vedas, register the intuitions of the perfected souls.¹ They are not so much dogmatic dicta as transcripts from life. They record the spiritual experiences of souls strongly endowed with the sense for reality. They are held to be authoritative on the ground that they express the experiences of the experts in the field of religion. If the utterances of the Vedas were uninformed by spiritual insight, they would have no claim to our belief. The truths revealed in the Vedas are capable of being re-experienced on compliance with ascertained conditions. We can discriminate between the genuine and the spurious in religious experience, not only by means of logic but also through life. By experimenting with different religious conceptions and relating them with the rest of our life, we can know the sound from the unsound.

The Vedas bring together the different ways in which the religious-minded of that age experienced reality and describe the general principles of religious knowledge and growth. As the experiences themselves are of a varied character, so their records are many-sided (*viśvatomukham*) which Jayatīrtha in his *Nyāyasudhā* interprets as "suggestive of many interpretations" (*anekārthatām*).

¹ *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, i. 2.

It is essential to every religion that its heritage should be treated as sacred. A society which puts a halo of sanctity round its tradition gains an inestimable advantage of power and permanence. The Vedic tradition became surrounded with sanctity, and so helped to transmit culture and ensure the continuity of civilisation. The sacred scriptures make the life of the spirit real even to those who are incapable of insight. Men, in the rough and tumble of life with their problems and perplexities, sins and sorrows, have no patience for balanced arguments or sustained meditation, but they want some formula or rule of life which they can accept as valid. Through it, they are inducted into a new way of life. A living tradition influences our inner faculties, humanises our nature and lifts us to a higher level. By means of it, every generation is moulded in a particular cast which gives individuality and interest to every cultural type. Even those who wish to discern the truth for themselves require a guide in the early stages.

The Hindu attitude to the Vedas is one of trust tempered by criticism, trust because the beliefs and forms which helped our fathers are likely to be of use to us also ; criticism because, however valuable the testimony of past ages may be, it cannot deprive the present age of its right to inquire and sift the evidence. Precious as are the echoes of God's voice in the souls of men of long ago, our regard for them must be tempered by the recognition of the truth that God has never finished the revelation of His

wisdom and love. Besides, our interpretation of religious experience must be in conformity with the findings of science. As knowledge grows, our theology develops. Only those parts of the tradition which are logically coherent are to be accepted as superior to the evidence of the senses and not the whole tradition.¹

The Hindu philosophy of religion starts from and returns to an experimental basis. Only this basis is as wide as human nature itself. Other religious systems start with this or that particular experimental datum. Christian theology, for example, takes its stand on the immediate certitude of Jesus as one whose absolute authority over conscience is self-certifying and whose ability and willingness to save the soul it is impossible not to trust. Christian theology becomes relevant only for those who share or accept a particular kind of spiritual experience, and these are tempted to dismiss other experiences as illusory and other scriptures as imperfect. Hinduism was not betrayed into this situation on account of its adherence to fact. The Hindu thinker readily admits other points of view than his own and considers them to be just as worthy of attention. If the whole race of man, in every land, of every colour, and every stage of culture, is the offspring of God, then we must admit that, in the vast compass of his providence, all are being trained by his wisdom and supported by his love

¹ *Ātmaparyayaḥ śruti. pratyakṣād balavattī, na śruti-mātram. Bhāmali. I. 1. 1.*

to reach within the limits of their powers a knowledge of the Supreme. When the Hindu found that different people aimed at and achieved God-realisation in different ways, he generously recognised them all and justified their place in the course of history. He used the distinctive scriptures of the different groups for their uplift since they remain the source, almost the only source, for the development of their tastes and talents, for the enrichment of their thought and life, for the appeal to their emotions and the inspiration of their efforts. Hinduism is the religion not only of the Vedas but of the Epics and the Purāṇas.¹ By accepting the significance of the different intuitions of reality and the different scriptures of the peoples living in India (*sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*), Hinduism has come to be a tapestry of the most variegated tissues and almost endless diversity of hues. The Purāṇas with their wild chronology and weird stories are mainly imaginative literature, but were treated as a part of the sacred tradition for the simple reason that some people took interest in them. The Tantras which deal especially with yogic *sādhana*, or discipline and have influenced the lives of some communities from the time of the *R̥g Veda*, are accepted as a part of the sacred literature and many Hindu ceremonies show traces of the Tāntrik worship. Every tradition which helps man to lift his soul to God is held up as worthy of adherence. "The Vedas, the Sāmkhya, the Yoga, the Pāsupata and

¹ Śrutiśmṛtipurāṇapoktadharmā.

the Vaiṣṇava creeds, each of them is encouraged in some place or other. Some think that, this is better, or that is better owing to differences of taste, but all men reach unto you, the Supreme, even as all rivers, however zigzag their courses may be, reach the sea." ¹ Hinduism is therefore not a definite dogmatic creed, but a vast, complex, but subtly unified mass of spiritual thought and realisation. Its tradition of the godward endeavour of the human spirit has been continuously enlarging through the ages.

The dialectic of religious advance through tradition, logic and life ² helps the conservation of Hinduism by providing scope for change. Religion and philosophy, life and thought, the practical and the theoretical, to use the language of Croce, form the eternal rhythm of the spirit. We rise from life to thought and return from thought to life in a progressive enrichment which is the attainment of ever higher levels of reality. Tradition is something which is for ever being worked out anew and recreated by the free activity of its followers. What is built for ever is for ever building. If a tradition does not grow, it only means that its followers have become spiritually dead. Throughout the history of Hinduism the leaders of thought and practice have been continually busy experimenting

¹ trayī sāmukhyam yogāḥ paśupatimatam vaiṣṇavam iti prabhinne prasthāne param idam atah pathyam iti ca rucīnām vaicitryāt ṛjukuṭilanānāpathajuṣām nṛṇām eko gamyaḥ tvam asi payasām arṇava ivā.

Mahimnastava.

² śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana.

with new forms, developing new ideals to suit new conditions. The first impulse of progress came when the Vedic Aryans came into contact with the native tribes. A similar impulse contributed to the protestant movements of Jainism and Buddhism when the Aryans moved out into the Gangetic valley. Contact with the highly civilised Dravīdians led to the transformation of Vedism into a theistic religion. The reform movements of Rāmānanda, Caitāṇya, Kabīr, and Nānak show the stimulus of Islām. The Brahmo-Samaj and the Arya-Samaj are the outcome of the contact with Western influences, and yet Hinduism is not to be dismissed as a mere flow and strife of opinions, for it represents a steady growth of insight, since every form of Hinduism and every stage of its growth is related to the common background of the Vedānta. Though Hindu religious thought has traversed many revolutions and made great conquests, the essential ideas have continued the same for four or five millenniums. The germinal conceptions are contained in the Vedānta standard.

The three prasthānas of the Vedānta, the Upaniṣads, the *Brahma Sūtra* and the *Bhagavadgītā*, answer roughly to the three stages of faith, knowledge and discipline. The Upaniṣads embody the experiences of the sages. Logic and discipline are present in them, though they are not the chief characteristics of those texts. The *Brahma Sūtra* attempts to interpret in logical terms the chief conclusions of the Upaniṣads. The *Bhagavadgītā*

is primarily a yoga śāstra giving us the chief means by which we can attain the truly religious life. They form together the absolute standard for the Hindu religion. It is said that other scriptures sink into silence when the Vedānta appears, even as foxes do not raise their voices in the forest when the lion appears.¹ All sects of Hinduism attempt to interpret the Vedānta texts in accordance with their own religious views. The Vedānta is not a religion, but religion itself in its most universal and deepest significance. Thus the different sects of Hinduism are reconciled with a common standard and are sometimes regarded as the distorted expressions of the one true canon. As the Mahābhārata says, the Veda is one, its significance is one, though different Vedās are constructed on account of misunderstanding.² The acceptance of this common authority by the different sects helps to purify them. Those parts of the new faith which are not in conformity with the Vedic Canon tend to be subordinated and gradually dropped out. While no creeds and no scruples were forced to disappear as out-worn or out of date, every one of them developed on account of the influence of the spirit of the Vedānta, which is by no means sectarian.

If religion is experience, the question arises, what is it that is experienced? No two religious systems

¹ tāvad garjanti śāstrāṇi jambukā vipine yathā
na garjati mahāśaktiḥ yāvad vedāntakesarī.

² eka eva dvijā vedo vedārthas caika eva
ekavedasya cājjñānāt vedās te bahavaḥ kṛtāḥ.

seem to agree in their answers to this question. The Hindu philosopher became familiar very early in his career with the variety of the pictures of God which the mystics conjure up. We know to-day from our study of comparative religion that there are different accounts of the mystical vision. Some Christian mystics declare that they see in the highest mystical vision the blessed Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Orthodox Muslim mystics deny this triune conception. From such variety the Hindu thinker did not rush to the conclusion that in religious experience we ascribe objective existence to subjective suggestions. The Upaniṣad says that "God, the maker of All, the great spirit ever seated in the hearts of creatures, is fashioned by the heart, the understanding, and the will. They who know that become immortal." ¹ Religious experience is not the pure unvarnished presentment of the real in itself, but is the presentment of the real already influenced by the ideas and prepossessions of the perceiving mind. The mind of man does not function in fractions. It cannot be split up into a few sharply defined elements, as the intellect, the emotions and the will. The intellect of man is not so utterly naked and undefiled as to justify the view that it is one and the same in all men. The Pragmatists have done a notable service

¹ eṣa devo viśvakarmā mahātmā sadā janānām hṛdaye sanniviṣṭaḥ

hṛdā maṇiṣā manasābhikṣpto ya enam vidur amṛtās te bhavanti. *Śvet. Up.*, iv. 17.

to the philosophy of religion in pointing out that different philosophies reflect different temperaments. The Divine reveals itself to men within the framework of their intimate prejudices. Each religious genius spells out the mystery of God according to his own endowment, personal, racial, and historical. The variety of the pictures of God is easily intelligible when we realise that religious experience is psychologically mediated.

It is sometimes urged that the descriptions of God conflict with one another. It only shows that our notions are not true. To say that our ideas of God are not true is not to deny the reality of God to which our ideas refer. Refined definitions of God as moral personality, and holy love may contradict cruder ones which look upon him as a primitive despot, a sort of sultan in the sky, but they all intend the same reality. If personal equation does not vitiate the claim to objectivity in sense perception and scientific inquiry, there is no reason to assume that it does so in religious experience.

The Hindu never doubted the reality of the one supreme universal spirit, however much the descriptions of it may fall short of its nature. Whatever the doctrinaires may say, the saints of God are anxious to affirm that much is hidden from their sight. God hideth himself. It is a sound religious agnosticism which bids us hold our peace regarding the nature of the supreme spirit. Silence is more significant than speech regarding the depths of the

divine. The altars erected to the unknown gods in the Græco-Roman world were but an expression of man's ignorance of the divine nature. The sense of failure in man's quest for the unseen is symbolised by them. When asked to define the nature of God, the seer of the Upaniṣad sat silent, and when pressed to answer exclaimed that the Absolute is silence. śānto 'yam ātmā. The mystery of the divine reality eludes the machinery of speech and symbol. The "Divine Darkness," "That of which nothing can be said," and such other expressions are used by the devout when they attempt to describe their consciousness of direct communion with God.

The Hindu thinkers bring out the sense of the otherness of the divine by the use of negatives, "There the eye goes not, speech goes not, nor mind, we know not, we understand not how one would teach it."¹ The *neti* of Yājñavalkya reminds us of the *nescio* of Bernard, of "the dim silence where all lovers lose themselves" of Ruysbroeck, of the negative descriptions of Dionysius the Areopagite, Eckhart and Boehme.

But the human mind finds it extremely difficult to resign itself to absolute silence or negative descriptions. Man is a talking animal. He insists on interpreting the religious mystery in terms of his own experience. The completely other, the absolutely unlimited, seems to be akin to the utterly indefinite. The human mind craves for something

¹ *Kena Up.*, 3.

definite and limited and so uses its resources for bringing down the Supreme to the region of the determined. We cannot think of God without using our imagination. The religious seer needs the help of the imagination to express his vision. "Without a parable spake he not unto them." The highest category we can use is that of self-conscious personality. We are persons "puruṣas," and God is perfect personality (uttama-puruṣa). If we analyse the concept of personality, we find that it includes cognition, emotion, and will, and God is viewed as the supreme knower, the great lover, and the perfect will, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva. These are not three independent centres of consciousness, as popular theology represents, but three sides of one complex personality. The different pictures of God which prevailed in the country were affiliated to one or the other of this trinity.

The soul of man is complex in character and so is the environment. The reactions of an infinite soul to an infinite environment cannot be limited to this or that formula. When we suffer from the pressure of the finite, we take refuge in the infinite. The finite presses on us at so many different points, and our different accounts of God are the outcome of this protean pressure. "Such as men themselves are, such will God Himself seem to them to be," says the Cambridge Platonist, John Smith. The seers of the Upaniṣads were impressed by the unreality of the world, its fleeting and transitory character, and sought for the infinite real, the *sat*

which would not roll away like the mists of *māyā*. The sorrow and the suffering of the world cut into the soul of the Buddha and added a poignancy to his conviction of the unreality of finite things, and he found an escape from it in the eternal *dharma* or righteousness. The inversion of the moral values affected the Hebrew most, and he found relief in an omnipotent and just God, who would destroy the wicked and save the righteous. The Hebrew prophets and Mahammad were struck by the majesty and the unconditional binding force of the imperative of conscience. Since they were familiar with kingship as the source of all authority, they made the supreme a lord of lords, a king of kings. The Protestant Christians do not care so much for the inviolable dignity of the ethical imperative as for the essential benignity and beneficence of the Supreme. God is our Father in heaven and we are his prodigal sons who have wandered from him, though he is ever ready to welcome us with rejoicing the moment we are willing to return. While fathers are just, mothers are merciful, and so the Catholic Christians and the Śāktas look upon God as the Mother, whose compassionate heart pours itself for the child out of *vātsalya*, or the love analogous to that of the cow for the calf whose impurities she licks away. Every view of God from the primitive worship of nature up to the Father-love of a St. Francis and the Mother-love of a Rāmakṛṣṇa represents some aspect or other of the relation of the human to the divine spirit. Each method of

approach, each mode of address answers to some mood of the human mind. Not one of them gives the whole truth, though each of them is partially true. God is more than the law that commands, the judge that condemns, the love that constrains, the father to whom we owe our being, or the mother with whom is bound up all that we can hope for or aspire to. "Him who is the One Real sages name variously."¹ "My names are many as declared by the great seers."² To admit the various descriptions of God is not to lapse into polytheism. When Yājñavalkya was called upon to state the number of gods, he started with the popular number 3306, and ended by reducing them all to one Brahman. "This indestructible enduring reality is to be looked upon as one only."³

These different representations do not tell us about what God is in himself but only what he is to us. The anthropomorphic conception of the divine is relative to our needs. We look upon God as interested in flowers and stars, little birds and children, in broken hearts and in binding them up. But God exists for himself and not merely for us. To look upon God as an instrument for the advancement of human ends is to exaggerate our own importance. We seem to give value to God, more than God to us. Tukārām says, "That we fall into

¹ *Rg Veda*, i. 164. 46.

² bahūni mama nāmāni kīrtitāni maharṣibhiḥ. *Mahābhārata*. Śānti parva.

³ ekadhaivānudraṣṭavyam etad aprameyam dhruvam. *Rṣhadāraṇyaka Up.*, iv. 4. 20.

sin is thy good fortune: we have bestowed name and form on thee; had it not been we, who would have asked after thee, when thou wast lonely and unembodied? It is the darkness that makes the light shine, the setting that gives lustre to the gem. Disease brought to light Dhanvantari; why should a healthy man wish to know him? It is poison that confers its value on nectar; gold and brass are high or low compared with each other. Tuka says, know this, O God, that because we exist, Godhead has been conferred on you." ¹ What constitutes existence for other is not what constitutes existence for oneself.

Every attempt at solving the problem of the ultimate basis of existence from a religious point of view has come to admit an Absolute or God. Rationalistic logic and mystic contemplation favour as a rule the former conception, while ethical theism is disposed to the latter. It has been so in Hindu thought from the age of the Upaniṣads till the present day. We find the same ambiguity in Christianity. The personal category is transcended in the highest experiences of the Christian mystics. Hinduism affirms that some of the highest and richest manifestations which religion has produced require a personal God. There is a rational compulsion to postulate the personality of the divine. While Hindu thought does justice to the personal aspect of the Supreme, it does not allow us to forget the supra-personal character of the central reality. Even those who admit the personal conception of

¹ *Tukārām*, iii. 87.

God urge that there are heights and depths in the being of God which are beyond our comprehension. The supreme cause and ground and end of the world is certainly not less than what we know as self-conscious personality. Only it is not an object among objects, or a subject among other subjects, but is the immanent ground and operative principle in all subjects and objects. The supra-personal and the personal representations of the real are the absolute and the relative ways of expressing the one reality. When we emphasise the nature of reality in itself we get the absolute Brahman ; when we emphasise its relation to us we get the personal Bhagavān.¹

Hindu thought believes in the evolution of our knowledge of God. We have to vary continually our notions of God until we pass beyond all notions into the heart of the reality itself, which our ideas endeavour to report. Hinduism does not distinguish ideas of God as true and false, adopting one particular idea as the standard for the whole human race. It accepts the obvious fact that mankind seeks its goal of God at various levels and in various directions, and feels sympathy with every stage of the search. The same God expresses itself at one stage as power, at another as personality, at a third as all-comprehensive spirit, just as the same forces which put forth the green leaves also cause the crimson flowers to grow. We do not say that the crimson flowers are all the truth and the green

¹ vadanti tat tattva-vidas tattvaṃ yajjñānam advayam
brahmeti paramātmēti bhagavān iti śabdyate. *Bhāṣa-
vata.*

leaves are all false. Hinduism accepts all religious notions as facts and arranges them in the order of their more or less intrinsic significance. The bewildering polytheism of the masses and the uncompromising monotheism of the classes are for the Hindu the expressions of one and the same force at different levels. Hinduism insists on our working steadily upwards and improving our knowledge of God. "The worshippers of the Absolute are the highest in rank; second to them are the worshippers of the personal God; then come the worshippers of the incarnations like Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, Buddha; below them are those who worship ancestors, deities and sages, and lowest of all are the worshippers of the petty forces and spirits."¹ Again, "The deities of some men are in water (*i.e.* bathing-places), those of the more advanced are in the heavens, those of the children (in religion) are in images of wood and stone, but the sage finds his God in his deeper self."² "The man of action finds his God in fire, the man of feeling in the heart, and the feeble-minded in the idol, but the strong in spirit find God everywhere."³ The seers see the Supreme in the self, and not in images. śivam ātmani paśyanti pratimāsu na yoginaḥ.

¹ upāsanaḥ brahmaṇaḥ prāk, dvitīyā saguṇasya ca
trītiyā smaryate līlāvigrahopāsanaḥ budhaiḥ
upāntīyā pitṛdevaṛṣigaṇānām astyupāsanaḥ
antimā kṣudradevānām pretādīnām vidhīyate.

² apsu devā manuṣyāṇām divi devā maṇiṣiṇām
bālānām kāṣṭhaloṣṭheṣu buddhasy ātmani devatā.

³ agnāu kriyavato devo hṛdi devo maṇiṣiṇām
pratimāsv alpabuddhīnām jñāninām sarvataḥ śivah.

It is, however, unfortunately the case that the majority of the Hindus do not insist on this graduated scale but acquiesce in admittedly unsatisfactory conceptions of God. The cultivated tolerate popular notions as inadequate signs and shadows of the incomprehensible, but the people at large believe them to be justified and authorised. It is true that the thinking Hindu desires to escape from the confusion of the gods into the silence of the Supreme, but the crowd still stands gazing at the heavens. In the name of toleration we have carefully protected superstitious rites and customs. Even those who have a clear perception of religious values indulge in practices which are inconsistent with their professions on the comfortable assumption that superiority should not breed want of sympathy for those who are not up to the mark. There has not been in recent times any serious and systematic endeavour to raise the mental level of the masses and place the whole Hindu population on a higher spiritual plane. It is necessary for the Hindu leaders to hold aloft the highest conception of God and work steadily on the minds of the worshippers so as to effect an improvement in their conceptions. The temples, shrines and sanctuaries with which the whole land is covered may be used not only as places of prayer and altars of worship, but as seats of learning and schools of thought which can undertake the spiritual direction of the Hindus.

LECTURE II

CONFLICT OF RELIGIONS : THE HINDU ATTITUDE

STUDENTS of mysticism are impressed by the universality of the mystic experience, though the differences in the formulations of it are by no means unimportant. The mystics of the world, whether Hindu, Christian or Muslim, belong to the same brotherhood and have striking family likeness. Miss Evelyn Underhill writes : " Though mystical theologies of the East and the West differ widely—though the ideal of life which they hold out to the soul differ too—yet in the experience of the saint this conflict is seen to be transcended. When the love of God is reached, divergencies become impossible, for the soul has passed beyond the sphere of the manifold and is immersed in the one Reality." ¹ Judged by the characteristic religious experience, St. John and St. Paul have not any material advantage over Plotinus and Śaṅkara. " One cannot honestly say," observes Miss Underhill, " that there is any wide difference between the Brahmin, the Sufi or the Christian mystics at their best." ² A hostile critic of mysticism, Hermann,

¹ Introduction to the *Autobiography of Devendranath Tagore*, p. xl.

² *Essentials of Mysticism* (1920), p. 4.

the German theologian, endorses this view from his own standpoint. Regarding Christian mystics he remarks, "Whenever the religious feeling in them soars to its highest flights, then they are torn loose from Christ and float away in precisely the same realm with the non-Christian mystics of all ages."¹ Again, "Augustine wrote a work of fifteen books on the Trinity, yet when he stood with his mother at the window of the house at Ostia and sought to express the profound sense he felt of being in the grasp of God, he spoke not of the Trinity, but of the one God in whose presence the soul is lifted above itself and above all words and signs."²

• It matters not whether the seer who has the insight has dreamed his way to the truth in the shadow of the temple or the tabernacle, the church or the mosque. Those who have seen the radiant vision of the Divine protest against the exaggerated importance attached to outward forms. They speak a language which unites all worshippers as surely as the dogmas of the doctors divide. The true seer is gifted with a universality of outlook, and a certain sensitiveness to the impulses and emotions which dominate the rich and varied human nature. He whose consciousness is anchored in God cannot deny any expression of life as utterly erroneous. He is convinced of the inexhaustibility of the nature of God and the infinite number of its possible manifestations.

¹ *The Communion of the Christian with God.* ² *Ibid.*, p. 29.

The intellectual representations of the religious mystery are relative and symbolic. As Plato would say, our accounts of God are likely stories but all the same legendary. Not one of them is full and final. We are like little children on the seashore trying to fill our shells with water from the sea. While we cannot exhaust the waters of the deep by means of our shells, every drop that we attempt to gather into our tiny shells is a part of the authentic waters. Our intellectual representations differ simply because they bring out different facets of the one central reality. From the R̥sis of the Upaniṣads down to Tagore and Gandhi, the Hindu has acknowledged that truth wears vestures of many colours and speaks in strange tongues. The mystics of other denominations have also testified to this. Boehme says : " Consider the birds in our forests, they praise God each in his own way, in diverse tones and fashions. Think you God is vexed by this diversity and desires to silence discordant voices ? All the forms of being are dear to the infinite Being Himself." Look at this Sufi utterance in the translation of Professor Browne of Cambridge :

Beaker or flagon, or bowl or jar,
Clumsy or slender, coarse or fine ;
However the potter may make or mar,
All were made to contain the wine :
Should we this one seek or that one shun
When the wine which gives them their worth is one ?

Bearing in mind this great truth, Hinduism developed an attitude of comprehensive charity instead of a fanatic faith in an inflexible creed. It accepted the multiplicity of aboriginal gods and others which originated, most of them outside the Aryan tradition, and justified them all. It brought together into one whole all believers in God. Many sects professing many different beliefs live within the Hindu fold. Heresy-hunting, the favourite game of many religions, is singularly absent from Hinduism.

Hinduism is wholly free from the strange obsession of the Semitic faiths that the acceptance of a particular religious metaphysic is necessary for salvation, and non-acceptance thereof is a heinous sin meriting eternal punishment in hell. Here and there outbursts of sectarian fanaticism are found recorded in the literature of the Hindus, which indicate the first effects of the conflicts of the different groups brought together into the one fold; but the main note of Hinduism is one of respect and good will for other creeds. When a worshipper of Viṣṇu had a feeling in his heart against a worshipper of Śiva and he bowed before the image of Viṣṇu, the face of the image divided itself in half and Śiva appeared on one side and Viṣṇu on the other, and the two smiling as one face on the bigoted worshipper told him that Viṣṇu and Śiva were one. The story is significant.

In a sense, Hinduism may be regarded as the first example in the world of a missionary religion.

Only its missionary spirit is different from that associated with the proselytising creeds. It did not regard it as its mission to convert humanity to any one opinion. For what counts is conduct and not belief. Worshippers of different gods and followers of different rites were taken into the Hindu fold. Kṛṣṇa, according to the *Bhagavadgītā*, accepts as his own, not only the oppressed classes, women and Śūdras, but even those of unclean descent (pāpavṛṇayāḥ), like the Kīrātas and the Hūṇas.¹ The ancient practice of Vratyastoma, described fully in the *Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa*, shows that not only individuals but whole tribes were absorbed into Hinduism.²

When in the hour of their triumph the Aryans made up with their dangerous though vanquished rivals, they did not sneer at their relatively crude cults. The native inhabitants of North India clothed the naked forces of nature with the gorgeous drapery of a mythic fancy, and fashioned a train of gods and goddesses, of spirits and elves out of the shifting panorama of nature, and the Vedic Aryans

¹ Kīrātābāṇāḥ, Hūṇāḥ, Śūdrāḥ, ābhīrakāṅkā yavanāḥ khaṣādayaḥ.

geḥyo ra pāpā yad āśīṣaḥ chadyanti tasmai prabhaviṣṭaḥ mamaḥ.

² See *Pañcavimśa Brāhmaṇa*, xvii. 1-4; *Baudhāyana*, xvii. 24-6; *Kātyāyana*, xxii. 4; *Lāṭyāyana*, viii. 6. Many modern sects, beginning with Caitanya, the Rādhāsvāmis, the Kabīrpanthis, the Sikhs, the Brahmo samājists and the Ārya samājists, accept caste-discriminations. Devala's smṛti lays down rules for the temple purification of people forcibly converted to other faiths, or of womenfolk defiled and confined for years, and even of people who, for worldly advantage, embrace other faiths.

accepted them all and set them side by side with the heavenly host to which they themselves looked with awe and admiration. It was enough for them that those crude objects were regarded by their adherents as sources of the supreme blessings of life and centres of power which can be drawn upon. The gods of the *Rg Veda* and the ghosts of the *Atharva Veda* melted and coalesced under the powerful solvent of philosophy into the one supreme reality which, according to the qualities, with which our imagination invests it, goes by this name or that.

The Epics relate the acceptance of new tribes and their gods into the old family circle. The clash of cults and the contact of cultures do not, as a rule, result in a complete domination of the one by the other. In all true contact there is an interchange of elements, though the foreign elements are given a new significance by those who accept them. The emotional attitudes attached to the old forms are transferred to the new which is fitted into the background of the old. Many tribes and races had mystic animals, and when the tribes entered the Hindu society the animals which followed them were made vehicles and companions of gods. One of them is mounted on the peacock, another on the swan, a third is carried by the bull, and a fourth by the goat. The enlistment of Hanumān in the service of Rāma signifies the meeting-point of early nature worship and later theism. The dancing of Kṛṣṇa on Kālīya's head represents the subordination, if not the displacement, of serpent worship

Rāma's breaking of the bow of Śiva signifies the conflict between the Vedic ideal and the cult of Śiva, who soon became the god of the south (Dakṣiṇāmūrti). There are other stories in the Epic literature indicating the reconciliation of the Vedic and the non-Vedic faiths. The heroised ancestors, the local saints, the planetary influences and the tribal gods were admitted into the Hindu pantheon, though they were all subordinated to the one supreme reality of which they were regarded as aspects. The polytheism was organised in a monistic way. Only it was not a rigid monotheism enjoining on its adherents the most complete intolerance for those holding a different view.

It need not be thought that the Aryan was always the superior force. There are occasions when the Aryan yielded to the non-Aryan, and rightly too. The Epics relate the manner in which the different non-Aryan gods asserted their supremacy over the Aryan ones. Kṛṣṇa's struggle with Indra, the prince of the Vedic gods, is one instance. The rise of the cult of Śiva is another. When Dakṣa, the protagonist of the sacrificial cult, conceives a violent feud against Śiva, there is disaffection in his own home, for his daughter Śatī who has become the embodiment of womanly piety and devotion developed an ardent love for Śiva.

The Vedic culture which resembles that of the Homeric Greeks or the Celtic Irish at the beginning of the Christian era, or that of the pre-Christian Teutons and Slavs, becomes transformed in the

Epics into the Hindu culture through the influence of the Dravidians. The Aryan idea of worship during the earliest period was to call on the Father Sky or some other shining one to look from on high on the sacrificer, and receive from him the offerings of fat or flesh, cakes and drink. But soon pūjā or worship takes the place of homa or sacrifice. Image worship which was a striking feature of the Dravidian faith was accepted by the Aryans. The ideals of vegetarianism and non-violence (ahimsā) also developed. The Vedic tradition was dominated by the Āgamik, and to-day Hindu culture shows the influence of the Āgamas as much as that of the Vedas. The Aryan and the Dravidian do not exist side by side in Hinduism, but are worked up into a distinctive cultural pattern which is more an emergent than a resultant. The history of the Hindu religious development shows occasionally the friction between the two strains of the Vedas and the Āgamas though they are sufficiently harmonised. When conceived in a large historical spirit, Hinduism becomes a slow growth across the centuries incorporating all the good and true things as well as much that is evil and erroneous, though a constant endeavour, which is not always successful, is kept up to throw out the unsatisfactory elements. Hinduism has the large comprehensive unity of a living organism with a fixed orientation. The Upaniṣad asks us to remember the Real who is one, who is indistinguishable through class or colour, and who by his varied forces provides as

is necessary for the needs of each class and of all.

When once the cults are taken into Hinduism, alteration sets in as the result of the influence of the higher thought. The Hindu method of religious reform is essentially democratic. It allows each group to get to the truth through its own tradition by means of discipline of mind and morals. Each group has its own historic tradition, and assimilation of it is the condition of its growth of spirit. Even the savage clings to his superstitions obstinately and faithfully. For him his views are live forces, though they may seem to us no more than childish fancies. To shatter the superstitions of the savage is to destroy his morality, his social code and mental peace. Religious rites and social institutions, whatever they may be, issue out of experiences that may be hundreds of years old. As the Hindu inquirer cast his eyes over the manifold variety of the faiths which prevailed in his world, he saw that they were all conditioned by the social structure in which their followers lived. History has made them what they are, and they cannot be made different all on a sudden. Besides, God's gracious purpose includes the whole of the human race. Every community has inalienable rights which others should respect. No type can come into existence in which God does not live. Robert Burns truly says: "And yet the light that led astray was light from heaven." To despise other people's gods is to despise them, for they and their

gods are adapted to each other. The Hindu took up the gods of even the savage and the uncivilised and set them on equal thrones to his own.

The right way to refine the crude beliefs of any group is to alter the bias of mind. For the view of God an individual stresses depends on the kind of man he is. The temperament and the training of the individual as well as the influence of the environment determine to a large extent the character of one's religious opinions. Any defect in one's nature or oneness in one's experience is inevitably reflected in the view the individual adopts with regard to the religious reality. One's knowledge of God is limited by one's capacity to understand him. The aim of the reformer should be to cure the defect and not criticise the view. When the spiritual life is quickened, the belief is altered automatically. Any change of view to be real must grow from within outwards. Opinions cannot grow unless traditions are altered. The task of the religious teacher is not so much to impose an opinion as to kindle an aspiration. If we open the eyes, the truth will be seen. The Hindu method adopts not force and threats but suggestion and persuasion. Error is only a sign of immaturity. It is not a grievous sin. Given time and patience it will be shaken off. However severe Hinduism may be with the strong in spirit, it is indulgent to the frailties of the weak.

The Hindu method of religious reform helps to bring about a change not in the name but in the

content. While we are allowed to retain the same name, we are encouraged to deepen its significance. To take an illustration familiar to you, the Yahveh of the Pentateuch is a fearsome spirit, again and again flaming up in jealous wrath and commanding the slaughter of man, woman, child and beast, whenever his wrath is roused. The conception of the Holy One who loves mercy rather than sacrifice, who abominates burnt offerings, who reveals himself to those who yearn to know him asserts itself in the writings of Isaiah and Hosea. In the revelation of Jesus we have the conception of God as perfect love. The name "Yahveh" is the common link which connects these different developments. When a new cult is accepted by Hinduism, the name is retained though a refinement of the content is effected. To take an example from early Sanskrit literature, it is clear that Kālī in her various shapes is a non-Aryan goddess.¹ But she was gradually identified with the supreme Godhead. Witness the following address to Kālī :

"Thou, O Goddess, O auspicious Remover of the distresses of those who turn to thee for refuge, art not to be known by speech, mind and intellect. None indeed is able to praise thee by words.

"O Goddess, having Brahman as thy personal form,

¹ In the *Mahābhārata* (iv. vii) we find that she delights in wine, flesh and animal sacrifices. *Gauḍavaho* (A.D. 700) refers to animal and human sacrifices offered to Kālī. Kṣudrakamalākara (fifteenth century A.D.), speaking of the image of Durgā at Vindhyachala near Mirzapur, says that Kālī is the goddess of the Kirātas and other aboriginal tribes and is worshipped by the Mlecchas, the Thugs, etc.

O Mother of the universe, we repeatedly salute thee, full of compassion.

"The work of creation, maintenance and absorption is a mere wave of thy sportive pleasure. Thou art able to create the whole in a moment. Salutation to thee, O all-powerful Goddess! Although devoid of attributes and form, although standing outside of objective existence, although beyond the range of the senses, although one and whole and without a second and all-pervading, yet assuming a form possessed of attributes for the well-being of devotees, thou givest them the highest good. We salute thee, O Goddess, in whom all the three conditions of existence become manifest."

Similarly Kṛṣṇa becomes the highest Godhead in the *Bhagavadgītā* whatever his past origin may be.

When the pupil approaches his religious teacher for guidance, the teacher asks the pupil about his favourite God, *iṣṭadevata*, for every man has a

¹devi prapannārtihare śive tvam vāṇīmanobuddhibhir
aprameyā
yato' syato naiva hi kaścid īśah śtotum svaśabdair
bhavatīm kadācit.

brahmasvarūpe jagadāmbike' lam dayāmayīm tvām
satatam namāmaḥ.

sargas.hitipratyavahārakāryam bhavadvilāsyā ta-
rangamātram
kartum kṣaṇenākhilamasyalam tvam namo' stvataste'
khilāśaktirūpe.

tvam nirguṇākāravivarjitāpi tvam bhāvarāṅgyāuca
bahirgatāpi
sarvendriyā gocaratām gatāpi tvekā hi akhaṇḍā vibhur
advayāpi.

svabhaktakalyāṇa vivardhanāya dhrtvā
saguṇam hitebhiyaḥ
mīṣṛeyasam yacchasi bhāvagamyā tribhāvarūpe bha-

right to choose that form of belief and worship which most appeals to him. The teacher tells the pupil that his idea is a concrete representation of what is abstract, and leads him gradually to an appreciation of the Absolute intended by it. Suppose a Christian approaches a Hindu teacher for spiritual guidance, he would not ask his Christian pupil to discard his allegiance to Christ but would tell him that his idea of Christ was not adequate and would lead him to a knowledge of the real Christ, the incorporate Supreme. Every God accepted by Hinduism is elevated and ultimately identified with the central Reality which is one with the deeper self of man. The addition of new gods to the Hindu pantheon does not endanger it. The critic who observes that Hinduism is "magic tempered by metaphysics" or "animism transformed by philosophy" is right. There is a distinction between magic tempered by metaphysics and pure magic. Hinduism absorbs everything that enters into it, magic or animism, and raises it to a higher level.

Differences in name become immaterial for the Hindu, since every name, at its best, connotes the same metaphysical and moral perfections. The identity of content signified by the different names is conveyed to the people at large by an identification of the names. Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva, Kṛṣṇa, Kālī, Buddha and other historical names are used indiscriminately for the Absolute Reality. "May Hari, the ruler of the three worlds worshipped by

the Śaivites as Śiva, by the Vedāntins as Brahman, by the Buddhists as Buddha, by the Naiyāyikas as the chief agent, by the Jāinas as the liberated, by the ritualists as the principle of law, may he grant our prayers." ¹ Śaṅkara, the great philosopher, refers to the one Reality, who, owing to the diversity of intellects (*matibheda*) is conventionally spoken of (*parikalpya*) in various ways as Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Mahēśvara.² A south Indian folksong³ says :

Into the bosom of the one great sea
Flow streams that come from hills on every side,
Their names are various as their springs,
And thus in every land do men bow down
To one great God, though known by many names.³

The Hindu method of reform enables every group to retain its past associations and preserve its individuality and interest. For as students are proud of their colleges, so are groups of their gods. We need not move students from one college to another, but should do our best to raise the tone of each college, improve its standards and refine its ideals, with the result that each college enables us to attain the same goal. It is a matter of indifference what college we are in, so long as all of them are steeped in the same atmosphere and

¹ yam Śaivāṁ samupāsate śiva itī brahmeti vedāntinaḥ
buddhā itī prajāpataḥ karmeti mīmāṃsakaḥ
yāyikāḥ.

arhantītyatha jainaśāsanarātāḥ karmeti mīmāṃsakaḥ
soyam vai vidadhātu vāṇīhitaphalam trailokyam ithe
bharīḥ.

² *Haristuti*, 18.

³ Gover, *The Folksongs of Southern India* (1871), p. 105.

train us to reach the same ideal. Of course there will be fanatics with narrow patriotism holding up Balliol as the best or Magdalene as modern, but to the impartial spectator the different colleges do not seem to be horizontal levels one higher than the other, but only vertical pathways leading to the same summit. We can be in any college and yet be on the lowest rung of the ladder or be high up in the scale. Where we are does not depend on the college but on ourselves. There are good Christians and bad Christians even as there are good Hindus and bad Hindus.

The Hindu method of reform has been criticised both from the theoretical and the practical points of view. Professor Clement Webb writes: "With its traditions of periodically repeated incarnations of the deity in the most diverse forms, its ready acceptance of any and every local divinity, or founder of a sect or ascetic devotee as a manifestation of God, its tolerance of symbols and legends of all kinds, however repulsive or obscene by the side of the most exalted flights of world-renouncing mysticism, it could perhaps more easily than any other faith develop, without loss of continuity with its past, into a universal religion which would see in every creed a form suited to some particular group or individual, of the universal aspiration after one Eternal Reality, to whose true being the infinitely various shapes in which it reveals itself to, or conceals itself from men are all alike indifferent."¹

¹ Needham, *Science, Religion and Reality* (1926), pp. 334-5.

While this statement represents the general tendency of the Hindu faith, it is not altogether fair to it when it suggests that for Hinduism there is nothing to choose between one revelation and another. Hinduism does not mistake tolerance for indifference. It affirms that while all revelations refer to reality, they are not equally true to it. Towards the close of the last lecture I noticed this point, and it is needless to elaborate it here. Hinduism requires every man to think steadily on the life's mystery until he reaches the highest revelation. While the lesser forms are tolerated in the interests of those who cannot suddenly transcend them, there is all through an insistence on the larger idea and the purer worship. Hinduism does not believe in forcing up the pace of development. When we give our higher experiences to those who cannot understand them we are in the position of those who can see and who impart the visual impressions to those born blind. Unless we open their spiritual eyes, they cannot see what the seers relate. So while Hinduism does not interfere with one's natural way of thinking, which depends on his moral and intellectual gifts, education and environment, it furthers his spiritual growth by lending a sympathetic and helping hand wherever he stands. While Hinduism hates the compulsory conscription of men into the house of truth, it insists on the development of one's intellectual conscience and sensibility to truth. Besides error of judgment is not moral obliquity. Weakness of understanding is not depravity of

heart. If a full and perfect understanding of the divine nature is necessary for salvation, how many of us can escape the jaws of hell? *Saktigītā* says: "There is no limit, O Mother, to thy kindly grace in the case of devotees who are not able to realise thy form consisting of ideal essences, through the defects in the knowledge of principles." We may not know God, but God certainly knows us.

Hinduism has enough faith in the power of spirit to break the bonds that fetter the growth of the soul. God, the central reality affirmed by all religions, is the continual evolver of the faiths in which men find themselves. Besides, experience proves that attempts at a very rapid progress from one set of rules to a higher one does not lead to advance but abrogation. The mills of the gods grind slowly in the making of history, and zealous reformers meet with defeat if they attempt to save the world in their own generation by forcing on it their favourite programmes. Human nature cannot be hurried. Again, Hinduism does not believe in bringing about a mechanical uniformity of belief and worship by a forcible elimination of all that is not in agreement with a particular creed. It does not believe in any statutory methods of salvation. Its scheme of salvation is not limited to those who hold a particular view of God's nature and worship. Such an exclusive absolutism is inconsistent with an all-loving universal God. It is not fair to God or man to assume that one people are the chosen of God, their religion occupies a central place in the

religious development of mankind, and that all others should borrow from them or suffer spiritual destitution.

After all, what counts is not creed but conduct. By their fruits ye shall know them and not by their beliefs. Religion is not correct belief but righteous living.¹ The truly religious never worry about other people's beliefs. Look at the great saying of Jesus: "Other sheep I have which are not of this fold." Jesus was born a Jew and died a Jew. He did not tell the Jewish people among whom he found himself, "It is wicked to be Jews. Become Christians." He did his best to rid the Jewish religion of its impurities. He would have done the same with Hinduism were he born a Hindu. The true reformer purifies and enlarges the heritage of mankind and does not belittle, still less deny it.

Those who love their sects more than truth end by loving themselves more than their sects. We start by claiming that Christianity is the only true religion and then affirm that Protestantism is the only true sect of Christianity, Episcopalianism the only true Protestantism, the High Church the only true Episcopal Protestant Christian religion, and our particular standpoint the only true representation of the High Church view.

The Hindu theory that every human being, every group and every nation has an individuality worthy of reverence is slowly gaining ground. Such a view

¹ Cp. Spinoza: "Religion is universal to the human race; wherever justice and charity have the force of law and ordinance, there is God's kingdom."

requires that we should allow absolute freedom to every group to cultivate what is most distinctive and characteristic of it. All peculiarity is unique and incommunicable, and it will be to disregard the nature of reality to assume that what is useful to one will be useful to everyone else to the same extent. The world is wide enough to hold men whose natures are different.

It is argued sometimes that the Hindu plan has not helped its adherents to a freer and larger life. It is difficult to meet such an indefinite charge. Anyway, it is a matter of grave doubt whether Hinduism would have achieved a more effective regeneration if it had displaced by force the old ideas, *i.e.* if it had adopted the method of conversion and proselytism instead of reform resulting from gradual development. It is quite true that Hinduism did not cut away with an unsparing hand the rank tropical growth of magic and obscurantism. Its method is rather that of sapping the foundations than cutting the growths.

While in the great days of Hinduism there was a great improvement in the general religious life of the Hindus by the exercise of the two principles of respect for man and unbending devotion to truth, there has been a "failure of nerve" in the Hindu spirit in recent times. There are within Hinduism large numbers who are the victims of superstition, but even in countries where the higher civilisation is said to have displaced the lower, the lower still persists. To meet a savage we need not

go very far. A great authority in these matters, Sir James Frazer, says: "Among the ignorant and superstitious classes of modern Europe, it is very much what it was thousands of years ago in Egypt and India, and what it now is among the lowest savages surviving in the remotest corners of the world. Now and then the polite world is startled by a paragraph in a newspaper which tells how in Scotland an image has been found stuck full of pins for the purpose of killing an obnoxious laird or minister, how a woman has been slowly roasted to death as a witch in Ireland, or how a girl has been murdered and chopped up in Russia to make those candles of human tallow by whose light thieves hope to pursue their midnight trade unseen."¹ Many Christians believe in spells and magic. Habits of human groups are hard to eradicate in proportion to the length of time during which they have existed. Rapid changes are impossible, and even slow changes are exceedingly difficult, for religions tend strongly to revert to type. When primitive tribes whose cults provided them with feminine as well as masculine objects of devotion entered the Buddhist fold they insisted on having in addition to the masculine Buddha the feminine Tārā. When the Græco-Romans worshipping Ashtoreth, Isis and Aphrodite entered the Christian Church, Mariolatry developed. It is related of an Indian Christian convert who attended the church on Sunday and the Kālī temple on Friday, that when the missionary gentleman

¹ *The Golden Bough*, abridged edition (1922), p. 56.

asked him whether he was not a Christian, he replied, "Yes, I am, but does it mean that I have changed my religion?" Hindu converts to other faiths frequently turn to Hindu gods in cases of trouble and sickness, presence or dread of death. Outer professions have no roots in inner life. We cannot alter suddenly our subconscious heritage at the bidding of the reformer. The old ideas cannot be rooted out unless we are educated to a higher intellectual and moral level.

The Hindu method has not been altogether a failure. There has been progress all round, though there is still room for considerable improvement. In spite of the fact that Hinduism has no common creed and its worship no fixed form, it has bound together multitudinous sects and devotions into a common scheme. In the Census Report for 1911 Mr. Burnes observes: "The general results of my inquiries is that the great majority of Hindus have a firm belief in one supreme God, Bhagavān, Paramēśvara, Īśvara, or Nārāyaṇa."¹ Regarding the spread of Hindu ideas and ideals, Sir Herbert Risley says: "These ideas are not the monopoly of the learned, they are shared in great measure by the man in the street. If you talk to a fairly intelligent Hindu peasant about the Paramātmā, Karma, Māyā, Mukti, and so forth, you will find as soon as he has got over his surprise at your interest in such matters, that the terms are familiar to him, and that he has formed a rough working theory of their bearing of

¹ Part I. p. 362.

his own future."¹ There is an inner cohesion among the Hindus from the Himālayas to Cape Comorin.

The work of assimilating the rawest recruits of the hill-tribes and other half-civilised hordes has been a slow one and by no means thorough. Among Hindus are counted many professing crude beliefs and submerged thoughts which the civilisation has not had time to eradicate. During the last few centuries Hinduism has not been faithful to its ideals, and the task of the uplift of the uncivilised has been sadly neglected.

Hinduism does not support the sophism that is often alleged that to coerce a man to have the right view is as legitimate as to save one by violence from committing suicide in a fit of delirium. The intolerance of narrow monotheism is written in letters of blood across the history of man from the time when first the tribes of Israel burst into the land of Canaan. The worshippers of the one jealous God are egged on to aggressive wars against people of alien cults. They invoke divine sanction for the cruelties inflicted on the conquered. The spirit of old Israel is inherited by Christianity and Islam, and it is for you to say whether it would not have been better for the Western civilisation if Greece had moulded it on this question rather than Palestine. Wars of religion which are the outcome of fanaticism that prompts and justifies the extermination of aliens of different creeds were

¹ *The People of India* (1915).

practically unknown in Hindu India. Of course, here and there there were outbursts of fanaticism, but Hinduism as a rule never encouraged persecution for unbelief. Its record has been a clean one, relatively speaking. It has been able to hold together in peace many and varied communities of men. Buddhism, which counts among its followers nearly a fifth of the human race, has always respected other faiths and never tried to supplant them by force. One of the earliest Buddhist books relates that Buddha condemned the tendency prevalent among the religious disputants of his day, to make a display of their own doctrines and damn those of others.¹ Buddha asks his followers to avoid all discussions which are likely to stir up discontent among the different sects. Religious toleration is the theme of one of Aśoka's rock edicts, "The King, beloved of the Gods, honours every form of religious faith, but considers no gift or honour so much as the increase of the substance of religion; whereof this is the root, to reverence one's own faith and never to revile that of others. Whoever acts differently injures his own religion while he wrongs another's." "The texts of all forms of religion shall be followed under my protection."² The

¹ *Sutta Nipāta*, 782; see also *Anguttara Nikāya*, iii. 57. 1, where Buddha encourages gifts by Buddhists to non-Buddhists as well. He admits the right of non-Buddhists to heaven. In the *Majjhima Nikāya* (i. p. 483) he mentions that a particular Ājīvaka gained heaven by virtue of his being a believer in Karma. Buddha held in high respect the Brahmins who led the truly moral life.

² The twelfth Rock Edict.

Hindu and the Buddhist rulers of India acted up to this principle with the result that the persecuted and the refugees of all great religions found shelter in India. The Jews, the Christians, the Parsees were allowed absolute freedom to develop on their own lines. Yuan Chwang reports that at the great festival of Prayāga, King Harṣa dedicated on the first day a statue to the Buddha, another to the sun, the favourite deity of his father, on the second, and to Śiva on the third. The famous Koṭṭayam plates of Sthānuravi (ninth century A.D.) and the Cochin plates of Vijayarāgaḍeva bear eloquent testimony to the fact that the Hindu kings not only tolerated Christianity but granted special concessions to the professors of that faith. Only the other day the Hindu prince of Mysore made a gift to the re-building of the Christian church in his State.

To-day the world has become a much smaller place, thanks to the adventures and miracles of science. Foreign nations have become our next-door neighbours. Mingling of populations is bringing about an interchange of thought. We are slowly realising that the world is a single co-operative group. Other religions have become forces with which we have to reckon, and we are seeking for ways and means by which we can live together in peace and harmony. We cannot have religious unity and peace so long as we assert that we are in possession of the light and all others are groping in the darkness. That very assertion is a challenge

to a fight. The political ideal of the world is not so much a single empire with a homogeneous civilisation and a single communal will, but a brotherhood of free nations differing profoundly in life and mind, habits and institutions, existing side by side in peace and order, harmony and co-operation, and each contributing to the world its own unique and specific best, which is irreducible to the terms of the others. The cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century and the nationalism of the nineteenth are combined in our ideal of a world-commonwealth, which allows every branch of the human family to find freedom, security and self-realisation in the larger life of mankind. I see no hope for the religious future of the world, if this ideal is not extended to the religious sphere also. When two or three different systems claim that they contain the revelation of the very core and centre of truth and the acceptance of it is the exclusive pathway to heaven, conflicts are inevitable. In such conflicts one religion will not allow others to steal a march over it, and no one can gain ascendancy until the world is reduced to dust and ashes. To obliterate every other religion than one's own is a sort of bolshevism in religion which we must try to prevent. We can do so only if we accept something like the Hindu solution, which seeks the unity of religion not in a common creed but in a common quest. Let us believe in a unity of spirit and not of organisation, a unity which secures ample liberty not only for every individual but for every type of organised life which has proved itself effective. For almost

all historical forms of life and thought can claim the sanction of experience and so the authority of God. The world would be a much poorer thing if one creed absorbed the rest. God wills a rich harmony and not a colourless uniformity. The comprehensive and synthetic spirit of Hinduism has made it a mighty forest with a thousand waving arms each fulfilling its function and all directed by the spirit of God. Each thing in its place and all associated in the divine concert making with their various voices and even dissonances, as Heraclitus would say, the most exquisite harmony should be our ideal.

That the Hindu solution of the problem of the conflict of religions is likely to be accepted in the future seems to me to be fairly certain. The spirit of democracy with its immense faith in the freedom to choose one's ends and direct one's course in the effort to realise them makes for it. Nothing is good which is not self-chosen; no determination is valuable which is not self-determination. The different religions are slowly learning to hold out hands of friendship to each other in every part of the world. My presence here this evening is an indication of it. The parliaments of religions and conferences and congresses of liberal thinkers of all creeds promote mutual understanding and harmony. The study of comparative religion is developing a fairer attitude to other religions. It is impressing on us the fundamental unity of all religions by pointing out that the genius of the people, the spirit of the age and the need of the hour determine

the emphasis in each religion. We are learning to think clearly about the inter-relations of religion. We tend to look upon different religions not as incompatibles but as complementaries, and so indispensable to each other for the realisation of the common end. Closer contact with other religions has dispelled the belief that only this or that religion has produced men of courage and patience, self-denying love and creative energy. Every great religion has cured its followers of the swell of passion, the thrust of desire and the blindness of temper. The crudest religion seems to have its place in the cosmic scheme, for gorgeous flowers justify the muddy roots from which they spring. Growing insistence on mysticism is tending to a subordination of dogma.¹ While intellectualism would separate the dissimilar and shut them up in different compartments, higher intuition takes account of the natural differences of things and seeks to combine them in the ample unity of the whole. The half-religious and the irreligious fight about dogmas and not the truly religious. In the biting words of Swift, "We have enough religion to hate one another but not enough to love one another." The more religious we grow the more tolerant of diversity shall we become.

¹ Cp. Dean Inge: "The centre of gravity in religion has shifted from authority to experience. . . . The fundamental principles of mystical religion are now very widely accepted, and are, especially with educated people, avowedly the main ground of belief." *The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought* (1926), pp. 113-15.

LECTURE III

HINDU DHARMA : I

BEFORE we turn to the practical side of Hinduism, it is necessary to clear the ground by referring to some of the chief objections urged against the conception of Hindu ethics. The doctrine of *māyā* is supposed to repudiate the reality of the world and thus make all ethical relations meaningless. The world of nature is said to be unreal and human history illusory. There is no meaning in time and no significance in life. To be delivered from this illusion which has somehow come to dominate the race of man is the end of all endeavour.

The Vedic thinkers adopted a realistic view of the world. In the Upaniṣads we have an insistence on the relative reality of the world. The illustrations of a musical instrument and its notes, the substances of clay and gold and the things made of clay and gold, make out that the objects of the world derive their being from the Supreme. As Yājñavalkya puts it, everything in the world is of value as leading to the realisation of self. When the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* looks upon the Supreme as the great Māyin, it suggests that this wonderful creation is his product. The Upaniṣads do not

support the view that the Supreme calls up appearances which have no existence except in deluded minds. The different theistic systems adopted by the large majority of the Hindus do not advocate the doctrine of *māyā*. The theory is held by Śaṅkara, who is regarded often as representing the standard type of Hindu thought.

It is quite true that Śaṅkara regards the world as *māyā* and urges several reasons in support of his thesis. The manifold of experience whether of co-existence in space or sequence in time is ever incomplete and partial and we cannot unify it. There will always be a surplus uncovered by the largest unity. The fact that the time and space world cannot be rounded into a systematic whole indicates that it is imperfect and unreal. Again, the real must be exempt from all change and persist for all time.¹ The historical particulars do not persist for all time, they die every moment. *Loke yad ārabdham tad anityam*. We may interpret this idea in our own terms. The historical particular finishes its course when it reaches its end. If the end is not reached, if our lives are to be wasted in the pursuit of the unattainable, if it is a question of travelling perpetually and never arriving, then the world process is unmeaning and the cry that has gone forth that all is vanity becomes justified. It cannot be interminable singing, there should also be such a thing as completion in a song. If the historical process is not all, if

¹ *kālatrayasattāvam*.

we are not perpetually doomed to the pursuit of an unattainable ideal, then we must reach perfection at some point of the historical process, and that will be the transcending of our historical individuality, of our escape from birth and death, or *saṃsāra*. History is the working out of a purpose, and we are getting nearer and nearer to its fulfilment. Mokṣa is the realisation of the purpose of each individual. On the attainment of perfection the historical existence terminates.¹ When one individual completes his purpose, he develops the universality of outlook characteristic of perfection, but retains his individuality as a centre of action. When the whole universe reaches its consummation, the liberated individuals lapse into the stillness of the Absolute. Those great forces which seem to be making silently and surely for the destruction of this starry universe in which our earth swims as a speck will reach their true destination. The world fulfills itself by self-destruction. Einstein's theory of relativity with its assumption that the spatio-temporal system is limited and measurable is not unfavourable to such a dissolution of the world. But this does not take away from the free being of God who is omnipotence or infinite possibility. The curtain will drop on this world, but another possibility, another plot, another drama may commence and go on for ages.

To some, it may appear that such a collapse of the world is a poor termination to all our struggles,

¹ jñānaikanivartayatvam.

and so they picture to us an eternal heaven or even eternal hell, but the implication of these eternal states is one of eternal idleness. As Herbert Spencer put it, deviation from perfection or the perfect adjustment of the organism to the environment is decay. The state of perfection is a condition of absolute stillness, stagnation, death. There are thinkers, both in the East and the West, who look upon Paradise as a state of activity where we sing the praises of God, and he has no end of patience in listening to his own glory. The only useful work which the liberated souls do is to help struggling humanity. So long as there are individuals who are unredeemed and so stand in need of saving knowledge, the liberated have some work to do. But if we allow that the world purpose is achieved, that all individuals have attained their perfection, there is nothing to be done. Aristotle says, "Endless duration makes good no better, nor white any whiter."¹ There is no creative process without travail, and the attainment of perfection for all means the end of creative activity. "Nothing that is perfectly real moves," according to Bradley. Activity is a characteristic of the historical process, and perfection is not historical. It lacks nothing and it cannot have any activity in it.

It is sometimes argued that the world process is infinite and so there will always be work to be done. In other words, there will never come a time when all individuals will reach their perfection. But this

¹ *Nicomachean Ethics*, i. 6.

will be a frustration of the purpose of God. So long as the world process continues, the liberated souls retain their individualities, which they lose in the event of the liberation of all, or sarvamukti.

It is not fair to represent Śaṅkara's view as an illusionism. Śaṅkara repudiates the subjectivism of Vijñānavādins and affirms the extra-mental reality of objects. His theory is not *dr̥ṣṭisṭivāda*, that objects rise into being when we perceive them and disappear when we do not. We perceive objects and do not simply contemplate apparitions. Śaṅkara distinguishes dreams from waking experiences and warns us against a confusion between the two. The experiences of waking life are not contradicted by anything else in our logical knowledge.¹ He is a realist so far as our experience goes. Things control thought.² Śaṅkara's theory of *avidyā* also confirms this view. For *avidyā* is not a private possession of this or that individual mind; it is common to all minds, being the cosmic principle of finiteness. It is the cause of the whole empirical world (*pr̥thiv yālōkāpadeśa*); common to all (*sarvasādhāraṇa*). Mokṣa or release of any one individual does not bring about the destruction of the world but only the displacement of a false outlook by a true one, *avidyā* by *vidyā*. When

¹ *naivam jāgaritopalabdham vastu stambhādrukam kaśchāncid api avasthāyām bādhyate*. Commentary on *Brahma Sūtra*, ii. 2. 29.

² Cp. *na vastu yādātmyavasthānam puruṣabuddhyapekṣam*; again, *bhūtavastuviṣayānām prāmāṇyam vastu-tantram*.

the illusion of the mirage is dissipated by scientific knowledge, the illusion stands there though it is no longer able to tempt us. The world is not so much denied as reinterpreted.

Śaṅkara believes that the logical dualism between subject and object is not final. It rests on a monism. Subject and object are phases of spirit, *ātmana eva dharmāḥ*. They have no existence apart from Brahman. "There are in the world many universals with their particulars—both conscious and unconscious. All these universals in their graduated series are included and comprehended in one great universal, that is, Brahman as a mass of intelligence."¹ Śaṅkara does not assert an identity between God and the world but only denies the independence of the world.² As The *Tikākāra* says: "The world is not identical with Brahman; only it has no separate being independent of its ultimate source."³ When Śaṅkara denies the reality of effects, he qualifies his denial by some such phrase as "independent of the cause" or "independent of God."⁴

If we raise the question as to how the finite rises from out of the bosom of the infinite, Śaṅkara says that it is an incomprehensible mystery, *māyā*. We

¹ *anekā hi vīkṣaṇāś cetanācetanarūpāḥ sāmānyaviśeṣāḥ tesām pāramparyaगत्या ekasmin mahāsāmānye antarbhāvāḥ prajñānaghane. Śaṅkara on Brhadāranyakopaniṣad, ii. 4. 9.*

² Cp. *Bhāmati*, na khalv ananyatvam iti abhedam brūmah, kintu bhedaṁ vyāśeddhāma.

³ *kāraṇāt prthak sattāśūnyatvam sādhyate, na tu sādhyatirekeṇa.*

⁴ *kāraṇavyatirekeṇa, brahmavyatirekeṇa.*

know that there is the absolute reality, we know that there is the empirical world, we know that the empirical world rests on the Absolute, but the *how* of it is beyond our knowledge. The hypothesis of creation is a weak one, and it assumes that God lived alone for some time and then suddenly it occurred to him to have company when he put forth the world. The theory of manifestation is not more satisfying, for it is difficult to know how the finite can manifest the infinite. If we say that God is transformed into the world, the question arises whether it is the whole of God that is transformed or only a part. If it is the whole, then there is no God beyond the universe and we lapse into the lower pantheism. If it is only a part, then it means that God is capable of being partitioned. We cannot keep one part of God above and another part below. It would be like taking half a fowl for cooking, leaving the other half for laying eggs.¹ Śaṅkara believes that it is not possible to determine logically the relation between God and the world. He asks us to hold fast both ends. It does not matter if we are not able to find out where they meet.

The history of philosophy in India as well as Europe has been one long illustration of the inability of the human mind to solve the mystery of the relation of God to the world. The greatest thinkers are those who admit the mystery and comfort themselves by the idea that the human mind is not

¹ na hi kukkuṭāder ekadeśo bhogāya paçyata ekadeśas tu praçavāya kalpyate, virodhāt. Ānandagiri on *Brahma Sūtra*, i, 2-8.

² dur-nirṇā

omniscient. Śaṅkara in the East and Bradley in the West adopt this wise attitude of agnosticism. We have the universe with its distinctions. It is not self-sufficient. It rests on something else, and that is the Absolute. The relation between the two is a mystery. The idea expressed in the statement "And God saw everything that He had made and behold it was very good" does not solve the problem. It assumes that the world is "very good" and we have our doubts about it. Unable to believe that a good God could be responsible for the horrors of nature, Plato held that the goodness of God was made somewhat ineffective by the intractableness of nature which he tried in vain to control. The Gnostics strove to express the idea that God was trying to redeem a world created by the devil. Augustine from this worked out his view of "total depravity" and the scheme of salvation. Some still clung to the idea of the omnipotence of God by paying him the doubtful compliment, as J. S. Mill says, of making him the creator of the devil. Leibniz argues that even if this world is in many ways defective, it is the best of all possible worlds; but this view implies an uncomplimentary reflection on the power of God. Hegelian absolutism is unable to account for the lapse of the perfect into the imperfect. Bergson emphasises the conflict of matter and life in the world and believes that the two are the negative and positive phases of one primal consciousness, but he is not able to account for the rise of the two tendencies from the first

principle. Croce arrives at the different forms of spirit, theoretical and practical, but he does not give us any metaphysical deduction of these forms from the one spirit. If the forms are all, then there is no Absolute, and if there is the Absolute, it seems to be a sort of dissolute Absolute.

A wise agnosticism is more faithful to the situation. But the logical mind of man is not willing to admit defeat. It cannot rest in the idea that the Absolute is incomprehensible and that the world hangs on it somehow. It makes the Absolute determinate and relates the world to this determinate principle as its expression. In view of the weakness of the human mind Śaṅkara allows these metaphors. The perfection of God overflows into the world. The world is the outflow of the surplus energies of God, the supreme artist. Līlā or sport brings out the rationality, the freedom and the joyous exercise of spontaneity involved in the art of creation. We look upon God as a personal lord, and endow him with the power of self-expression and self-communication. A sterile perfection is an inconceivability. The principle of self-expression is also called māyā. It also stands for the principle of objectivity by interaction with which the subject self is able to express himself. But these attempts are devices to understand the nature of the relation of God to the world.

However that may be, no theory has ever asserted that life is a dream and all experienced events are illusions. One or two later followers of Śaṅkara

lend countenance to this hypothesis, but it cannot be regarded as representing the main tendency of Hindu thought.

The next objection goes to the opposite extreme. To the Hindu ethical rules are meaningless because the world is divine. Everything is God, and there is no excuse for our interfering with the sacred activities of the pickpocket and the perjurer. The critic believes that he refutes the theory of divine immanence associated with all forms of Indian thought when he exclaims, Is Piccadilly Circus God? is Hyde Park Corner God? The Hindu view rebels against the cold and formal conception of God who is external to the world, and altogether remote and transcendent. The natural law of the world is but a working of God's sovereign purpose. The uniformity of nature, the orderliness of the cosmos, and the steady reaching forward and upward of the course of evolution proclaim not the unconscious throbbing of a soulless engine, but the directing mind of an all-knowing spirit. The indwelling of God in the universe does not mean the identity of God with the universe. According to the latter view God is so immanent in everything that we have only to open our eyes to see God in it, but also there is nothing of God left outside the whole of things. God lies spread out before us. The world is not only a revelation, but an exhaustive revelation of God. Hindu thought takes care to emphasise the transcendent character of the Supreme. "He bears the world but is by no means lost in

it."¹ The world is in God and not God in the world. In the universe we have the separate existence of the individuals. Whether the divine spark burns dimly or brightly in the individual, the sparks are distinct from the central fire from which they issue.

Hindu thought admits that the immanence of God is a fact admitting of various degrees. While there is nothing which is not lit by God, God is more fully revealed in the organic than in the inorganic, more in the conscious than in the unconscious, more in man than in the lower creatures, more in the good man than in the evil. But even the worst of the world cannot be dismissed as completely undivine, fit only to be cast into hell fire. While Hinduism believes in the divine indwelling and declares that there is no escaping from the divine presence, it does not say that everything is God as we find it. Piccadilly is not God, though even Piccadilly cannot be unless it is allowed by divine activity. There are divine potentialities in even the worst of men, the everlasting arms of God underneath the worst sinners. No one is really beyond hope. The worst sinner has a future even as the greatest saint has had a past. No one is so good or so bad as he imagines. The great souls of the world address themselves to the task of rousing the divine possibilities in the publicans and the sinners.

The doctrine of Karma is sometimes interpreted

¹ bhūtabhṛn na ca bhūtaśtaḥ, ix. 5.

as implying a denial of human freedom which is generally regarded as the basis of all ethical values. But when rightly viewed the law does not conflict with the reality of freedom. It is the principle of science which displaces belief in magic or the theory that we can manipulate the forces of the world at our pleasure. The course of nature is determined not by the passions and prejudices of personal spirits lurking behind it but by the operation of immutable laws. If the sun pursues his daily and the moon her nightly journey across the sky, if the silent procession of the seasons moves in light and shadow across the earth, it is because they are all guided in their courses by a power superior to them all. "Verily O Gārgī, at the command of that Imperishable, the sun and the moon stand apart, the earth and the sky stand apart . . . the moments, the hours, the days, the nights, the fortnights, the months, the seasons and the years stand apart. Verily O Gārgī, at the command of that Imperishable, some rivers flow from the snowy mountains to the east, others to the west in whatever direction each flows." ¹ There is the march of necessity everywhere. The universe is lawful to the core.

The theory of Karma recognises the rule of law not only in outward nature, but also in the world of mind and morals. Rta manifests itself equally in nature and in human society. We are every moment making our characters and shaping our destinies. "There is no loss of any activity which

¹ *Bṛh. Up.*, iii. 8. 9.

we commence nor is there any obstacle to its fulfilment. Even a little good that we may do will "protect us against great odds." ¹ What we have set our hearts on will not perish with this body. This fact inspires life with the present sense of eternity.

At a time when people were doing devil's work under divine sanction and consoling themselves by attributing everything to God's will, the principle of Karma insisted on the primacy of the ethical and identified God with the rule of law. All's law, yet all's God. Karma is not a mechanical principle but a spiritual necessity. It is the embodiment of the mind and will of God. God is its supervisor, *karmādhyakṣaḥ*. ² Justice is an attribute of God. The character of God is represented by St. James as one "with whom can be no variation neither shadow that is cast by turning." Every act, every thought is weighed in the invisible but universal balance-scales of justice. The day of judgment is not in some remote future, but here and now, and none can escape it. Divine laws cannot be evaded. They are not so much imposed from without as wrought into our natures. Sin is not so much a defiance of God as a denial of soul, not so much a violation of law as a betrayal of self. We carry with us the whole of our past. It is an inefaceable record which time cannot blur nor death erase.

There is room for repentance and consequent

¹ *Bhagavadgītā*, iii. 40.

² *Svet. Uṣ.*, vi. 11.

forgiveness on this scheme. The critic who urges that belief in Karma makes religious life, prayer and worship impossible has not a right understanding of it. In his opinion God has abdicated in favour of his law. To pray to God is as futile a superstition as to bid the storm give us strength, or the earthquake to forgive us our sins. Of course the Hindu does not look upon prayer as a sort of Aladdin's lamp to produce anything we want. God is not a magician stopping the sun in its course and staying the bullet in its march. But his truth and constancy, his mercy and justice find their embodiment in the implacable working of the moral law. Forgiveness is not a mitigation of God's justice but only an expression of it. We can insist with unflinching rigour on the inexorability of the moral law and yet believe in the forgiveness of sins. Spiritual growth and experience are governed by laws similar to those which rule the rest of the universe. If we sow to the flesh we shall of the flesh reap corruption. The punishment for a desecrated body is an enfeebled understanding and a darkened soul. If we deliberately fall into sin, shutting our eyes to moral and spiritual light, we may be sure that in God's world sin will find us out and our wilful blindness will land us in the ditch. A just God cannot refuse to any man that which he has earned. The past guilt cannot be wiped away by the atoning suffering of an outward substitute.¹ Guilt cannot be transferred. It must be

¹ Cp. *munir manute mūrkhō mucyate*. The monk meditates and the fool is freed.

atoned for through the sorrow entailed by self-conquest. God cannot be bought over and sin cannot be glossed over.

— The principle of Karma reckons with the material or the context in which each individual is born. While it regards the past as determined, it allows that the future is only conditioned. The spiritual element in man allows him freedom within the limits of his nature. Man is not a mere mechanism of instincts. The spirit in him can triumph over the automatic forces that try to enslave him. The *Bhagavadgītā* asks us to raise the self by the self. We can use the material with which we are endowed to promote our ideals. The cards in the game of life are given to us. We do not select them. They are traced to our past Karma, but we can call as we please, lead what suit we will, and as we play, we gain or lose. And there is freedom.

What the individual will be cannot be predicted beforehand, though there is no caprice. We can predict an individual's acts so far as they are governed by habit, that is, to the extent his actions are mechanical and not effected by choice. But choice is not caprice. Freewill in the sense of an undetermined, unrelated, uncaused factor in human action is not admitted, but such a will defies all analysis. It has nothing to do with the general stream of cause and effect. It operates in an irregular and chaotic way. If human actions are determined by such a will, there is no meaning in punishment or training of character. The theory of Karma allows man the freedom to use the material

in the light of his knowledge. Man controls the uniformities in nature, his own mind and society. There is thus scope for genuine rational freedom while indeterminism and chance lead to a false fatalism.

The universe is not one in which every detail is decreed. We do not have a mere unfolding of a pre-arranged plan. There is no such thing as absolute prescience on the part of God, for we are all his fellow-workers. God is not somewhere above us and beyond us, he is also in us. The divine in us can, if utilised, bring about even sudden conversions. Evolution in the sense of epigenesis is not impossible. For the real is an active developing life and not a mechanical routine.

The law of Karma encourages the sinner that it is never too late to mend. It does not shut the gates of hope against despair and suffering, guilt and peril. It persuades us to adopt a charitable view towards the sinner, for men are more often weak than vicious. It is not true that the heart of man is desperately wicked and that he prefers evil to good, the easy descent to hell to the steep ascent to heaven.

Unfortunately, the theory of Karma became confused with fatality in India when man himself grew feeble and was disinclined to do his best. It was made into an excuse for inertia and timidity and was turned into a message of despair and not of hope. It said to the sinner, "Not only are you a wreck, but that is all you ever could have been. That was

your pre-ordained being from the beginning of time." I have said enough to indicate that such a philosophy of despair is not the necessary outcome of the doctrine of Karma.

Let us now turn to the practical side of Hinduism. Hinduism is more a way of life than a form of thought. While it gives absolute liberty in the world of thought it enjoins a strict code of practice. The theist and the atheist, the sceptic and the agnostic may all be Hindus if they accept the Hindu system of culture and life. Hinduism insists not on religious conformity but on a spiritual and ethical outlook in life. "The performer of the good—and not the believer in this or that view—can never get into an evil state," *na hi kalyāṇakṛt kaścit dūrgatim tāta gacchati*.¹ In a very real sense practice precedes theory. Only by doing the will does one know the doctrine. Whatever our theological beliefs and metaphysical opinions may be, we are all agreed that we should be kind and honest, grateful to our benefactors and sympathetic to the unfortunate. Hinduism insists on a moral life and draws into fellowship all who feel themselves bound to the claims which the moral law or dharma makes upon them. Hinduism is not a sect but a fellowship of all who accept the law of right and earnestly seek for the truth.

Dharma is right action. In the *R̥g Veda*, *ṛta* is the right order of the universe. It stands for both the satya or the truth of things as well as the dharma

¹ *Bhagavadgītā*, vi. 40.

or the law of evolution. Dharma formed from the root *dhṛ*, to hold, means that which holds a thing and maintains it in being. Every form of life, every group of men has its dharma, which is the law of its being. Dharma or virtue is conformity with the truth of things; *adharma* or vice is opposition to it. Moral evil is disharmony with the truth which encompasses and controls the world.

Desires constitute the springs of human action. The life of man centres round certain basic cravings, each distinct from the other in its object and each stimulating men to a particular mode of activity in order to satisfy it. If the several desires were independent of one another and never crossed or modified one another, then their different expressions would be separate and unco-ordinated. Family life will have little to do with economic pursuits. Industrial relations will be ethically colourless. Religious activities may be indifferent to the secular sides of life. But man is a whole, and so all his activities have an overarching unity. Each individual has in him the sex and the parental instincts, love of power and wealth, desire for the common good and a hunger for communion with the unseen. These different activities react upon and modify one another. They function in interdependence in man's life. If life is one, then there is one master science of life which recognises the four supreme ends of *dharma* or righteousness, *artha* or wealth, *kāma* or artistic and cultural life, and *mokṣa* or

spiritual freedom. The Hindu code of practice links up the realm of desires with the perspective of the eternal. It binds together the kingdoms of earth and heaven.

Hinduism does not believe in any permanent feud between the human world of natural desires and social aims and the spiritual life with its discipline and aspiration on the other. It condemns only natural existence which is unrelated to the background. Such a life which concentrates on this world and its good things is not satisfying; for the greatest prosperity comes to its end, dissolving into emptiness. The world and all else on which we pin our faith will desert us in the moment of our triumph. The Hindu thinker dwells on the evanescence of the world and its pitiful futility if its connection with the eternal is snapped.

All worldly relationships have their end, but they cannot be ignored. To behave as if they do not exist simply because they do not persist is to court disaster. The eternal is manifested in the temporal, and the latter is the pathway to the former. Truth in the finite aspect leads us to infinite truth. Renunciation is the feeling of detachment from the finite as finite and attachment to the finite as the embodiment of the infinite. The two are bound to each other and to separate them is ruinous. The Upaniṣad says : " In darkness are they who worship only the world, but in greater darkness they who worship the infinite alone. He who accepts both saves himself from death by the knowledge of the

former and attains immortality by the knowledge of the latter."

Artha takes note of the economic and the political life of man, the craving for power and property. The urge which gives rise to property is something fundamental in human nature. Unless we change the very constitution of the human mind, we cannot eradicate the idea of property. For most men property is the medium for the expression of personality and intercourse with others.

While the pursuit of wealth and happiness is a legitimate human aspiration, they should be gained in ways of righteousness (dharma), if they are to lead ultimately to the spiritual freedom of man (mokṣa). Each one of these ends requires ethical discipline. Freedom can be obtained only through bonds of discipline and surrender of personal inclination. To secure the freedom to acquire and to enjoy we have to limit ourselves and bind our will in certain ways. The countries which are politically free are largely bound in thought and practice. Political freedom is not possible without a large curtailment of freedom of thought and action. In the interests of spiritual freedom Hindu society regulated the most intimate details of daily life, and they are the rules of dharma. These rules are not the same in all parts of the country or in all periods of Hindu history. The Hindu legislators accepted the bewildering variety of customs professed by the tribes in India as the civilisation spread from the Indus to the Cape. The law books recognise the

variety, though they try to refine whatever seems to be morally objectionable.¹ While recognising them all an ideal standard is enjoined which imperceptibly brings about a refinement of the customs. According to the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, the young man is asked in cases of doubt to take as his authority what is done in similar circumstances by the Brahmins "competent to judge, apt and devoted but not harsh, lovers of virtue." Manu urges that the conduct of good people (*sadbhiḥ*) and righteous souls of the regenerate classes (*dhārmikais ca dvijātibhiḥ*) may be regarded as consistent (*aviruddham*) with the customs of all countries, families and castes.

Mokṣa is spiritual realisation. The Hindu Dharma says, Man does not live by bread alone, nor by his work, capital, ambition or power or relations to external nature. He lives or must live by his life of spirit. Mokṣa is self-emancipation, the fulfilment of the spirit in us in the heart of the eternal. This is what gives ultimate satisfaction, and all other activities are directed to the realisation of this end.

As to the methods of obtaining freedom, the Hindu thinker adopted a very catholic attitude. "As the birds fly in the air, as the fish swim in the sea, leaving no traces behind, even so is the pathway to God traversed by the seeker of spirit."²

The different pathways have been broadly dis-

¹ See Baudhāyana, Bṛhaspati, Devala, Gautama.

² *śakunīnām ivākāśe jale vāricarāṇa iva
yathā padam na dṛśyeta tathā jñānavidāṃ gatiḥ.*

tinguished into the three types of jñāna, wisdom, bhakti or devotion, karma or service. The three are not exclusive, but emphasise the dominant aspects. Wisdom (jñāna) does not mean intellectual acumen or dialectical power. Jñāna is realised experience. We are saved from sin only when we live in the presence of God. If we have true insight, right action will take care of itself. Truth cannot but act rightly. The way of devotion is the most popular one. Sinners as well as saints, ignorant as well as learned, foolish as well as wise find it easy. Prayer and petition, fasting and sacrifice, communion and self-examination, all are included in the life of devotion. In its highest flights, bhakti coincides with jñāna, and both these issue in right karma or virtuous life.

While the individual and the social sides of karma are inseparably intertwined, the theory of varṇa or caste emphasises the social aspect, and that of āśrama or stages of life the individual aspect. The four stages of brahmacarya or the period of training, gārhastya or the period of work for the world as a householder, vānaprasthya or the period of retreat for the loosening of the social bonds, and saṅṅyāsa or the period of renunciation and expectant awaiting of freedom indicate that life is a pilgrimage to the eternal life through different stages.

The first period is that of training and discipline of body and mind. Plastic youth is moulded to a life of duty. The student is required to live for a fixed period in the house of his teacher, where he is

taught the arts and sciences which would be useful to him in after life. Women were also entitled to brahmacharya.¹ They were given the training of their classes, and thus enabled to take up the functions of the caste in the emergencies of life. Restrictions regarding Vedic study were introduced when women of other racial stocks with different customs were accepted in marriage.

The second stage is that of the householder or the grhastha. • A human being is not ordinarily self-sufficing. The God of Aristotle may enjoy his solitary existence, but not the men and women of the world. These are as a rule encouraged to enter the married life.² India has known for centuries what Freud is popularising in Europe, that repressed desires are more corrupting in their effects than those exercised openly and freely. Monastic tendencies were discouraged until one had a normal expression of natural impulses. He who runs back from marriage is in the same boat with one who runs away from battle. Only failures in life avoid

¹ purā kalpeṣu nārīṇāṃ mauñjibandhanam iṣyate
adhyāpanam ca vedānāṃ sāvitṛivacanam tathā.

² According to *Harita Smṛiti* (xx. 23), quoted by Sāyaṇa in his commentary on *Parāśara Saṃhitā* (Bombay Sanskrit Series, Part II, p. 82), girls are divided into two classes : Brahmvādinīs, or those who are devoted to sacred wisdom, and Sadyovadhūs, or those who get married. Some of the well-known women of early Sanskrit literature, like Gārgī in the *Bṛh. Up.*, Sulabhā in *Mahābhārata*, Śabarī in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, lived unmarried lives. The Hindu social code deals not so much with such exceptional cases as with the typical course and its functional rule. It legislates for the normal.

occasions for virtue. Marriage is regarded as sacred. The very gods are married. When the Hindu descends from the adoration of the Absolute and takes to the worship of a personal god, his god has always a consort. He does not worship a bachelor or a virgin. Śiva is ardhanaṛīśvara, and his image signifies the co-operative interdependent, separately incomplete but jointly complete masculine and feminine functions of the supreme being. There is nothing unwholesome or guilty about the sex life. Through the institution of marriage it is made the basis of intellectual and moral intimacies. Marriage is not so much a concession to human weakness as a means of spiritual growth. It is prescribed for the sake of the development of personality as well as the continuance of the family ideal. Marriage has this social side. Every family is a partnership between the living and the dead. The Śrāddha ceremony is intended to impress the idea of the family solidarity on the members. At the end of the ceremony the performer asks, "Let me, O fathers! have a hero for a son."¹

The Hindu ideal emphasises the individual and the social aspects of the institution of marriage. Man is not a tyrant nor is woman a slave, but both are servants of a higher ideal to which their individual inclinations are to be subordinated. Sensual love is sublimated into self-forgetful devotion. Marriage for the Hindu is a problem and not a

¹ *vīraṃ me datta pitarah.* Cp. the Vedic prayer, May we have great heroes amongst us. *Suvīraṣo bhavema.*

datum. Except in the pages of fiction we do not have a pair agreeing with each other in everything, tastes and temper, ideals and interests. Irreducible peculiarities there will always be, and the task of the institution of marriage is to use these differences to promote a harmonious life. Instincts and passions are the raw material which are to be worked up into an ideal whole. Though there is some choice with regard to our mates, there is a large element of chance in the best of marriages. Carve as we will that mysterious block of which our life is made, the black vein of destiny or chance, whatever we may call it, appears again and again in it. That marriage is successful which transforms a chance mate into a life companion. Marriage is not the end of the struggle, it is but the beginning of a strenuous life where we attempt to realise a larger ideal by subordinating our private interests and inclinations. Service of a common ideal can bind together the most unlike individuals. Love demands its sacrifices. By restraint and endurance, we raise love to the likeness of the divine.

In an ideal marriage the genuine interests of the two members are perfectly reconciled. The perfectly ethical marriage is the monogamous one. The relation of Rāma and Sītā, or Sāvitrī and Satyavān, where the two stand by each other against the whole world, is idealised in the Hindu scriptures. In the absence of absolute perfection we have to be content with approximations. We need not, however, confound the higher with the

lower. Eight different kinds of marriages are recognised in the Hindu law books. Manu did not shut his eyes to the practices of his contemporaries. He arranges the different kinds of marriages in an order. While marriages in which personal inclination is subordinated rank high, those by mutual choice (*gāndharva*), force (*rākṣasa*), purchase (*āśura*) come lower. The lowest is *paśāca*. When the lover ravishes a maiden without her consent, when she is asleep, or intoxicated or deranged in mind, we have a case of *paśāca* marriage.¹ It is a very low kind of marriage, but admitted as valid with the laudable motive of giving the injured women the status of wives and their offspring legitimacy.

Insistence on the interests of the family led to a compromise of the monogamous ideal. While the monogamous ideal is held up as the best, polygamy was also tolerated. When you have no male offspring, or when, by mistake or chance, you seduce a woman when you are married, it is your duty to protect her from desertion and from public scorn, save her from a life of infamy and degradation, and protect her children who are in no way responsible for the ways of their parents; polygamy is permissible. The story of the *Rāmāyana* has for one of its chief lessons the evils of polygamy. The palace of Daśaratha was a centre of intrigue, and Rāma, the hero of the story, stands up for the monogamous ideal.

A system which looks upon marriage as com-

¹ *Manu*, iii. 34.

pulsory for all has its own weaknesses, though it does not develop large numbers of unmarried women who see no meaning in life. It is obliged to discountenance the remarriage of widows.¹ It unconsciously tends to lower the marriageable age of girls. It is necessary for the leaders to remember the Hindu ideas and bring about a more satisfactory state of affairs.

The recognition of the spiritual ideal of marriage requires us to regard the marriage relation as an indissoluble one. So long as we take a small view of life and adopt for our guide the fancy or feeling of the moment, marriage relation cannot be regarded as permanent. In the first moments of infatuation we look upon our partners as angels from heaven, but soon the wonder wears away, and if we persist in our passion for perfection, we become agitated and often bitter. The unrest is the effect of a false ideal. The perfect relation is to be created and not found. The existence of incompatibility is a challenge to a more vigorous effort. To resort to divorce is to confess defeat. The misfits and the maladjustments are but failures.

Modern conditions are responsible for the large numbers of divorces and separations. Life has become too hurried. We have no time to understand one another. To justify our conduct, we are setting up exaggerated claims on behalf of the individual will and are strongly protesting

¹ But see *R̥g Veda*, x. 18. 8; *Āśvalāyana*, iv. 2. 18; *Agni Purāṇa*, cliij.

against-discipline¹ We are confusing self-expression and self-development with a life of instincts and passions. We tend to look upon ourselves as healthy animals and not spiritual beings. We have had sin with us from the beginning of our history, but we have recently begun to worship it. It is not very modern for a man or woman who is sick of his or her partner to take to another, but what is really modern is the new philosophy in justification of it. Disguised feeling is masquerading as advanced thought. The woman who gives up her husband for another is idealised as a heroine who has had the courage to give up the hypocritical moral codes and false sentiments, while she who clings to her husband through good report and bad is a cowardly victim of conventions. Sex irregularities are becoming less shocking and more popular.

Though we have had our share of exaggerating the wickedness of women, and though we have some texts which regard the woman as the eternal temptress of the man Adam, a snare of perdition, as Donaldson expressed it, "a fireship continually striving to get alongside the male man-of-war and to blow him up into pieces," the general Hindu view of woman is an exalted one. It regards the woman as the helpmate of man in all his work, *sahadharminī*.¹ The Hindu believes in the speciality

¹ Sāyana, commenting on *Rig Veda*, v. 61. 8, says: "The wife and the husband, being the equal halves of one substance, are equal in every respect; both should join and take equal part in all work, religious and secular." This ideal is lowered in some passages of *Manu* and *Yājñavalkya*.

of the contribution which women makes to the world. She has special responsibilities and special duties. Even such an advanced thinker as Mrs. Bertrand Russell allows that "each class and sex has that to give to the common stock of achievement, knowledge and thought which it alone can give, and robs itself and the community by inferior imitation."¹ So long as children cannot be shaken from heaven, but have to be built within their mothers' bodies, so long will there be a specific function for women. As the bearing and rearing of children take a good deal of their time and attention, women were relieved of the economic responsibilities for the family. While man is expected to take to the worldly pursuits (*yajña-prādhānya*), woman is capable of great heights of self-control and self-denial (*tapa-prādhānya*). The stricter code of morality applied to women is really a compliment to them, for it accepts the natural superiority of the women. But the modern woman, if I may say so, is losing her self-respect. She does not respect her own individuality and uniqueness, but is paying an unconscious tribute to man by trying to imitate him. She is fast becoming masculine and mechanical. Adventurous pursuits are leading her into conflict with her own inner nature.

The third stage arises when the responsibilities of home are given up. The wife accompanies the husband to the forest, if she shares his spiritual

¹ *Hypatia* (1925).

aims. According to Manu, one must enter the third stage when one becomes a grandfather, or one's skin begins to show wrinkles or one's hair turns grey. When one's bodily powers wane, it is time to depart to the forest and prepare oneself for the true life of the spirit. The main objective of this stage is to escape from the bustle of life into the solitude of the forest to meditate on the higher problems.

The stature of man is not to be reduced to the requirements of the society. Man is much more than the custodian of its culture or protector of his country or producer of its wealth. His social efficiency is not the measure of his spiritual manhood. The soul which is our spiritual life contains our infinity within it. What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world but lose his own soul? A Sanskrit verse reads: "For the family sacrifice the individual; for the community the family; for the country the community, and for the soul the whole world."¹ Family and country, nation and the world cannot satisfy the soul in man. Each individual is called upon at a certain stage of his life to give up his wife and children and his caste and work. The last part of life's road has to be walked in single file.

The aim of the saññyāsin is not to free himself from the cares of outward life, but to attain a state of spiritual freedom when he is not tempted by riches or honour; and is not elated by success or depressed by failure. He develops a spirit of
 atmārthe prthivīm tyajet.

equanimity and so "bears patiently improper words and does not insult anyone; he does not hate anyone for the sake of his physical body."¹ These free men are solitary souls who have not any personal attachments or private ambitions, but embody in their own spirit the freedom of the world. They take on the wideness of the whole earth,² dwell in love and walk in righteousness. The social order regards the saññyāsin as a parasite since he does not contribute to it materially and does not care for its forms. The state looks on him with suspicion as he does not profess any loyalty to any family or church, race or nation. He does not function in any industrial factory, social system or political machine. These saññyāsins do not serve our policies that make the world unsafe for human life, do not promote our industries that mechanise persons, and do not support our national egoisms that provoke wars. Patriotism is not enough for these fine souls. Life, and not India's life or England's life, demands their devotion. They look upon all men and all groups as equal (*samatā sarvasmin*).

While some forms of Christianity and Buddhism judge the life of the world to be inferior to the life of the monk, and would have loved to place the whole of mankind at one swoop in the cloister, Hinduism while appreciating the life of the saññyāsin, refrained from condemning the state of the householder. Every state is necessary, and in so far as it is necessary it is good. The blossom does not

¹ *Manu*, vi. 47 ff.

² Cp. *vārāṇasī medinī*.

deny the leaf and the leaf does not deny the stalk nor the stalk the root. The general rule is that we should pass from stage to stage gradually.

The liberated soul is not indifferent to the welfare of the world.¹ It is related of Buddha that when he was on the threshold of nirvāṇa he turned away and took the vow never to cross it so long as a single being remained subject to sorrow and suffering. The same idea comes out in the sublime verse of the *Bhāgavata*: "I desire not the supreme state (of bliss) with its eight perfections, nor the cessation of rebirth. May I take up the sorrow of all creatures who suffer and enter into them so that they may be made free from grief." Mahādeva the prince of ascetics drank poison for the sake of the world. Freedom on the highest level of existence expresses itself on the lower as courage to suffer, sacrifice, and die.

This fourfold plan of life yet dominates the Hindu mind. The general character of a society is not always best expressed by the mass of its members. There exists in every community a natural élite, which better than all the rest represents the soul of the entire people, its great ideals, its strong emotions and its essential tendency. The whole community looks to them as their example. When the wick is ablaze at its tip, the whole lamp is said to be burning.

¹. Renunciation is the surrendering of the notions of I and mine, and not the giving up of the work enjoined by the scriptures. ahaṁkāra mama kāra tyāga eva saññīyāso vakṣyate nā'śeṣaśāstrārthatyāgaḥ. Medhātithi on *Manu*, vi. 32.

LECTURE IV

HINDU DHARMA : II

THE institution of caste illustrates the spirit of comprehensive synthesis characteristic of the Hindu mind with its faith in the collaboration of races and the co-operation of cultures. Paradoxical as it may seem, the system of caste is the outcome of tolerance and trust. Though it has now degenerated into an instrument of oppression and intolerance, though it tends to perpetuate inequality and develop the spirit of exclusiveness, these unfortunate effects are not the central motives of the system. If the progressive thinkers of India had the power, as they undoubtedly have the authority, they would transform the institution out of recognition. It is not my purpose this evening to relate the evils of the system ; I wish to draw your attention to the underlying principles.

Any survey of the castes of the present day will reveal the complex origin of the institution. Castes are of many kinds, tribal, racial, sectarian, occupational. Some are due to migration. When members of an old caste migrate to a different part of the country, they become a new caste.

As it is clear from the Sanskrit word *varṇa*, caste

had originally reference to colour. If we look into the past history of India, we see how the country has been subjected to one race invasion after another. Even at the beginning of her history India was peopled by various racial groups, the dark aboriginal tribes, the sturdy Dravidians, the yellow-skinned Mongols and the blithe forceful Aryans. Very soon she developed intimate intercourse with the Persians, the Greeks and the Scythians, and some of these settled down in India. No other country in the world has had such racial problems as India.

Regarding the solution of the problem of racial conflicts the different alternatives which present themselves are those of extermination, subordination, identification or harmonisation. The first course has been adopted often in the course of the history of the world. The trail of man is dotted with the graves of countless communities which reached an untimely end. But is there any justification for this violation of human life? Have we any idea of what the world loses when one racial culture is extinguished? It is true that the Red Indians have not made, to all appearance, any contribution to the world progress, but have we any clear understanding of their undeveloped possibilities which, in God's good time, might have come to fruition? Do we know so much of ourselves and the world and God's purpose as to believe that our civilisation, our institutions and our customs are so immeasurably superior to those of others,

not only what others actually possess but what exists in them potentially? We cannot measure beforehand the possibilities of a race. Civilisations are not made in a day, and had the fates been kindlier and we less arrogant in our ignorance, the world, I dare say, would have been richer for the contributions of the Red Indians. Our civilisation is quite recent when compared with the antiquity of man and the differentiation of human types. Some of the ancestors of the Great British people who are now in the vanguard of humanity were not much advanced as depicted by Julius Cæsar. Who could understand the great potentialities of the savages of Britain dressed in skins at their religious worship burning men alive to appease their gods? No one acquainted with the ancestors of the Teutons would have anticipated for them their glorious contributions to music and metaphysics. Human potentiality is so great, and our knowledge of fundamental racial differences so little, that the cruel repression and extermination of races is not the part of wisdom. A little understanding of human nature and history will enable us to sympathise with the savage and the primitive, the barbarous and the backward, and help us to see that they also in their imperfect fashions are struggling towards that abiding city which shines in dazzling splendour up the steep and narrow way. Every people, every tribe however little advanced in its stage of development, represents a certain psychic type or pattern. The interests of humanity require

that every type should be assisted and educated to its adequate expression and development. No race lives to itself and no race dies to itself. Besides, the backwardness of races is due to environmental conditions, physical, social and cultural. Races show considerable powers of adaptation when an external stimulus is applied to them.

When extermination is impossible, the powerful races of the world adopt the second alternative of subordination. They act on the maxim, spare the slave and smash the rebel. The superior races of the world cannot have a clean conscience if they remember their dealings with the coloured ones on the Congo, in Brazil, in Peking at the time of the Boxer revolution, and in America to-day. We have had recently Lord Milner's confession of faith. For him the British Empire means the *brotherhood* of communities of like *blood* and the mastery of the British race over the non-British dependencies. Civilisation is not the suppression of races less capable of or less advanced in culture by people of higher standing. God does not give us the right to destroy or enslave the weak and the unfit. One race may not be as clever or as strong as another, and yet the highest idealism requires that we should give equality of opportunity even to unequal groups. We must respect the independence of every people and lead the backward ones to a full utilisation of the opportunities of their environment and a development of their distinctive natural characteristics.

Racial fusion on a large scale is an impossibility, if it is to be achieved in a short period of time. For long centuries of social tradition and natural inheritance have produced marked divergencies of temperament, mentality and physique which cannot be destroyed at a stroke. Nor is it necessary to do away with race individualities and differences to solve the race problem. Uniformity is not the meaning of unity.

In dealing with the problem of the conflict of the different racial groups, Hinduism adopted the only safe course of democracy, viz. that each racial group should be allowed to develop the best in it without impeding the progress of others. Every historical group is unique and specific and has an ultimate value, and the highest morality requires that we should respect its individuality. Caste, on its racial side, is the affirmation of the infinite diversity of human groups. Though the Vedic Aryans started their life in India with a rigid and narrow outlook, regarding themselves as a sort of chosen people, they soon became universal in intention and developed an ethical code applicable to the whole of humanity, a mānavadharmā. Those who tried to bring together different races in India, are worshipped as the makers of the Hindu society. Rāma used the aboriginal tribes in the work of civilising the South. He brought together the Aryans and the non-Aryans, and so did Kṛṣṇa and Buddha.

When the aboriginal tribes and others accepted

the Hindu standpoint they did not surrender their own individuality, but modified it as well as the Hindu spirit which they absorbed. The change is as much in the new group form as in the old ideal. The tribes were admitted into the larger life of Hinduism with the opportunities and the responsibilities which that life gave them, the opportunities to share in the intellectual and cultural life of the Hindus and the responsibilities of contributing to its thoughts, its moral advancement and its spiritual worth—in short, to all that makes a nation's life. Each group dealt with the Hindu ideas in its own characteristic way. We need not overrate the stagnation of the aboriginal tribes. They were also raised above the welter of savagery and imbued with the spirit of gentleness. Sheltered on the same soil, bound together by common interests, evolving under the influence of common psychic and moral surroundings, the different component tribes not only improved in their level but became adapted to each other in spite of diversity of origin. Mr. Valentine Chirol remarks: "The supple and subtle forces of Hinduism had already in prehistoric times welded together the discordant beliefs and customs of a vast variety of races into a comprehensive fabric sufficiently elastic to shelter most of the indigenous populations of India, and sufficiently rigid to secure the Aryan Hindu ascendancy."¹

Indiscriminate racial amalgamation was not en-

¹ *India: Old and New* (1921), pp. 42-3.

couraged by the Hindu thinkers. The Hindu scriptures recognised the rules about food and marriage which the different communities were practising. What we regard as the lower castes have their own taboos and customs, laws and beliefs which they have created for themselves in the course of ages. Every member of the group enters into the possession of the inheritance bequeathed. It is the law of use and wont that distinguishes one group from its neighbours. Caste is really custom.¹ Crude and false as the customs and beliefs of others may seem to us, we cannot deny that they help the community adopting them to live at peace with itself and in harmony with others. It is a point of social honour for every member to marry within his own caste, and a "low" caste woman would refuse to marry one outside her caste, even if it be from a "higher" one.

Though the Hindu theory of caste does not favour the indiscriminate crossing of men and women, interbreeding has been practised, largely unconsciously, and the essential differences of tribes were modified. Purely anthropological groups are found only among primitive and savage peoples, and not in societies which play a part in the march of humanity. There has been a general infusion of foreign blood into the Hindu race, and within the race itself there has been a steady flow of blood from the Brahmin to the Caṇḍāla. The inter-

¹ na kulam kulam ity āhur ācāram kulam ucyate.

mixture of blood has been carefully regulated by means of anuloma and pratiloma marriages, though the tendency to indiscriminate crossing was not encouraged. While Manu recommends marriages of members of the same caste (savarna) he tolerates marriages of men with women of the "lower castes" (anuloma). Though he does not justify pratiloma marriages, i.e. marriages of women of the "higher" castes with men of the "lower," he describes the various progeny of such marriages. While they were not regarded as proper there is no doubt that they prevailed. Castes of a mixed type have been formed in order to regularise the position of groups originally proceeding from marriages forbidden or discountenanced by custom or law but condoned after a time. Some of the groups which are to-day regarded as "untouchable" are said to have arisen by indiscriminate crossing.

While we are dealing with this question, it may be observed that the Hindu system did not condemn all crossing as mischievous. When the stocks are of nearly the same level, crossing is highly beneficial. The deplorable example of the Eurasians is frequently quoted, but then the two stocks happen to be widely different. Besides, the circumstances which accompany their birth and training will damage the best of men. The white man who seduces an Indian nearly always abandons her when she becomes a mother, and the child coming into the world as the product of debauchery, badly nourished and much despised, grows up generally

in conditions which are not very desirable. Not only inheritance but environment also counts.

Yet the principle of savarna marriages is not unsound. It is a difficult question to decide whether the influence of heredity is so great as to justify savarna marriages only. The question of nature *versus* nurture is still hotly debated. Democrats are quite certain that it is not blue blood or inherited traits that make for the superiority of the upper classes. The Hindu view, however, has the support of ancient Greek thought and modern science. The Greeks believed in heredity and actually developed a theory of race betterment by the weeding out of inferior strains and the multiplication of the superior ones. As early as the sixth century B.C. the Greek poet (Theognis of Megara) wrote, "We look for rams and asses and stallions of good stock, and one believes that good will come from good ; yet a good man minds not to wed the evil daughter of an evil sire. . . . Marvel not that the stock of our folk is tarnished, for the good is mingling with the base." We are all familiar with Plato's views of biological selection as the best method of race improvement. Aristotle also believed that the state should encourage the increase of superior types. There has been during the eighteenth century an increasing insistence on the natural equality of men. Adopting the views of Locke and Rousseau, the thinkers of French and American Declarations of Independence, Buckle held that men were moulded by their environments

as so much soft clay. Modern science, however, holds that this view exaggerates the influence of the environment. Progress does not depend on a mere change of surroundings. Darwin's teaching that evolution proceeds by heredity was taken up by Galton and other biologists like Weismann and De Vries, and the science of eugenics rests to-day on somewhat safe and sound foundations. The marvellous potency of the germ-plasm is shown by carefully isolating and protecting it against external influences when it steadily follows its predetermined course. Even when interfered with, it tends to overcome the opposition and resume its normal course. Every cell of our body contains tiny chromosomes, which practically determine our being, height and weight, form and colour, nervous organisation and vital energy, temperament and intelligence. Half the number of chromosomes in every cell of our body comes from the father and half from the mother, and they transmit to us most faithfully the qualities of our parents. Any stupidity or insanity of our parents, grandparents or great-grandparents will be transmitted to our children and our children's children. The Hindu thinkers, perhaps through a lucky intuition or an empirical generalisation, assumed the fact of heredity and encouraged marriages among those who are approximately the same type and quality. If a member of a first-class family marries another of poor antecedents the good inheritance of the one is debased by the bad inheritance of the other, with

the result that the child starts life with a heavy handicap. If the parents are of about the same class the child would be practically the equal of the parents.¹ Blood tells. We cannot make genius out of mediocrity or good ability out of inborn stupidity by all the aids of the environment.

It does not, however, mean that nature is all and nurture is nothing. The kind of nurture depends on the group and its type. So long as we had the caste system, both nature and nurture co-operated. There is such a thing as social heredity. Each successive generation acquires by conscious effort the social acquisitions of the groups.

¹ An interesting record of one Martin Kallakak appeared in the *Popular Science* *Siftings* the other day: "Martin Kallakak was a young soldier in the Revolutionary War. His ancestry was excellent. But in the general laxity and abnormal social conditions of war-time he forgot his noble blood. He met a physically attractive but feeble-minded girl. The result of the meeting was a feeble-minded boy. This boy grew up and married a woman who was apparently of the same low stock as himself. They produced numerous progeny. These children in turn married others of their kind, and now for six generations this strain has been multiplying. Since that night of dissipation long ago the population has been augmented by 480 souls who trace their ancestry back to Martin Kallakak and the nameless girl. Of these 143 have been feeble-minded, 33 have been immoral, 36 illegitimate, 3 epileptics, 3 criminals and 8 brothel-keepers. The original Martin, however, after sowing this appalling crop of wild oats, finally married a young Quaker woman of splendid talents and noble ancestry. From this union there have been 496 direct descendants. Many of them have been governors, soldiers, one founder of a great university, doctors, lawyers, judges, educators, land-holders, and useful citizens and admirable parents prominent in every phase of social life. The last one in evidence is now a man of wealth and influence."

If we want to prevent the suicide of the social order, some restrictions have to be observed with regard to the marital relations. Marriages should be, not necessarily in one's own caste but among members of approximately the same level of culture and social development. For castes also degenerate. As sons are expected to follow the calling of their fathers, superior individuals are not allowed to grow higher than the groups, and the inferior ones are not allowed to sink lower into their proper scale. Caste, as it is, has not made room for high-born incompetents and low-born talents. While every attempt should be made to energise the weak and the lowly by education and moral suasion, indiscriminate marriage relations do not seem to be always desirable.

Without creating great racial disturbances the Hindu spirit brought about a gradual racial harmony. The synthesis of caste started as a social organisation of different ethnic types. There is no doubt that there are many animists who have not been assimilated by Hinduism. When Hindu India lost its independence its work of assimilation and reform stopped, though the present day Hindu leaders are slowly realising their responsibilities towards them.

Caste was the answer of Hinduism to the force pressing on it from outside. It was the instrument by which Hinduism civilised the different tribes it took in. Any group of people appearing exclusive in any sense is a caste. Whenever a group repre-

sents a type a caste arises. If a heresy is born in the bosom of the mother faith and if it spreads and produces a new type, a new caste arises. The Hindu Society has differentiated as many types as can be reasonably differentiated, and is prepared to accept new ones as they arise. It stands for the ordered complexity, the harmonised multiplicity, the many in one which is the clue to the structure of the universe.

To-day many brilliant writers are warning us of a world-conflict of races. The rise of racial self-consciousness is a peculiar phenomenon of our times. The coloured peoples are clamouring for a share in the control of the world. Those who are politically subject are demanding political freedom. The conflict between emigration and immigration countries is highly acute. When the weak, the ignorant and the slothful races were wiped out or subordinated, it was argued in defence of this method that the savage races and the primitive peoples could not expect to remain undisturbed in their habitat, for the world cannot afford to let fields lie fallow and ore remain undug, and if the chance occupants of resourceful areas are too feeble and sluggish to develop them, their displacement by people who can redeem the waste places is necessary and right. The mere fact that in the chance wanderings of the race, a particular tribe happened to pitch its tent on a diamond field or an oil-well whose existence it has not guessed and whose use it has not understood, does not give that

tribe an exclusive claim to its possession. No country belongs to itself. The needs of the world are the paramount consideration. But this argument is not applied to the present conditions. While the pressure of population draws masses of men from their countries to seek employment elsewhere, and while there are immense underpopulated areas requiring intelligent labour for the development of their resources, the adjustments are not allowed to take place. America, Australia, South Africa, etc., are forbidden lands to the coloured people. Latin America is very sparsely populated, and might easily contain ten times its present number and increase its production to an almost unlimited extent. There are territories which thirst for population and others which are overflowing with it, and yet the pride of race and love of power are overriding all considerations of abstract justice and economic necessity. It is not my purpose here to deal with the practical difficulties in the way of an easy solution of the racial problem. They are great, but they can be solved only by the consciousness of the earth as one great family and an endeavour to express this reality in all our relationships. We must work for a world in which all races can blend and mingle, each retaining its special characteristics and developing whatever is best in it.

Very early in the history of Hinduism, the caste distinctions came to mean the various stratifications into which the Hindu society settled. The confusion between the tribal and the occupational is

the cause of the perpetuation of the old exclusiveness of the tribal customs in the still stringent rules which govern the constitution of each caste. Caste on its social side is a product of human organisation and not a mystery of divine appointment. It is an attempt to regulate society with a view to actual differences and ideal unity. The first reference to it is in the *Puruṣa Sūkta*, where the different sections of society are regarded as the limbs of the great self. Human society is an organic whole, the parts of which are naturally dependent in such a way that each part in fulfilling its distinctive function conditions the fulfilment of function by the rest, and is in turn conditioned by the fulfilment of its function by the rest. In this sense the whole is present in each part, while each part is indispensable to the whole. Every society consists of groups working for the fulfilment of the wants of the society. As the different groups work for a common end they are bound by a sense of unity and social brotherhood. The cultural and the spiritual, the military and the political, the economic classes and the unskilled workers constitute the four-fold caste organisation. The different functions of the human life were clearly separated and their specific and complementary character was recognised. Each caste has its social purpose and function, its own code and tradition. It is a close corporation equipped with a certain traditional and independent organisation, observing certain usages regarding food and marriage. Each group is free

to pursue its own aims free from interference by others. The functions of the different castes were regarded as equally important to the well-being of the whole. The serenity of the teacher, the heroism of the warrior, the honesty of the business man, and the patience and energy of the worker all contribute to the social growth. Each has its own perfection.

The rules of caste bring about an adjustment of the different groups in society. The Brahmins were allowed freedom and leisure to develop the spiritual ideals and broadcast them. They were freed from the cares of existence, as gifts to them by others were encouraged and even enjoined. They are said to be above class interests and prejudices, and to possess a wide and impartial vision. They are not in bondage to the State, though they are consulted by the State. The State, as one of the groups in society, was essentially military in its organisation. Its specific function was to preserve peace and order, and see to it that the different groups worked in harmony and no confusion of functions arose. The Government was an executive organisation expected to carry out the best interests of the people. The Brahmins, as the advisors of the Government, point out the true interests of society.

The political and the economic life of the community is expected to derive its inspiration from the spiritual. This principle saved the State from becoming a mere military despotism. The sovereign power is not identified with the interests of the

governing classes but with those of the people at large. While dharma represents the totality of the institutions by which the commonweal is secured and the life of the people is carried on, Government is the political organisation which secures for all the conditions under which the best life can be developed. The State did not include the other institutions, trade guilds, family life, etc., which were allowed freedom to manage their own affairs. It did not interfere with art, science and religion, while it secured the external conditions of peace and liberty necessary for them all. To-day, the functions of the State are practically unlimited, and embrace almost the whole of social life.

In spite of its attachment to the principle of non-violence, Hindu society made room for a group dedicated to the use of force. As long as human nature is what it is, as long as society has not reached its highest level, we require the use of force. So long as society has individuals who are hostile to all order and peace, it has to develop controls to check the anti-social elements. These anti-social forces gather together for revolt when the structure of society is shaken by war or internal dissensions. It is a great tribute to the relative soundness of the social structure in Great Britain, in all its strata, that the general strike which continued for nine days was marked by such little criminality and rowdyism.

The economic group of the Vaiśyas were required to suppress greed and realise the moral respon-

sibilities of wealth. Property is looked upon as an instrument of service. In the great days of Hinduism, the possessor of property regarded it as a social trust and undertook the education, the medical relief, the water supply and the amusements of the community. Unfortunately at the present day in almost all parts of the world, the strain of money-making has been so great that many people are breaking down under it. Love of wealth is disrupting social life and is tending to a suppression of the spiritual. Wealth has become a means of self-indulgence, and universal greed is the cause of much meanness and cruelty, which we find in the world. Hinduism has no sympathy with the view that "to mix religion and business is to spoil two good things." We ought not to banish eternal values from life.

The unskilled workers and the peasants form the proletariat. These castes are the actual living members of the social body each centred in itself and working alongside one another in co-operation. When a new group is taken into the fold of Hinduism, it is affiliated with one of the four castes. Many of the races from outside were accepted as Kṣatriyas. Mr. Jackson writes : "Those Indians indeed have a poor opinion of their country's greatness who do not realise how it has tamed and civilised the nomads of Central Asia, so that wild Turcoman tribes have been transformed into some of the most famous of the Rajput royal races." 1

¹ *Indian Antiquary*, January 1911.

The system of caste insists that the law of social life should not be cold and cruel competition, but harmony and co-operation. Society is not a field of rivalry among individuals. The castes are not allowed to compete with one another. A man born in a particular group is trained to its manner, and will find it extremely hard to adjust himself to a new way. Each man is said to have his own specific nature (*svabhāva*) fitting him for his own specific function (*svadharma*), and changes of *dharma* or function are not encouraged. A sudden change of function when the nature is against its proper fulfilment may simply destroy the individuality of the being. We may wish to change or modify our particular mode of being, but we have not the power to effect it. Nature cannot be hurried by our desires. The four castes represent men of thought, men of action, men of feeling, and others in whom none of these is highly developed.¹ Of course, these are the dominant and not the exclusive characters, and there are all sorts of permutations and combinations of them which constitute adulterations (*sankara*) and mixture (*miśrajāti*). The author of the *Bhagavadgītā* believes that the divisions of caste are in accordance with each man's character and aptitude.² Karma is adapted to *guṇa*, and our qualities in nature can be altered only gradually. Since we cannot determine in each individual case

¹ Cp. also, *sadguṇo brāhmaṇo varṇaḥ kṣatriyasto rajo-
guṇaḥ*

tamogūṇaḥ tathā vaiśyaḥ saṃskṛtānta śūdras.

² iii. 21; xvii. 13, 41, 45-6.

what the aptitudes of the individuals are, heredity and training are used to fix the calling. Though the functions were regarded as hereditary, exceptions were freely allowed. We can learn even from lowly persons. All people possess all qualities though in different degrees. The Brahmin has in him the possibilities of a warrior. The *r̥sis* of old were agriculturists and sometimes warriors too.

The caste idea of vocation as service, with its traditions and spiritual aims, never encouraged the notion of work as a degrading servitude to be done grudgingly and purely from the economic motive. The perfecting of its specific function is the spiritual aim which each vocational group set to itself. The worker has the fulfilment of his being through and in his work. According to the *Bhagavadgītā*, one obtains perfection if one does one's duty in the proper spirit of non-attachment. The cant of the preacher who appeals to us for the deep-sea fishermen on the ground that they daily risk their lives, that other people may have fish for their breakfasts, ignores the effect of the work on the worker. They go to sea not for us and our breakfasts but for the satisfaction of their being. Our convenience is an accident of their labours. Happily the world is so arranged that each man's good turns out to be the good of others. The loss of artistic vitality has affected much our industrial population. A building craftsman of the old days had fewer political rights, less pay and less comfort too, but he was more happy as he enjoyed his work. Our

workers who enjoy votes will call him a slave simply because he did not go to the ballot-box. But his work was the expression of his life. The worker, whether a mason or a bricklayer, blacksmith or carpenter, was a member of a great co-operative group initiated into the secrets of his craft at an impressionable age. He was dominated by the impulse to create beauty. Specialisation has robbed the worker of pride in craft. Work has now become business, and the worker wants to escape from it and seeks his pleasure outside in cinemas and music-halls. While the social aspirations of the working classes for a fuller life are quite legitimate, there is unfortunately an increasing tendency to interpret welfare in terms of wealth. The claims of materialism are more insistent in the present vision of social betterment. The improvement of human nature is the true goal of all endeavour, though this certainly requires an indispensable minimum of comfort to which the worker is entitled.

We are now face to face with class conflicts: There has grown up an intense class consciousness with elements of suspicion and hatred, envy and jealousy. We are no more content to bring up our children in our own manner of life, but are insisting that all doors must be opened to those equipped with knowledge. The difficulties are due to the fact that some occupations are economically more paying, and all wish to knock at the paying doors. Democracy is so interpreted as to justify

not only the very legitimate aspiration to bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth, but also the increasing tendency for a levelling down of all talent. This is not possible. There will always be men of ability who lead and direct, and others who will obey and follow. Brains and character will come to the top, and within the framework of democracy we shall have an aristocracy of direction. It is not true that all men are born equal in every way, and everyone is equally fit to govern the country or till the ground. The functional diversities of workers cannot be suppressed. Every line of development is specific and exclusive. If we wish to pursue one we shall have to turn our attention away from others. While we should remove the oppressive restrictions, dispel the ignorance of the masses, increase their self-respect, and open to them opportunities of higher life, we should not be under the illusion that we can abolish the distinctions of the genius and the fool, the able organiser and the submissive worker. Modern democracies tend to make us all mere "human beings," but such beings exist nowhere.

India has to face in the near future the perils of industrialism. In factory labour where men are mechanised, where they have little to do with the finished product, and cannot take any pleasure in its production, work is mere labour, and it does not satisfy the soul. If such mechanical work cannot be done by machines, if men have to do it, the less of it they have to do the better for them.

The more the work tends to become mechanical and monotonous, the more necessary is it that the worker should have larger leisure and a better equipment for the intelligent use of it. The standard of employment must be raised not merely in wages, but in welfare. Mechanical work should be economically more paying than even that of the artist or the statesman. For in the latter case work is its own reward. In ancient India the highest kind of work, that of preserving the treasures of spiritual knowledge, was the least paid. The Brahmin had no political power or material wealth. I think there is some justice in this arrangement, which shows greater sympathy for those whose work is soul-deadening. We have also to remember that the economic factor is not the most important in a man's life. A man's rank is not to be determined by his economic position. Gambling peers are not higher than honest artisans. The exaltation of the economic will lead to a steady degradation of character. Again, we should not forget that the individuals who constitute the nation cannot all pursue the one occupation of political leadership or military power, but will be distributed into many employments, and these will tend to create distinctive habits and sympathies. Though there may be transfers from one group to another, they are not likely to be numerous.

We are not so certain to-day as we were a century ago that the individualistic conception of society is the last word in social theory. The moral

advantages of the spiritual view of society as an organic whole are receiving greater attention. A living community is not a loose federation of competing groups of traders and teachers, bankers and lawyers, farmers and weavers, each competing against all the rest for higher wages and better conditions. If the members of the different groups are to realise their potentialities, they must share a certain community of feeling, a sense of belonging together for good or evil. There is much to be said from this point of view for the system of caste which adheres to the organic view of society and substitutes for the criterion of economic success and expediency a rule of life which is superior to the individual's interests and desires. Service of one's fellows is a religious obligation. To repudiate it is impiety.

Democracy is not the standardising of everyone so as to obliterate all peculiarity. We cannot put our souls in uniform. That would be dictatorship. Democracy requires the equal right of all to the development of such capacity for good as nature has endowed them with. If we believe that every type means something final, incarnating a unique possibility, to destroy a type will be to create a void in the scheme of the world. Democracy should promote all values created by the mind. Each kind of service is equally important for the whole. Society is a living organism, one in origin and purpose though manifold in its operations. There can be no real freedom in any section or class

in a society so long as others are in bondage. It is a truly democratic ideal that is uttered in the words, "May all cross safely the difficult places of life, may all see the face of happiness, may all reach that right knowledge, may all rejoice everywhere."¹ While the system of caste is not a democracy in the pursuit of wealth or happiness, it is a democracy so far as the spiritual values are concerned, for it recognises that every soul has in it something transcendent and incapable of gradations, and it places all beings on a common level regardless of distinctions of rank and status, and insists that every individual must be afforded the opportunity to manifest the unique in him. Economically we are a co-operative concern or brotherhood where we give according to our capacity and take according to our needs. Politically we enjoy equal rights in the sight of law, and these two enable us to attain true spiritual freedom. A just organisation of society will be based on spiritual liberty, political equality and economic fraternity.

In the social order we find that one dominant group invariably subordinates others. Under the feudal constitution of society the exercise of the military function was most esteemed. In modern capitalist organisations wealth dominates. In the Hindu scheme the cultural forms the highest and the economic the lowest, for the cultural and the spiritual are ends in themselves and are not pursued

¹ sarvas taratu durgāṇi sarvo bhadraṇi paśyatu
sarvas tad buddhim āpnotu sarvas sarvatra nandatu.

for the sake of anything else. The highest in the social hierarchy is the true Brahmin, in whom we find a complete union of opposites, a self-sacrifice which is true freedom, a perfect self-control which is perfect service, absence of personal ambition along with the most intense devotion to the world. The valiant knight, the kṣatriya hero, is not the ideal of India, for he has not the vision of the whole. He identifies himself with one part as against another. He has always something opposed to him which he aims at overpowering. The Brahmin sage who sees the whole of life stands above parties and is centred in the whole surveying all manifestations. He would be untrue to himself if he identified himself with one part as against another. If he does not fight it is not because he rejects all fighting as futile, but because he has finished his fights. He has overcome all dissensions between himself and the world and is now at rest. Both Buddha and Christ were tempted by the Evil One, who had to be defeated before they could obtain freedom. Maitrī or friendliness to all is the chief quality of the Brahmin,¹ and most of us cannot attain to it except by gradual steps. The good fighter is the preliminary to the wise sage. He who fights gallantly as a warrior gains practical insight through the battlefield and becomes mature for the divine peace of wisdom. Courage on the battlefield manifested in giving and receiving

¹ Cp. maitrī karma samasteṣu brāhmaṇasya uttamam dhanam.

wounds, in dealing death and frankly meeting it, is praised by Aristotle and many militarists. The willingness to sacrifice one's life is the mark of the superior person. Courage becomes the chief virtue of the Kṣatriya, but this type is not the highest, for Kṣatriya valour, however sublimated, is the expression of the primitive in us. We shall have wars and soldiers so long as the brute in us is untamed. Even the highly civilised men become brutal at times. The tendency to cruelty is repressed in them rather than outgrown.

In those awful moments of life when the soul stands facing a great wrong and is torn with anguish and indignation the Kṣatriya exclaims: "Now you shan't do that; I'll kill you," and the true Brahmin will say, "Do not do that; I would rather die." The higher the man, the fewer are his rights and the more numerous his duties.

While the dreamer wishes to see his ideals realised immediately and entirely, the Hindu code insists on a gradual transformation. It takes note of the laws and conditions of reality. The misguided idealist is shocked by the imperfections of man, is exasperated by the slow progress achieved, attributes to all his own enthusiasm for ideals, dreams short cuts to the millennium, and thus joins the forces of revolt. The State looks upon him as a danger to society. By protesting against the checks and controls he leaves society open to the assaults of anarchy. The wise plan is to keep our feet on earth and our eyes steady on the stars. Ideals have

to be realised through the common clay of human nature, of which the high and the low, the wise and the foolish are made. If all men were wise, life would be a simple task ; but as men are attempting to be wise with varying degrees of success, the problems of human life have the character they possess. The Hindu thinkers distinguish between the less evolved in whom the powers of self-analysis and self-direction have not arisen, and the more evolved or the twice-born who were graded into the three classes of Brahmin, Kṣatriya and Vaiśya. The different castes represent members at different stages on the road to self-realisation. However lowly a man may be, he can raise himself sooner or later by the normal process of evolution to the highest level and obtain freedom from the vicissitudes of time. Room and time are found for each to take his natural level, and everyone who shows a tendency to rise is lifted to the level of his highest capacity.

Distinctions soon began to be made among the different occupations, and the privileges and restrictions caused the degradation of some groups. Whenever the hierarchical conception tended to endanger the spiritual status and equality of the different classes, protests were uttered. All irrational snobbery was denounced. An artisan is as much a civilised man as a warrior. In the early days of the human race, it is said, there were no class distinctions, since all are born from the Supreme.¹

¹ sarvam brāhmam idam jagat. *Mahābhārata*, Śanti, p. 186.

According to the Śruti, the fishermen, the slaves and the gamblers are all divine.¹ The *Bhāgavata* makes out that there is only one class ever, as there is only one God. Manu says that all men are born unregenerate (śūdra) by the first or physical birth, but become regenerate (dvija) by the second or spiritual birth. Caste is a question of character. "One becomes a Brahmin by his deeds not by his family or birth; even a Caṇḍāla is a Brahmin if he is of pure character."² Some of the great ṛṣis worshipped by the Brahmins are half-castes and hybrids. Vasiṣṭha was born of a prostitute, Vyāsa of a fisherwoman, Parāśara of a Caṇḍāla girl.³ Conduct counts and not birth. So far as the attainment of perfection is concerned, even the "low" castes can attain as much as the "high." Kṛṣṇa says in the *Bhagavadgītā*, "Those who take refuge in me even of inferior birth, women and Śūdras, they also attain the highest state."⁴ "The outcasts who have devotion are entitled to get the saving knowledge through the name of God; women, Śūdras and degraded Brahmins are entitled to get it through the Tantras."⁵ The passion for perfection burns with as keen a flame in the destitute

¹ Brahmadāsā brahmadāsā brahmaiveme kitavāḥ.

² ix. 14. 48.

³ gaṇikāgarbhasaṁbhūto vasiṣṭhaś ca mahāmuniḥ
tapasā brāhmaṇo jātaḥ saṁskāras tatra kārṇaṁ
jātau vyāsastu kaivartyaḥ śvapākyās tu parāśaraḥ.
bahavo'nyepi vipratvam, prāptā ye pūrvam advijāḥ.

⁴ ix. 32.

⁵ antyajā pi ye bhaktā nāmajñānādhikāriṇaḥ
strīśūdrabrahmabandhūnām tantraññānādhikāritā.

as well as the opulent, the weak as well as the strong.* Love is not the possession of a class; nor is imaginative piety a commodity to be bought in markets. Social distinctions disappear so far as these gifts go.

While we all are entitled to perfection, different people are allowed to use the methods which have come down to them through their own group forms. The three upper castes are entitled to obtain perfection through the performance of Vedic sacrifices which the fourth is not allowed to do. Upanayana or initiation ceremony and Vedic study were denied to them. Society was perhaps anxious to preserve its useful members from losing their heads over them. Saving knowledge can be gained apart from Vedic study and rights. Śaṅkara allows that Śūdras like Sūta and Vidura obtained the highest knowledge by virtue of their previous life. Through a study of the Epics and the Purāṇas, through meditation (japa), fasting (upavāsa), and worship of God (pūja) one can attain the Supreme. Every man from the simple fact of his manhood (puruṣamātra sambandhibhiḥ) is capable of reaching perfection.¹

The struggle for equality has been with us from the beginning of India's history. We have one evidence of it in the feud between Vasiṣṭha, the pillar of orthodoxy and the enemy of all innovation, and Viśvāmitra, the leader of the progressives and the champion of freedom and liberty. While the con-

¹ Śaṅkara on *Brahma Sūtra*, iii. 4. 38.

servative Vasiṣṭha wanted the Vedic religion to be confined solely to the Aryans, Viśvāmitra tried to universalise it. The movement of the Upaniṣads was in spirit a democratic one. Buddhism, as is well known, undermines all hierarchical ideas. Śaṅkara's philosophy was essentially democratic, and Rāmānuja honoured members of the Śūdra and the Pañcama classes as Ālvārs.

The Vedic rule of life was confined to the people who developed under the stimulus of experience recorded in the Vedas. Its forms are singularly well marked in type, and those of others were sufficiently unlike them so as to justify a distinction. Each group was allowed to work out its life unfettered by alien ideas which might confuse or obliterate its aim. But soon these special forms were regarded as a sort of spiritual monopoly, and ideas of superiority and inferiority developed. The institution of caste came into being for the development of society (*lokānām tu vivṛdhy artham*),¹ and the welfare of society to-day demands a breaking down of all suspicion of monopoly. With the general levelling up there will be a greater democratisation of the ideals. In the golden age only the Brahmins practised austerities, in the second both Brahmins and Kṣatriyas, in the third the three upper classes, and in the fourth all the four classes. In other words, the Hindu scriptures should be thrown open at the present day to all people irrespective of their caste or sex.

¹ *Manu*, i. 32.

We are now at the end of our course. We see that the Hindu recognises one supreme spirit, though different names are given to it. In his social economy he has many castes, but one society. In the population there are many races and tribes, but all are bound together by one common spirit. Though many forms of marriage are permitted, there is only one ideal aimed at. There is a unity of purpose underlying the multitudinous ramifications. It may perhaps be useful to conclude this course with a brief résumé of the central spirit of Hinduism and its application to the problems of religion and society.

The world which is a perpetual flow is not all. Its subjection to law and tendency to perfection indicate that it is based on a spiritual reality which is not exhausted in any particular object or group of objects. God is *in* the world, though not *as* the world. His creative activity is not confined to the significant stages in the evolutionary process. He does not merely intervene to create life or consciousness, but is working continuously. There is no dualism of the natural and the supernatural. The spiritual is an emergent of the natural in which it is rooted. The Hindu spirit is that attitude towards life which regards the endless variety of the visible and the temporal world as sustained and supported by the invisible and eternal spirit.

Evil, error and ugliness are not ultimate. Evil has reference to the distance which good has to traverse. Ugliness is half-way to beauty. Error

is a stage on the road to truth. They have all to be outgrown. No view is so utterly erroneous, no man is so absolutely evil as to deserve complete castigation. If one human soul fails to reach its divine destiny, to that extent the universe is a failure. As every soul is unlike all others in the world, the destruction of even the most wicked soul will create a void in God's scheme. There is no Hell, for that means there is a place where God is not, and there are sins which exceed his love. If the infinite love of God is not a myth, universal salvation is a certainty. But until it is achieved, we shall have error and imperfection. In a continuously evolving universe evil and error are inevitable, though they are gradually diminishing.

In religion, Hinduism takes its stand on a life of spirit, and affirms that the theological expressions of religious experience are bound to be varied. One metaphor succeeds another in the history of theology until God is felt as the central reality in the life of man and the world. Hinduism repudiates the belief resulting from a dualistic attitude that the plants in my garden are of God, while those in my neighbour's are weeds planted by the Devil which we should destroy at any cost. On the principle that the best is not the enemy of the good, Hinduism accepts all forms of belief and lifts them to a higher level. The cure for error is not the stake or the cudgel, not force or persecution, but the quiet diffusion of light.

In practical religion, Hinduism recognises that

there are those who wish to see God face to face, others who delight in the endeavour to know the truth of it all. Some find peace in action, others in non-action. A comprehensive religion guides each along his path to the common goal, as all woo the same goddess though with different gifts. We must not give supreme and sole importance to our specialty. Perfection can be attained as a celibate, or a householder, or an anchorite. A rigid uniform outlook is wrong. The saintliness of the holy man does not render the steadfastness of the devoted wife or the simple innocence of the child superfluous. The perfection of every type is divine. "Whatever is glorious, good, beautiful and mighty, understand that it goes forth from out of a fragment of my splendour." ¹

The law of Karma tells us that the individual life is not a term, but a series. Fresh opportunities will be open to us until we reach the end of the journey. The historical forms we assume will depend on our work in the past. Heaven and Hell are higher and lower stages in one continuous movement. They are not external to the experiencing individuals. Purification is by means of purgation. The wages of sin is suffering. We need not regard sin as original and virtue as vicarious. We should do our duty in that state of life to which we happen to be called. Most of us have not a free hand in selecting our vocation. Freedom consists in making the best of what we

¹ *Bhagavadgītā*, x. 41.

have, our parentage, our physical nature and mental gifts. • Every kind of capacity, every form of vocation, if rightly used, will lead us to the centre.

While the ideal of monogamy is held up as the best means for a complete mental and spiritual as well as physical understanding between husband and wife, other forms were permitted in view of the conditions of people with different ideals and interests, habits and desires. A happy marriage requires to be made by slow steps and with much patient effort. If incompatibility of temper is enough to justify divorce, many of us will be divorced. • While women's functions are distinguished from those of men, there is no suggestion of their inferiority.

• While caste has resulted in much evil, there are some sound principles underlying it. Our attitude to those whom we are pleased to call primitive must be one of sympathy. The task of the civilised is to respect and foster the live impulses of backward communities and not destroy them. Society is an organism of different grades, and human activities differ in kind and significance. But each of them is of value so long as it serves the common end. Every type has its own nature which should be followed. No one can be at the same time a perfect saint, a perfect artist, and a perfect philosopher. Every definite type is limited by boundaries which deprive it of other possibilities. The worker should realise his potentialities through his work, and should perform it in a spirit of service

to the common weal. Work is craftsmanship and service.⁵ Our class conflicts are due to the fact that a warm living sense of unity does not bind together the different groups.

These are some of the central principles of the Hindu faith. If Hinduism lives to-day, it is due to them, but it lives so little. Listlessness reigns now where life was once like a bubbling spring. We are to-day drifting, not advancing, waiting for the future to turn up. There is a lack of vitality, a spiritual flagging. Owing to our political vicissitudes, we ignored the law of growth. In the great days of Hindu civilisation it was quick with life, crossing the seas, planting colonies, teaching the world as well as learning from it. In sciences and arts, in trade and commerce it was not behind the most advanced nations of the world till the middle of this millennium. To-day we seem to be afraid of ourselves, and are therefore clinging to the shell of our religion for self-preservation. The envelope by which we try to protect life checks its expansion. The bark which protects the interior of a tree must be as living as that which it contains. It must not stifle the tree's growth, but must expand in response to the inner compulsion. An institution appropriate and wholesome for one stage of human development becomes inadequate and even dangerous when another stage has been reached. The cry of conservatism "it has always been thus" ignores the fundamentals of the theory of relativity in philosophy and practice, in taste and morals,

in politics and society, of which the ancient Hindus had a clear grasp. The notion that in India time has stood still for uncounted centuries, and nought has been changed since the primeval sea dried up, is altogether wrong. While there has been continuity with the past, there has also been progress. The Upaniṣads are products of a perfectly spiritual movement which implicitly superseded the cruder ceremonial religion of the Vedas. When the movement of the Upaniṣads became lost in dogmatic controversies, when the fever of disputes and dialectics lulled the free spirit of religion, Buddhism called upon the people to adhere to the simplicity of truth and the majesty of the moral law. About the same period, when canonical culture and useless learning made religion inhuman scholasticism, and filled those learned in this difficult trifling with ridiculous pride, the *Bhagavadgītā* opened the gates of heaven to all those who are pure in heart. When the ritualists succeeded in imprisoning the living faith in rigid creeds, the true prophets of the spirit, the Śaiva and the Vaiṣṇava saints, and the theologians like Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, summoned the people to the worship of the living God. The influence of Madhva and Caitanya, Basava and Pāmānanda, Kabīr and Nānak is not inconsiderable. There has been no such thing as a uniform stationary unalterable Hinduism whether in point of belief or practice. Hinduism is a movement, not a position; a process, not a result; a growing tradition, not a fixed revelation. Its past history encourages us

to believe that it will be found equal to any emergency that the future may throw up, whether on the field of thought or of history.

After a long winter of some centuries, we are to-day in one of the creative periods of Hinduism. We are beginning to look upon our ancient faith with fresh eyes. We feel that our society is in a condition of unstable equilibrium. There is much wood that is dead and diseased that has to be cleared away. Leaders of Hindu thought and practice are convinced that the times require, not a surrender of the basic principles of Hinduism, but a restatement of them with special reference to the needs of a more complex and mobile social order. Such an attempt will only be the repetition of a process which has occurred a number of times in the history of Hinduism. The work of readjustment is in process. Growth is slow when roots are deep. But those who light a little candle in the darkness will help to make the whole sky aflame.

INDEX

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p> Āgamas, 41
 <i>Agni Purāṇa</i>, 87
 Ānandagiri, 67
 <i>Āṅguttara Nikāya</i>, 56
 Aphrodite, 53
 Aristotle, 64, 83, 101, 119
 Ārya Samāj, 22, 38
 Ashoreth, 53
 Asoka, 56
 <i>Āśvālāyana</i>, 87
 <i>Atharva Veda</i>, 39
 Augustine, 35, 68
 <i>Autobiography of Devendra-
nath Tagore</i>, 34

 Basava, 129
 Bauddhāyana, 38, 81
 Bergson, 68
 Bernard, 26
 <i>Bhāṣya</i>, 117, 122, 38, 45, 73, 75,
 77, 111, 112, 121, 126, 129
 <i>Bhāgavata Purāṇa</i>, 92, 120
 <i>Bhāmātī</i>, 19, 66
 Boehme, 26, 36
 Bradley, 64, 68
 Brahmā, 27, 46, 47
 <i>Brahma Sūtra</i>, 22, 65, 67, 122
 Brahman, 31
 Brahmo Samāj, 22, 38
 <i>Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad</i>, 29,
 66, 72, 83
 Brhaspati, 81
 Browne, Professor, 36
 Buckle, 101 </p> | <p> Buddha, 28, 32, 46, 47, 53,
 56-7, 92, 97, 117, 129
 Buddhism, 22, 56, 91, 123, 129
 Burns, Mr., 54
 Burns, Robert, 42

 Caitanya, 22, 38, 129
 Catholics, 28
 Chirol, Mr. Valentine, 98
 Christ, 46
 Christianity, 19, 39, 34, 48,
 51, 55, 57, 91
 <i>Communion of the Christian
with God</i>, 35
 Croce, 21, 69

 Dakṣa, 40
 Darwin, 102
 Devala, 38, 81
 De Vries, 102
 Dionysius, 26
 Donaldson, 88
 Durgā, 44

 Eckhart, 26
 Einstein, 63
 Epics, 20, 39, 40, 121
 <i>Essentials of Mysticism</i>, 34

 <i>Folk-songs of Southern India,
The</i>, 47
 Francis, St., 28
 Frazer, Sir James, 53
 Freud, 83 </p> |
|---|---|

- Galton, 102
 Gandhi, 76
Gaṇḍavāha, 44
 Gautama, 81
Golden Bough, The, 53
 Gover, 47
 Greeks, 102
- Hanumān, 39
Haristuti, 47
Harivaṃś Smṛiti, 83
 Harsa, 57
 Hebrews, 28, 57
 • Hegel, 68 •
 Heraclitus, 56
 Hermann, 34
 Hosea, 44
- Indra, 40
India: Old and New, 98
Indian Antiquary, 110
 Inge, Dean, 60
 Isaiah, 44
 Isis, 53
 Islam, 55
 Israel, 55
- Jacks, Principal, 11
 Jackson, Mr., 110
 James, 47
 Jainism, 22
 Jayatirtha, 17
 Jesus, 10, 44, 51, 73, 117
 John, St., 34
- Kāhīr, 22, 120
 Kābirpanthis, 38
 Kāh, 44, 46
 Kālīya, 39
 Kātyāyana, 38
Kena Upaniṣad, 26
 Kṛṣṇa, 32, 38, 39, 40, 45, 46,
 97, 120
- Kṣudrakamalākara, 44
Kūrma Purāṇa, 14
- Lātyāyana, 38
 Leibniz, 68
 Locke, 102
- Madhva, 120
Mahābhārata, 23, 29, 44, 83
 120
 Mahammad, 28
Mahmānastara, 21
Mayjhima Nikāya, 50
 Manchester College, 11
 Manu, 81, 85-6, 91-2, 101, 120
 Mariolatry, 53
 Māyā, 28, 61-70
 Medhātithi, 92
 Mill, J. S., 65
 Muslims, 34
- Naiyāyikas, 47
 Nānak, 22, 120
 Needham, 48
Nyāyasūdhā, 17
- Oxford History of India*, 14
- Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa*, 38
Parāśara Samhitā, 83
 Parsees, 56
 Pāsupata, 21
 Paul, St., 34
 Pentateuch, 44
People of India, The, 55
 Plato, 36, 68, 101
Platonic Tradition in Eng. sh
Religious Thought, The, 60
 Plotinus, 34
Popular Science Siftings, 103
 Pragmatists, 24
 Protestants, 28
Puruṣa Sūktā, 107

- Rāma, 3-, 39, 40, 97
 Rāmākṛṣṇa, 28
 Rāmānanda, 22, 129
 Rāmānuja, 122, 129
 Rāmāyaṇa, 83, 86
Rg Veda, 13, 20, 29, 39, 77, 87, 88
 Risley, Sir Herbert, 54
 Rousseau, 101
 Russell, Mrs. Bertrand, 89
 Ruysbroeck, 26
 Śaktas, 28
Śaktigītā, 50
 Śaṅkara, 34, 47, 62-70, 121, 122, 129
 Śāṅkīya, 21
 Satī, 40
 Sāyana, 83, 88
Science, Religion and Reality, 48
 Sikhs, 38
 Śiva, 27, 37, 40, 46, 47, 57, 84
 Smith, John, 27
 Smith, Vincent, 14
 Spencer, Herbert, 64
 Spinoza, 51
 Sthānuravi, 57
Sūta Nipāta, 56
Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, 61, 73
 Swift, 60
 Tagore, 36
Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, 17
Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa, 38
 Tantras, 121
 Tārā, 53
Taittirīya Upaniṣad, 81
 Theognis, 102
 Trinity, 24, 35
 Tukārām, 29-30
 Underhill, Miss Evelyn, 34
Upaniṣads, 22, 24, 26-7, 36, 60, 79-80, 122, 129
 Vedānta, 22-3
 Vedas, 10-21, 23, 40-1, 61, 84, 122, 129
 Vijayarāgaḍeva, 57
 Viṣṇānavāda, 65
 Viṣṇu, 27, 37, 46-7
 Vratyastoma, 38
 Webb, Professor Clement, 48
 Weismann, 102
 Wesley, 16
 Yahveh, 44
 Yājñavalkya, 26, 29, 61, 88
 Yoga, 21
 Yuan Chwang, 57



GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD
LONDON: 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C. 1
CAPE TOWN: 58-60 LONG STREET
TORONTO: 91 WELLINGTON STREET WEST
BOMBAY: 15 GRAHAM ROAD, BALLARD ESTATE
CALCUTTA: 17 CENTRAL AVENUE, P.O. DHARAMTALA,
WELLINGTON, N.Z.: 8 KINGS CRESCENT, LOWER HUTT
SYDNEY, N.S.W.: BRADBURY HOUSE, 55 YORK STREET

By the same Author

Indian Philosophy

Demy 8vo.

2 Vols.

Vol. I (*Revised Edition*) 25s. Vol. II (*Revised Second Edition*) 30s.

"An intellectual achievement of the first rank, and may be regarded as authoritative."—*New Statesman*

"We are fortunate in that Professor Radhakrishnan is evidently deeply read in the philosophy of the West, and shows considerable acquaintance with general Western literature; a happy blend of Eastern conceptions with Western terminology makes the book intelligible even to the inexpert, and, it need hardly be added, instructive."—*Times*

The Bhagavadgītā

La. Cr. 8vo.

10s. 6d.

In the re-spiritualization of the world, the Bhagavadgītā will have a considerable influence. Professor Radhakrishnan, the greatest living interpreter of Indian thought, and who is equally at home in the European and Asiatic traditions of thought, provides an authoritative and inspiring guide to the meaning and message of the Bhagavadgītā. This volume gives us the Sanscrit text, an English translation and an original commentary which may well become a classic on the subject.

Religion and Society

Demy 8vo.

10s. 6d.

"A highly stimulating and deeply satisfying book. If one wishes to see the great problems that face mankind to-day through the eyes of one steeped in both the wisdom of the East and the philosophy of the West, there is probably no one more competent to give us that insight than Professor Radhakrishnan."—*Inquirer*

An Idealist View of Life

By S. RADHAKRISHNAN

HIBBERT LECTURES, 1929

Demy 8vo.

Revised Second Edition

Cloth 10s. 6d.

This book contains the Hibbert Lectures delivered in London and Manchester under the title "An Idealist View of Life" and is devoted to a vindication of the idealist attitude in a changing world. After a brief survey of modern challenge to religion, the proposed substitutes of naturalism, humanism, etc., are criticized. The main part of the book deals with the outlines of a spiritual philosophy which is as much opposed to scientific naturalism as to religious dogmatism. Speaking from the rich religious background of India, the author emphasizes throughout the need for an adequate appreciation of the natural profundity of the human soul.

Contemporary Indian Philosophy

Edited by S. RADHAKRISHNAN and J. H. MUIRHEAD

Demy 8vo.

16s.

The great Vedānta tradition, combined with the stimulus to philosophic thought coming from contact with Western systems, has roused new interest in speculative philosophy on the continent of India, and much that is now being produced in the universities and elsewhere is coming to us with a stamp of its own and with an intrinsic importance for students of philosophy. This volume is a continuation of the series recently published in the Library of Philosophy in Contemporary British and Contemporary American Philosophy and contains among others contributions from such well-known writers as Rabindranath Tagore, Das Gupta, Radhakrishnan, with a short Foreword by the General Editor of the Library.

Sense and Thought

A STUDY IN MYSTICISM

By GRETA HORT, M.A., Ph.D.

La. Crown 8vo

8s. 6d.

In special connection with the Cloud of Unknowing, the author investigates the working of the mind in various types of experiences, showing how sense and thought, conation and cognition, practice and theory, work together, as well in secular as in religious experiences; that in each type of experience reality presents itself to man, but that while secular experiences are partial, religious experiences are whole experiences. The phenomenon of ecstasy is discussed as being a normal mode of thinking. She discusses the love of God, the conception of God as law, the relation between the transcendent and the immanent, and concludes by showing that the conception of the Absolute is inherent in one type of Christianity.

All Prices are Net

LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD

